Howcroft v. City of Peabody (2001)

Laws ch. 12, § 11H); see also Andre-sen v. Diorio, 349 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2003); Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2002)(“The MCRA provides a cause of action for any person whose rights under the Constitution, federal law, or state law have been interfered with by threats, intimidation, or coercion of another.”); Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 740 , 780 N.E.2d 926, 934 (2002); Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 745 (2001)(“The …

Instead, Thornton does insist that her MDR claim should be reimagined as a claim brought pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"), which provides a "mechanism for obtaining relief from the interference, or attempted interference, with rights conferred by Federal or Massachusetts law." Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 745 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).

Where it has, "Massachusetts courts have required 'a pattern of harassment and intimidation.'" Id. (quoting Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)) (finding repeated verbal harassment, relocation of work site, and multiple failed attempts to suspend plaintiff without pay and deprive him of benefits supported a MCRA claim)).

Liability cannot be founded upon mere insults, threats, or annoyances" (citation omitted). 5 Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 596 (2001).

Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1 , 11 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the “Town is also entitled to summary judgment on the MCRA claim because under Massachusetts law a municipality cannot be sued under the MCRA”) (citing Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-92 (2001)); Fletcher v. Szostkiewicz, 190 F. Supp. 2d 217, 230 (D.

At the very least, however, “Massachusetts courts have required ‘a pattern of harassment and intimidation’ to support a finding of non-physical coercion under the MCRA.” Thomas, 909 F.3d at 493 (quoting Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)); see Mason v. Cent.

“The qualified immunity principles developed under § 1988 apply equally to claims under the MCRA.” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 595 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (2001).

Id.; Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 744-45 (2001). .

See Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (2001) (“[W]e conclude that a municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.”).

Anzalone v. Administrative Office of the Trial Ct., 457 Mass. at 660 ; Howcraft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 597 (2001).

See Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989); Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).

Laws ch. 258, § 10 (c), which precludes the imposition of municipal liability for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, [and] intentional emotional distress ….” See Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 747 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (dismissing the plaintiff’s IIED claim against the city pursuant to Mass. Gen.

Claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities. "[T]o avoid a State's sovereign immunity to a damages suit, a plaintiff must sue the State official in his individual and not his official capacity." O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 415 Mass. 132 , 141 n.13 (1993) (holding that damages are only available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against State officials if sued in their individual capacities); Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 593, 596 (2…

We are skeptical that the board is a proper defendant for such a claim, see Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-592 (2001) ("persons" covered by MCRA are "corporations, societies, associations and partnerships" [citation omitted]; no indication term includes political subdivisions), but need not resolve the issue because we understand Barros's claims to be focused on Pittman and Samuels's to be focused on Gibson, neither of whom was a member of the board. [13] So…

“To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintif[f] must be able to establish ‘(1) that the defendant intended to cause, or should have known that [its] conduct would cause, emotional distress; (2) that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that [it] caused the plaintiff[’s] distress; and (4) that the plaintif[f] suffered severe distress.’” Jones v. Maloney, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 745, 750 (2009) (bracketed text altered) (quot…

However, courts have typically found that a finding of non-physical coercion “require[s] ‘a pattern of harassment and intimidation[.]’” Id. at 493 (citing Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).

L. c. 12, §§ 11H-11J, or the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , both of which allow claims against only those defendants who are "persons." DCF does not qualify as a "person" under either statute. "[T]here is no indication in the MCRA that the word 'person' includes either the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions." Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 592 (2001). "[I]t is a widely accepted rule of statutory construction that general words in a s…

Mass. 2001) (finding that “the MCRA does not permit holding a municipality liable under the theory of vicarious liability.”) Plaintiff counters that defendants’ argument “regarding the absence of municipal liability under the MCRA has never been endorsed by the [Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court][.]” (#476 at 9.) Yet this proposition, articulated by the Massachusetts Appeals Court in Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), is one which has …

However, courts have typically found that a finding of non-physical coercion “require[s] ‘a pattern of harassment and intimidation[.]’” Id. at 493 (citing Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).

“The MCRA creates no substantive rights; rather, it provides a mechanism for obtaining relief from the interference, or attempted interference, with rights conferred by Federal or Massachusetts law.” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 594 (2001).

Fitchburg then argues, and the Court agrees, that “a municipality cannot be sued under the MCRA.” [ECF No. 9 at 7 (quoting Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1 , 11 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (concluding that a municipality is not a “person” within the terms of the MCRA)))].5 Summers, in his response, states that he “has set forth [a] cause[] of action . . . under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for Conspiracy to Violate Civi…

Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1 , 11 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)).

Like § 1983, the MCRA is not a source of substantive rights but only a “mechanism for obtaining relief from the interference, or attempted interference, with rights conferred by Federal or Massachusetts law.”7 Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 745 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).

The First Circuit has cautioned that “the exception for claims based on non-physical coercion remains a narrow one” and that “Massachusetts courts have required ‘a pattern of harassment and intimidation’ to support a finding of non-physical coercion under the MCRA.” Thomas, 909 F.3d at 492–93 (quoting Nolan v. CN8, 656 F.3d 71, 77-78 (1st Cir. 2011); and then citing Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 594 (2001)).

Defendants' cross motion for summary judgment. "[T]he defendants, as the moving parties, have assumed 'the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue, even if [they] would have no burden on an issue if the case were to go to trial,' and demonstrating further that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 583 (2001), quoting Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass.…

“To be considered extreme and outrageous, the defendant’s conduct must be beyond all bounds of decency and . . . utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 747 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

“Massachusetts courts have required ‘a pattern of harassment and intimidation’ to support a finding of non-physical coercion under the MCRA.” Id. (quoting Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 594 (2001)).

Id. at 493 (quoting Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)).

“Massachusetts courts have required ‘a pattern of harassment and intimidation’ to support a finding of non-physical coercion under the MCRA.” Thomas, 909 F.3d at 493 (quoting Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 594 (2001)).

Def.’s Mem. 5 [#16] (citing Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 593 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 745 (2001)).

In order to prevail on this claim, Bertram must demonstrate “(1) that the defendant intended to cause, or should have known that his conduct would cause, emotional distress; (2) that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered severe distress.” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 747 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting Cady v. Marcella, 729 N.E.2d 1125, 1131 (Mas…

M.G.L. c. 12 § 11H; Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).

Plaintiff is not an at-will employee. coercion under the MCRA.” Thomas, 909 F.3d at 493 (quoting Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 594 (2001)).

Second, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has held that “a municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the [MCRA].” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-92 (2001).

However, the Appeals Court has held that “a municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the [MCRA].” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-92 (2001).

Massachusetts courts hold that, unlike under § 1983, a “municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-92 (2001).

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (“[A] State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) (state school not subject to suit under § 1983); Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1 , 11 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[U]nder Massachusetts law a municipality cannot be sued under the MRCA”); Williams v. O’Brien, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 173 (2010) (“[T]he Commonwealth, including its agencies, is not a ‘per…

Liability cannot be founded upon mere insults, threats, or annoyances.” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 596 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 747 (2001) (quoting Cady v. Marcella, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 340-41 , 729 N.E.2d 1125, 1131 (2000)) (additional citations and internal punctuation omitted).

The Town, School District, and Individual Defendants in their official capacities move for summary judgment on the ground that municipal entities are not subject to liability under the MCRA. “[A] municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the [MCRA].” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (2001); see also Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1 , 11 n. 9 (1st Cir.2002).

Liability cannot be founded upon mere insults, threats, or annoyances.” Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 596 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 747 (2001) (quoting Cady v. Marcella, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 334, 340-41 , 729 N.E.2d 1125, 1131 (2000)) (additional citations and internal punctuation omitted).

Under Massachusetts law, “a municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act[.]” How- croft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 591-92 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 744 (2001).

Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 744-45 (2001). .

Contrast Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 586-87 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 741 (2001) (while complaints about failure to enforce no-smoking statute at police station contained elements of a personal grievance, the “decisive portion” of the complaint raised issue of public concern for failure to comply with the law).

Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573 , 747 N.E.2d 729, 747 (2001) (MTCA bars the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against city and “like claims” against police department officers).

Ct. 573, 596, 747 N.E.2d 729, 747 (2001)) (additional citation omitted).

Howcraft v. Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 596 (2001).

See Saxonis v. Lynn, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 916, 918 (2004) (public employee sued in official capacity for intentional tort immune under G.L.c. 258, § 10(c)), review denied, 443 Mass. 1104 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 819 (2005); Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 596 (2001) (affirming dismissal, under G.L.c. 258, §10(c), of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against public employee sued in official capacity); see also Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 Mas…

The court also notes the MTCA would preclude the plaintiffs assertion of his intentional tort claims (intentional interference with business relations and abuse of process) against both the City, see G.L.c. 258, §10(c) (precluding public employer liability for employee’s intentional torts), and the individual defendants acting in their official capacities, see Saxonis v. Lynn, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 916, 918 (2004) (stating public employee sued in official capacity for intentional …

City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 596 (2001).

Forastiere v. Breault, 485 U.S. 906 (1988); Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 595 (2001) (“qualified immunity principles . . . under § 1983 apply equally to claims under [the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act]”).