Borden, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (1994)

Instead, the Board held the Company violated the Act “by insisting as a price for any collective-bargaining agreement that its employees give up their statutory rights to be properly represented by the Union.” In other words, the Company’s rigid adherence throughout negotiations to a battery of contract proposals undermining “the Union’s ability to function as the employees’ bargaining representative” demonstrated it “could not seriously have expected meaningful collective b…

See Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 19 F.3d 502 , 507 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ompensatory civil contempt 20 allows an aggrieved debtor to obtain compensatory damages, 21 attorneys fees, and the offending creditor’s compliance with the 22 discharge injunction.”); Nash v. Clark Cnty.

Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 135 , 56 S.Ct. 397 , 80 L.Ed. 528 (1936) (explaining that agency ruling interpreting statute “is no more retroactive in its operation than is a judicial determination construing and applying a statute to a case in hand”); Farmers Telephone Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 184 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.1999); McKenzie v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1216, 1222 (8th Cir.1986) (“An interpretive rule ... clarifies or explains existing law or …

This court uses “a five-factor balancing test to determine whether an agency’s ruling should be applied retroactively.” Borden, 19 F.3d at 511.

The Supreme Court held that while the successor was obligated to recognize and bargain with the incumbent union, it was not bound by the substantive provisions of the agreement which the predecessor had negotiated and to which the successor had not consented.9 Id. at 281-82 ; see Borden, Inc. v. NLRB, 19 F.3d 502 , 509 (10th Cir. 1994); NLRB v. Tricor Prod., Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 269 (10th Cir. 1980).