Levy v. Local Union Number 810 (1994)

Even though not formally promulgated as regulations, these opinion letters, as the views of the agency charged with implementing ERISA, are at least “ ‘a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,’ ” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 , 118 S.Ct. 2196 , 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 , 65 S.Ct. 161 , 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)); see also MDPhysicians & Assocs., Inc. v. State Bd. of…

Rather, in an analogous context, we specifically have held that in Title VII cases, “a district court awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant should consider . . . as a limiting factor, the plaintiff’s financial resources.” Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir. 1982); cf. Baker v. Alderman, 158 20 F.3d 516 , 529 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] district court must consider financial ability in the award of sanctions.”).

Levy, 20 F.3d at 518.

O’Neil v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO General, Inc., 37 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Levy v. Local Union Number 810, 20 F.3d 516, 519 [2d Cir.1994]).

O'Neil v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO General, Inc., 37 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Levy v. Local Union Number 810, 20 F.3d 516, 519 [2d Cir.1994]).

Courts have held that, even in the absence of wrongdoing by particular trustees, trust agreements that “excessively protect fund trustees from removal” violate ERISA “because they insulate trastees from responsibility for failure to carry out their fiduciary duties.” Levy v. Local Union No. 810, 20 F.3d 516, 519 (2d Cir.1994).

“In general,” the Court explained, “‘trust agreements that excessively protect fund trustees from removal violate [these] fiduciary mandates of ERISA because they insulate trustees from responsibility for failure to carry out their fiduciary duties.’” Id. (quoting Levy v. Local Union Number 810, 20 F.3d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1994)).

Further, as the Court also previously stated, the applicable statutes setting forth the purposes of the applicable ERISA statute and the obligations of the parties, are commendable and clear. 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (c)(1) states, in pertinent part, that “the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of admi…

See Levy v. Local Union Number 810, 20 F.3d 516, 519 (2d Cir.1994).

See Levy v. Local Union Number 810, 20 F.3d 516, 519 (2d Cir.1994).

TaftHartley Funds, of course, are welfare and benefit funds for union members that are jointly administered by employer-designated and union-designated trustees, pursuant to federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (c)(5)(B); see Levy v. Local Union Number 810, 20 F.3d 516, 517-18 (2d Cir.1994) (describing the general framework of Taft-Hartley Funds).

See Levy, 20 F.3d at 520 .

See Levy v. Local Union No. 810, 20 F.3d 516 , 519 (2d Cir.1994). 3 To permit ERISA fund trustees to remain in office contrary to the wishes of the highest authority in their appointing organization would turn ERISA funds into potentially independent sources of power, contrary to the objectives of both ERISA and §§ 301 and 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act ( 29 U.S.C. §§ 185 , 186).