United States v. Copple, John R., an Individual Mechem Financial Incorporated, a Corporation, John R. Copple (1994)

In response, Lane cites United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir.1994), for the proposition that “when the contested issue is intent, whether or not victims lost money can be a substantial factor in the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence.” Copple, 24 F.3d at 545 .

III 1993); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 488 , 130 L.Ed.2d 400 (1994); United States, v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir.1989).

III 1993); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, (No. 94-5771), 1994 WL 466503 (Nov. 7, 1994); United States v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 263 , 264 (3d Cir. 1989).

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Proving specific intent in mail fraud cases is difficult, and, as a result, a liberal policy has developed to allow the government to introduce evidence that even peripherally bears on the question of intent.”).

United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Jemal, 26 F.3d at 1272 ); see also United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Proving specific intent in mail fraud cases is difficult, and, as a result, a liberal policy has developed to allow the government to introduce evidence that even peripherally bears on the question of intent.”).

We review the record as a whole to evaluate harmless error, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir.1995), and find that the properly admissible evidence presented at trial that McVeigh carried out the bombing was direct and compelling, see Copple, 24 F.3d at 546 (finding error in admitting prejudicial victim impact testimony to be “harmless because of the overwhelming evide…

Moreover, even if the four incoming radiotelegrams that the evidence does not link to Reilly were not authenticated properly, see R. app. at 120K68D), 1202(68E), 1226(70A), 1228(70C), their admission into evidence was harmless. 12 “Trial error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.” United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir.1993)).

We agreed that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the testimony, but we qualified that assessment: the district court did not err by admitting any impact testimony; instead, the error arose from admitting too much testimony and from the fact that some of it “went beyond anything that was reasonable to prove [the defendant’s] specific intent to defraud.” Id. at 545.

In United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir.1994), the Third Circuit concluded that victim-impact testimony was relevant to show intent to defraud in a mail fraud prosecution where the defendant claimed that “he had simply made a bad business decision,” explaining that “[p]roof that someone was victimized by the fraud is ... treated as some evidence of the schemer’s intent.” So too here.

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994).

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994). .

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994). .

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir.1978).

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 1978).

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir.1994); see also Van Dyke, 605 F.2d at 222-25 (intent to defraud inferred from evidence, including the defendant’s failure to respond to customer complaints); Anderson v. United States, 369 F.2d 11, 15 (8th Cir.1966)(defendant’s failure to take any steps to ameliorate the victims’ loss is *219 indicative of fraudulent intent).

Although Romano complains that he was sentenced based on losses not presented to the grand jury, even assuming that this is true, loss is not an element of the crime of mail fraud, United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994).

In response, Lane cites United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1995), for the proposition that “when the contested issue is intent, whether or not victims lost money can be a substantial factor in the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence.” Copple, 24 F.3d at 545 .

Under the “highly probable” standard, however, “[t]here is no need to disprove ‘every reasonable possibility of prejudice.’ ” United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 342 (3d Cir.2001), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1211 , 152 L.Ed.2d 148 (2002); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir.1996); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278…

Under the"highly probable" standard, however, "[t]here is no need to disprove 27 ‘every reasonable possibility of prejudice.’ " United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 342 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1211 (2002); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 1986).

Holmes refers to our opinion in United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 548 (3d Cir.1994), where we held that a scheme involving thirty-one victims and millions of dollars of stolen money was not outside the heartland of fraud cases.

Holmes refers to our opinion in United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 548 (3d Cir. 1994), where we held that a scheme involving thirty-one victims and millions of dollars of stolen money was not outside the heartland of fraud cases.

In general, to satisfy the elements for mail fraud, "[p]roof of actual loss by the intended victim is not necessary." United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 488 (1994).

In general, to satisfy the elements for mail fraud, “[p]roof of actual loss by the intended victim is not necessary.” United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 488 , 130 L.Ed.2d 400 (1994).

One of the relevant provisions to which the requirement of specific factual findings applies is "the defendant's ability to pay and the financial need of defendant and the defendant's dependents." United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir.) ("Copple I") (citing Logar, 975 F.2d at 961 ), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 488 (1994)).

One of the relevant provisions to which the requirement of specific factual findings applies is "the defendant's ability to pay and the financial need of defendant and the defendant's dependents." United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir.) ("Copple I") (citing Logar, 975 F.2d at 961 , cert. denied,U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 488 , 130 L.Ed.2d 400 (1994)).

In general, to satisfy the elements for mail fraud, "[p]roof of actual loss by the intended victim is not necessary." United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 (holding that defendant's prior conviction by jury for wire fraud could not be used as collateral estoppel to establish predicate act for violation of RICO in trial before second jury).

In general, to satisfy the elements for. mail fraud, “[p]roof of actual loss by the intended victim is not necessary.” United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — N.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 488 , 130 L.Ed.2d 400 (1994).

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 488 , 130 L.Ed.2d 400 (1994); United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir.1985).

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir.), cert. 11 .

Moreover, even if the four incoming radiotelegrams that the evidence does not link to Reilly were not authenticated properly, see R. app. at 1201 (68D), 1202 (68E), 1226 (70A), 1228 (70C), their admission into evidence was harmless.0 "Trial error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment." United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Whether Ugalde is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the prosecution presented prejudicial victim impact testimony. ¶52 Ugalde argues that much of the evidence presented against her was “victim impact evidence,” citing to Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992), and U.S. v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994).

Thus, it is plausible that Natera’s patent portfolio is relevant to apportionment and Signatera.'* 12 United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Sohnen v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18-CV-6744, 2025 WL 25418 , at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Sohnen v. Charter Comme Inc., No. 18-CV-6744, 2025 WL 25418 , at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 768 (6th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Sutherlin, 118 Fed.Appx. 911, 914 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that, in trial for various frauds, including mail fraud, the government was entitled to introduce proof of investor loss to prove the defendants’ specific intent to defraud)); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir.1994) (proof of loss is relevant in fraud prosecution to prove intent); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 39…

United States v. Carey, 337 Fed.Appx. 256 , 263 n. 9 (3d Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994)). “[A] scheme or artifice to defraud need not be fraudulent on its face, but must involve some sort of fraudulent misrepresentation or omission reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.” Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 528 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelco…

The type of victim harmed by the criminal conduct was simply not in dispute, and the opinions dealt with other issues. 23 See, e.g.: *474 United States v. Hawes, 523 F.3d 245, 255-56 (3d Cir.2008) (investors were victims of mail fraud); United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 189-90, 192, 205-06 (3d Cir.2007) (federal agency was victim of mail fraud and defense procurement fraud); 24 United States v. Fallon, 470 F.3d 542, 547-48 (3d Cir.2006) (customer was victim of mail fra…

Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 748 (discussing unfair prejudice); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1994)(same).

See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1286 , 134 L.Ed.2d 230 (1996); Turcks, 41 F.3d at 901 ; United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 550 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 989 , 115 S.Ct. 488 , 130 L.Ed.2d 400 (1994); see also United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 14 (2d Cir.1997) (finding that defendant’s failure to object to restitution order where sentencing court did not consider § 3664(a) factors is not a …

The elements of the Federal crime of mail fraud are (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) participation by a defendant, with the specific intent to defraud, in the particular scheme charged, and (3) “ ‘a mailing must further the scheme to defraud or be incident to an essential part of that scheme.”’ United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797-98 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir.1989)); see United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 451 , 106…

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that we need not reverse a trial error if it was harmless and that a “[t]rial error is harmless if it is highly probably that [it] did not affect the judgment”).

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535 , 547 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994).

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir.1994) ("Proving specific intent in mail fraud cases is difficult, and, as a result, a liberal policy has developed to allow the government to introduce evidence that even peripherally bears on the question of intent.").

The court instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of guilty on Count Four only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the March 4, 1998 mailing was “intended to further or assist in carrying out or continuing the scheme to defraud.” App. vol. 49 at 10; see United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The essential elements of the crime of mail fraud are 1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; 2) participation by the defendant with specific intent to …

The court instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of guilty on Count Four only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the March 4, 1998 mailing was “intended to further or assist in carrying out or continuing the scheme to defraud.” App. vol. 49 at 10; see United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994) (“The essential elements of the crime of mail fraud are 1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; 2) participation by the defendant with specific intent to d…

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir.1994).

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1994).

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 (3d Cir.1994).

See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 547, n.17 (3d Cir. 1994).

See Copple, 24 F.3d at 547 .

See generally United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1994) ("[T]he government does not have to show that the victims actually suffered a loss to satisfy the elements of the mail fraud statute....