Cluster 661469 (1994)

Pa. , 14 F.3d 848 , 857 (3d Cir. 1994) ("We must look to the language of the Supreme Court's opinion to see what it intend[s]....").

The “[l]aw of the case rules have developed ‘to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.’” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir.l994)(quoting CHARLES A, WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.

“On remand, a trial court is free ‘to make any order or direction in further progress of the case, not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court, as to any question not settled by the decision.’ ” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Bankers Trust Co., 761 F.2d at 950 ).

Casey, 14 F.3d at 857; Litman v. Mass. Mut.

“Law of the case rules have developed ‘to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.’ ” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir.1994). “[A]n inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court.” Id.

Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 855 (3d Cir.1994) ("Unlike a denial, a grant of injunctive relief subjects the losing party to contempt, and provides some or all of the relief sought by the claimant, two of the key features we identified in Cohen as justifying an interlocutory appeal."); Ross v. Zavarella, 916 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir.1990); Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1467 .

Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 855 (3d Cir.1994) (“Unlike a denial, a grant of injunctive relief subjects the losing party to contempt, and provides some or all of the relief sought by the claimant, two of the key features we identified in Cohen as justifying an interlocutory appeal.”); Ross v. Zavarella, 916 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir.1990); Cohen, 867 F.2d at 1467.

Because the District Court did not have the benefit of the Campbell decision when it imposed upon PSM a punitive damages award, see, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856-57 (3d Cir.1994) (discussing generally the mandate rule and the Supreme Court’s mandate to lower courts), we vacate the District Court’s Memorandum and Order filed January 4, 2002 and remand to the District Court for a determination on the punitive damages issue in…

Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir.1994).

Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994).

Casey v. Planned Parenthood, supra, 14 F.3d at 854; Stricklin v. Regents, 420 F.2d 1257 , 1259 (7th Cir.1970).

Casey v. Planned Parenthood, supra, 14 F.3d at 854; Stricklin v. Regents, 420 F.2d 1257 , 1259 (7th Cir.1970).

Casey, 14 F.3d at 856.

Casey, 14 F.3d at 856.

Casey, 14 F.3d at 856.

Id. at 853-54 (summarizing history of the case).

Casey, 14 F.3d at 861 (“At a minimum, we believe the Court meant that other state abortion laws require individualized application of the undue burden standard.”); see also Schafer, 507 U.S. at 1014 , 113 S.Ct. at 1669 (O’Connor, J., concurring in denial of stay) (lower courts should have examined factual record specifically in determining whether law created undue burden).

Casey, 14 F.3d at 856.

Compare In re Brauer, 80 B.R. 903, 912 (N.D.Ill.1987); In re Great American Pyramid Joint Venture, 144 B.R. 780, 793 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1992); and In re Rose, 86 B.R. 439, 442 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988) (all concluding that creditor consensus is relevant to the BICT analysis), with Superior Siding, supra, 14 F.3d at 243; and Staff, supra, 146 B.R. at 261 (both concluding that majority rule is not a substitute for the BICT and even may be of minor significance). 3.The K.P. presented so…

Put differently, a district court may only enter orders that are “not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court.” McBride v. Int’l Longshoremen's Ass’n, 778 F.3d 453, 458 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir. 1994)); Chambers, 148 F.3d at 225 .

It is well recognized, for example, that a district court may depart from an appellate court’s mandate when there is an intervening change in controlling law.61 Other exceptional circumstances may justify a departure, as in the case of new evidence becoming available, or where applying the mandate rule would cause manifest injustice or disserve judicial economy, but such circumstances must be shown to be clear and compelling.62 Similarly, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, …

When an appellate court “adopts a new legal standard * * * on * * * [some] occasions, it applies the new standard itself and decides the merits.” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.1994). 5 And federal appellate courts have used that approach in a wide array of cases, including antitrust claims. {¶ 75} In MCI Communications Corp. v. Am.

Casey, 14 F.3d at 857 (reviewing the history of the mandate rule).

Casey, 14 F.3d at 857 (reviewing the history of the mandate rule).

In rendering our decision, we are bound by the doctrine of the law of the case to “implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and the circumstances it embraces.” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir.1985)).

Feb. 4, 1988) (“The law of the case doctrine directs the Court to give great deference to matters previously decided in a case, particularly where the prior ruling was made by a different judge in the same court.” (footnote and citations omitted)); Casey v. Planned Parenthood of SE Pa., 14 F.3d 848 , 856 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Other law of the case rules apply to subsequent rulings by the same judge in the same case or a closely related one, to rulings by different judges at …

Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 859-60 (3d Cir.1994) (“The Commonwealth argues that the Supreme Court’s decision to affirm in part and reverse in part rather than to vacate our decision demonstrates that it did not contemplate further substantive proceedings in the district court....

The rule has developed “to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing [case].” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.

“Law of the case rules have developed ‘to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.’ ” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Charles A. Wright et al., 18 Federal Rules and Practice § 4478 (1981)).

Continental, 236 B.R. at 322 (citing Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.1994)).

Generally, “ ‘an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court.’ ” State v. Collier, 263 Kan. 629 , 952 P.2d 1326, 1331 (1998) (quoting Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir. 1994)).

Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.1994).

The statutory authority for the power of the appellate courts dates from the first Judiciary Act of 1789 and is now found in 28 U.S.C. § 2106 .’ Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir. 1994) (footnotes omitted.) ‘The so-called “mandate rule” is simply a subspecies of the venerable “law of the case” doctrine, a staple of our common law as old as the Republic. . . .’ Federated Rural Electric Insurance Corp. v. Arkansas Electric Coope…

The Court is bound, of course, to implement “both the letter and spirit” of the Third Circuit’s mandate, “taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and the circumstances it embraces.” Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.) (Scirica, J.) (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir.1985), stay of mandate denied, 510 U.S. 1309 , 114 S.Ct. 909 , 127 L.Ed.2d 352 (1994)).

Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir. *1517 1994) (footnotes omitted). 64 “The so-called ‘mandate rule’ is simply a subspecies of the venerable ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a staple of our common law as old as the Repub-lic_” Federated Rural Electric Insurance Corp. v. Arkansas Electric Cooperatives, Inc., 896 F.Supp. 912, 914 (E.D.Ark.1995) (citation omitted).

Casey, 14 F.3d at 857.

In contrast, the Third Circuit in Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 (3rd Cir.1994) (“Casey II ”), stated that the Supreme Court in Casey had “set a new standard for facial challenges to pre-viability abortion laws.” Id. at 863, n. 21.

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F. 3d 848 , 863, n. 21 (1994).

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F. 3d 848 , 863, n. 21 (1994).

A component of this general doctrine 9 is referred to as the “mandate rule,” which “instructs an inferi- or court to comply with the instructions of a superior court on remand.” Id., at 40; accord Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir.1994).

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 , 857 (3d Cir. 1994).

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood , 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994).

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F.3d 848 , 857 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir.1985) (citations omitted)) (“It is axiomatic that on remand for further proceedings after decision by an appellate court, the trial court must proceed in accordance with the mandate and the law of the case as established on appeal”). 4 In that Order, this court determined that: • the principal balance of FBCC’s cl…

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F.3d 848 (3rd Cir.1994).” Civ.

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F. 3d 848 , 857 (3d Cir.1994) ("The mandate rule applies... only to those issues that were decided by the appellate court.").

See Casey *384 v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 , 856-57 (3d Cir.1994)(examining role of Supreme Court precedent); Loftus v. SEPTA, 843 F.Supp. 981, 984 (E.D.Pa.1994)(same); Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420, 437-38 (E.D.Pa.1993).

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F.3d 848 , 863 n. 21 (3d Cir.) (stating in dicta that “the [Supreme] Court has, in this case, set a new standard for facial challenges to pre-viability abortion laws” by requiring “only that a plaintiff show an abortion regulation would be an undue burden ‘in a large fraction of the cases’ ”), stay denied, 510 U.S. 1309 , 114 S.Ct. 909 , 127 L.Ed.2d 352 (1994).

See, Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 , 863 n. 21 (3rd Cir.1994); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 , 1458 (8th Cir.1995); and Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2453 , 138 L.Ed.2d 211 (1997).

See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 , 856-57 (3d Cir.), stay denied, 510 U.S. 1309 , 114 S.Ct. 909 , 127 L.Ed.2d 352 (1994).

See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 822 F.Supp. 227 (E.D.Pa.1993) (allowing presentation of additional evidence to apply "undue burden” standard), rev’d, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir.1994), stay denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 909 , 127 L.Ed.2d 352 (1994) (Souter, J., in chambers). 6 .