Cluster 669670 (1994)

See Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 20 (3d Cir. 1993); but cf. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 780-83 . 6 Especially relevant here is the case of Leucadia, in which we held that "there is a presumptive right of public access to pretrial motions of a nondiscovery nature, whether preliminary or dispositive, and the material filed in connection therewith." 998 F.2d at 164 . 29 In the present case, the District Court's auction procedure transformed the bids into judicial records.

See Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 20 (3d Cir.1993); but cf. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 780-83 . 6 Especially relevant here is the case of Leucadia, in which we held that “there is a presumptive right of public access to pretrial motions of a nondiscov- ery nature, whether preliminary or dispos-itive, and the material filed in connection therewith.” 998 F.2d at 164 .

See Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 20 (3d Cir. 1993); but cf. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 780-83 .6 Especially relevant here is the case of Leucadia, in which we held that "there is a presumptive right of public access to pretrial motions of a _________________________________________________________________ 6.

But see Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3d Cir.1994).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790 ("The appropriate approach in considering motions to modify confidentiality orders is to use the same balancing test that is used in determining whether to grant such orders in the first instance . . . .").

Id. at 789-90 ("In determining whether to modify an already-existing confidentiality order, the parties' reliance on the order is a relevant factor.").

Id. at 789-90 (“In determining whether to modify an already-existing confidentiality order, the parties’ reliance on *112 the order is a relevant factor.”)- In Pansy , the Court made it clear that, in considering motions to modify protective orders, the district courts were to follow the same balancing test used in deciding whether to grant them, “with one difference: one of the factors the court should consider ... is the reliance by the original parties on the confidential…

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 783 ("We review the grant or modification of a confidentiality order for abuse of discretion.").

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 783 (“We review the grant or modification of a confidentiality order for abuse of discretion.”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790 (“The appropriate approach in considering motions to modify confidentiality orders is to use the same balancing test that is used in determining whether to grant such orders in the first instance . . . .”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788 (“[I]f a case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in favor of granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality.”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788 ("[I]f a case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in favor of granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality.").

See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[S]imply because courts have the power to grant orders of confidentiality does not mean that such orders may be granted arbitrarily.”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 791 (“Courts have discretion to fashion such orders according to the needs and circumstances of each case.”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 791 (“Courts have discretion to fashion such orders according to the needs and circumstances of each case.”).

Co. , 905 F.2d 1424 , 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (allowing intervention three years after a case was settled); see also Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. , 712 F.3d 1349 , 1353-54 (9th Cir. 2013) ; Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg , 23 F.3d 772 , 779 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he growing consensus among the courts of appeals [is] that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated.") 10 Alabama did not provide any deta…

A district court may not “‘rely on the general interest in encouraging settlement’ to justify the sealing of an agreement.” Id. (quoting Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194 ); Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788 (“District courts should not rely on the general interest in encouraging settlement, and should require a particularized showing of the need for confidentiality in reaching a settlement.”).

See, e.g., 23 F.3d at 785 (“Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of such orders, or the countervailing public interests which are sacrificed by the orders.”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 784 (“It is well-established that a district court retains the power to modify or lift confidentiality orders that it has entered.”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 784 ("It is well-established that a district court retains the power to modify or lift confidentiality orders that it has entered."). 67 Accordingly, we reject appellants' request for the federal recognition of one or more evidentiary privileges derived from the Pennsylvania confidentiality provisions under which appellants have sought protection from discovery.

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (“As embarrassment is usually thought of as a nonmonetizable harm to individuals, it may be especially difficult for a business enterprise, whose primary measure of well-being is presumably monetizable, to argue for a protective order on this ground.”) (citing Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121 ).

See, e.g., Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (“As embarrassment is usually thought of as a nonmonetizable harm to individuals, it may be especially difficult for a business enterprise, whose primary measure of well-being is presumably monetizable, to argue for a protective order on this ground.”) (citing Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121 ).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (“The public’s interest is particularly legitimate and important where, as in this case, at least one of the parties to the action is a public entity or official.”); see also McKenna, 2000 WL 1521604 , at *2 (“Evidence of discrimination within the ranks may be an indication of the treatment received by the public at-large.”).

See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d at 790 (“ ‘[r]eliance will be less with a blanket order, because it is by nature overinclusive’ ”) (quoting Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins.

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788 (“[I]f a case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in favor of granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality.”).

See Tribune-Review Publishing Co., 574 Pa. at 673, 833 A.2d at 119 (stating that although courts have “essentially acknowledged the possibility that disclosure might chill future attempts to resolve disputes, they generally concluded that this risk must yield to the public’s right to know.”); Pansy, 23 F.3d at 792 (“Neither the interests of parties in settling cases, nor the interests of the ... court in cleaning their dockets, can be said to outweigh the important values ma…

“Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning do not support a good cause showing.” Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994).

See In re Avandia, 924 F.3d at 671–72 (explaining that the sixth factor looks to “whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official”); see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (“The public's interest is particularly legitimate and important where, as in this case, at least one of the parties to the action is a public entity or official.”).

The Court denied Salyers’ Motion, explaining that while he is “entitled to use these confidential documents to advance his own interests in the Salyers litigation, his Motion [was] procedurally improper because it [was] essentially one made on behalf of non-parties and their interests in a separate proceeding in state court.” See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he procedural device of permissive intervention is appropriately used to enab…

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 779 (“[I]ntervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place [even] long after a case has been terminated.”).

The Piazzas’ bald assertion to the contrary—without analysis or citation to legal authority—has not convinced the Court otherwise. 22 See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788 (“[I]f a case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in favor of granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality.”). 23 Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178, 183 (Pa. Super. 2002); see also But this public interest…

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (“[t]he injury must be shown with specificity”).

Pansy, 23 F.3d at 778 (“By virtue of the fact that the Newspapers challenge the validity of the Order of Confidentiality . . . they meet the requirement of Fed.

See In re Avandia, 924 F.3d at 671 ; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (“[P]rivacy interests are 9 diminished when the party seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate public scrutiny.”).

See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788 (“On the other hand, if a case involves private litigants, and concerns matters of little legitimate public interest, that should be a factor weighing in favor of granting or maintaining an order of confidentiality.”) B.

Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples . . . will not suffice.” Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995); see also In re Avandia, 924 F.3d at 672 ; LEAP Sys., Inc., 638 F.3d at 222 ; Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2005) (a “broad, unsubstantiated allegation of harm . . . does not support a showing of good cause”); Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (“Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a clearly …

Jd; see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is well-established that a party wishing to obtain an order of protection over discovery material must demonstrate that ‘good cause’ exists ....”). ““Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure.

Some factors which do not support the finding of a compelling interest and weigh against sealing include if: “(1) the party benefitting from the [seal] is a public entity or official; (2) the information sought to be sealed relates to a matter of public concern; and (3) the information sought to be sealed is relevant to other litigation and sharing it would promote fairness and efficiency.” Id. at 658 (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994)).

A party moving for such relief bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that subjecting the witness to a deposition “will work a clearly defined and serious injury.” Brockaway, 2019 WL 13551037 , at *1 (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994)).

Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples, however, will not suffice.” Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994)).

See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 , 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Good cause is established on a showing [with specificity] that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure.”) III.

Besides showing that the information qualifies for protection, the moving party must also show goodId c.asueese a flosor Preasntsryic vt.i nBgo rdoiussgehm oifn Sattrioound osbnu trhge ground that it would be harmed by its disclosure. , 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (“good cause must be demonstrated to justify the order.”).

Cf. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 784 (“It is well-established that a district court retains the power to modify or lift confidentiality orders that it has entered.”) 2 To avoid redundancy, however, the Court will incorporate any overlapping analysis of proposed redactions when they present identical concerns and produce the same result under the private and public interest factors. that the defendants demonstrated the requisite “good cause” to protect “confidential and sensitive” busin…

See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (“‘Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning,’ do not support a good cause showing.”) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 785 F.2d 1108 , 1121 (3d Cir. 1986))).

Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (allowing intervention three years after a case was settled), and citing Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 712 F.3d 1349 , 1353– 54 (9th Cir. 2013); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he growing consensus among the courts of appeals [is] that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated.”)) Van Pelt seeks intervention to acces…

See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[P]rivacy interests are diminished when the party seeking protection is a public person subject to legitimate public scrutiny.”); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (stating that there is a “paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants”).

ECF No. 19 ¶ 14 (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994) (“when a settlement agreement is not filed with the court, it is not a ‘judicial record’ for purposes of the right of access doctrine.”) (citations omitted)).

Pa. Dec. 30, 2015) (citing e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) ("While preventing embarrassment may be a factor satisfying the 'good cause' standard, an applicant for a protective order whose chief concern is embarrassment must demonstrate that the embarrassment will be particularly serious."); Rose v. Rothrock, No. 08-3884, 2009 WL 1175614 , at *8 (E.D.

Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.”); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 , 786–87 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The burden of justifying the confidentiality of each and every document sought to be covered by a protective order remains on the party seeking the order.”); Cipollone v. Ligg…

“A finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.” Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986); see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3rd Cir. 1994) (“Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).