Persyn v. United States (1995)

Cl. 579 (1995) ("Persyn I "); and (3) granting the government's motion for Judgment on Partial Findings and dismissing the complaint, Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

To the extent that a taking of an avigation easement could occur gradually, “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority holds that ... the extent of the invasion and the degree of interference is ascertainable when the United States begins to operate its aircraft at low elevations and with such frequency that they substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the land, with the intent to continue such flights indefinitely.” Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 197 (1…

Background of the Claims The facts of this ease are set out in Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 190-93 (1995) (“Persyn II”), 1 and are only briefly summarized here.

Trial testimony established that pilots are required to follow a “glide slope” when they are landing aircrafts using their instruments, as opposed to their sight. 8 See Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

Cl. 150, 157 (2012) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

In resolving the government’s motion, “the judge, as the sole trier of fact, may weigh the evidence and is not required to resolve all issues of evidence and credibility in the plaintiff’s favor.” Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

Under RCFC 52(c), “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” In considering an RCFC 52(c) motion, “the judge, as the sole trier of fact, may weigh the evidence and is not required to resolve all issues of evidence and credibility i…

Pursuant to RCFC 52(c), “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” In resolving such a motion, “the judge, as the sole trier of fact, may weigh the evidence and is not required to resolve all issues of evidence and credibility in t…

App. 3d 610, 616 (1980) (ruling that, in cases alleging damages as the result of an easement imposed by a government taking, “the measure of damages *** is the depreciation in [the property’s] fair market value *** caused by its subjection to the condemnor’s superior right to use the land”); see also Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles, 24 Ill. 2d 520, 532-33 (1962); Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

“In this court the judge, rather than a jury, is always the trier of fact.” Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194 (1995). 5 .

Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed.Cl. 710 , 712 n.1 (2010) (citing Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194 (1995)).

However, ”[i]n this court, the judge, rather than a jury, is always the trier of fact.” Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194 (1995). .

Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194 (1995). .

When considering a motion for directed verdict, the court makes “all reasonable inferences and resolves all issues of credibility in the plaintiffs favor.” Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 195 (1995).

“In this court, the judge, rather than a jury, is always the trier of fact.” Persyn v. United, States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194 (1995).

The defendant further argues that avigation easement claims cannot be tried on a “one size fits all” formula and that such claims turn on individualized proof, e.g. “[e]ach element must be established for each parcel, and evidence of a taking over one parcel in a case does not, without more, support a finding of taking over other parcels.” Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 196 (1995).

“A dismissal under RCFC 41(a)(1)(A) does not automatically insulate a party from Rule 11 sanctions.” Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194 (1995).

Trial testimony established that pilots are required to follow a "glide slope" when they are landing aircrafts using their instruments, as opposed to their sight. (8) See Persyn v. United States , 34 Fed.

FACTS The substantive facts of this case are set forth in Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 190-93 (1995) (“Persyn”).

See Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

Brown, 73 F.3d at 1104-05 ; see also Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

See Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194-95 (1995).

See generally Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187 , 190 n. 3 (1995) (referencing one of Jane's yearbooks), aff'd, 106 F.3d 424 , 1996 WL 740996 (1996) (Table), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213 , 117 S.Ct. 1697 , 137 L.Ed.2d 824 (1997).

See, e.g., Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

See Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.

See Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194-95 (1995), aff'd, 106 F.3d 424 (Fed.Cir.1996) (Table).

See Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 194-95 (1995).

Creppel v. United States, 33 Fed.Cl. 590, 600 (1995); accord Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 187, 203 (1995); Martin v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 542, 551 , aff'd, 41 F.3d 1519 (Fed.Cir. 1994).