Cluster 677815 (1994)

But see Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479 (interpreting "desires” as used in the Directives to have essentially the same meaning as intent). .

The policy therefore would pass constitutional muster even under heightened or strict scrutiny; it certainly passes under the rational basis review applicable to the classifications at issue in this case, 18 as courts repeatedly held under the previous Directive, see, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc ); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 , 110 S.Ct. 1296 , 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); cf. Woodward v. United Sta…

Cir.1989) (upholding military’s pre-1982 exclusion of homosexuals), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 , 110 S.Ct. 1295 , 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir.1984) (upholding pre-1982 exclusion even were heightened scrutiny applicable); but see Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir.1994) (interpreting the prior policy as “conduct-based” because the ban on status raises constitutional problems), and as the S…

We avoided deciding the constitutional question, instead construing the regulation “to mandate separation due to a statement of homosexuality only when that statement itself indicates more than the inchoate ‘desire’ or ‘propensity’ that inheres in status.” Id. at 1479.

Addressing the complaint of a lone U.S. Navy serviceman who was discharged for stating he was gay, the district court had issued an injunction preventing *776 the Department of Defense ("DOD") from discharging anyone based on sexual orientation and from maintaining files on the sexual orientation of servicemen "in the absence of conduct affecting the military mission." Id. at 1472.

Addressing the complaint of a lone U.S. Navy serviceman who was discharged for stating he was gay, the district court had issued an injunction preventing the Depart- ment of Defense (“DOD”) from discharging anyone based on sexual orientation and from maintaining files on the sexual orientation of servicemen “in the absence of conduct affecting the military mission.” Id. at 1472.

Rather, we concluded, these regulations required discharge only for statements “that show a concrete, fixed, or expressed desire to commit homosexual acts.” Id. at 1479.

The Supreme Court has long recognized the constitutional infirmity of penalizing status alone.” Id. at 1478.

The Supreme Court has long recognized the constitutional infirmity of penalizing status alone." Id. at 1478. 33 To avoid this constitutional difficulty, we interpreted the old policy regarding homosexuals in the military narrowly, relying on the fact that the military's policy did not appear to allow the discharge of a service member solely because of a homosexual orientation.

Meinhold II, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir.1994). 33 The majority does not acknowledge these conflicts, donning the mantle of deference to the district court.

However, we were unwilling to condone the Navy's discharge of Meinhold "solely because of a statement of orientation devoid of any concrete, expressed desire or intent to act on his homosexual propensity contrary to military policy." Id. at 1472 (emphasis added). 29 Thus, the district court correctly concluded that this court has consistently held that regulations of the nature at issue here, directed to homosexual acts rather than merely to status or orientation, are consti…

See Steffan, 41 F.3d at 684 ; Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1478; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 ; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 ; Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229 .

Rather, we concluded, these regulations required discharge only for statements "that show a concrete, fixed, or expressed desire to commit homosexual acts." Id. at 1479.

Accordingly, Westwood was required to file a separate notice of appeal in order to challenge the merits of the September 14 order, as the parties did in Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1473, and Hoffman, 536 F.2d at 1271.

Accordingly, Westwood was required to file a separate notice of appeal in order to challenge the merits of the September 14 order, as the parties did in Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1473, and Hoffman, 536 F.2d at 1271.

See, e.g., Williams, 115 F.3d at 666 ; Stansell, 847 F.2d at 615 (“Because a reasonable limiting construction can be placed on the challenged regulation, we hold that [it] is not substantially overbroad.”) (emphasis added); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1479 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he regulation under which Meinhold was processed need not be construed so broadly as to raise constitutional concerns.

Meinhold v. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1476-77 (9th Cir. 1994) (“. . . we are guided by [a] long-settled rule: The military’s ‘considered professional judgment,’ is ‘not lightly to be overruled by the judiciary.’ . . .

Dispensing information to facilitate public awareness about safe disposal of toxic materials constitutes "encouragement," not regulation 25 "When the constitutional validity of a statute or regulation is called into question, it is a cardinal rule that courts must first determine whether a construction is possible by which the constitutional problem may be avoided." Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1476. 26 In its most recent treatment of compelled speech, the Supreme Court held that a …

"When the constitutional validity of a statute or regulation is called into question, it is a cardinal rule that courts must first determine whether a construction is possible by which the constitutional problem may be avoided.” Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1476. .

Dispensing information to facilitate public awareness about safe disposal of toxic materials constitutes "encouragement," not regulation 38 "When the constitutional validity of a statute or regulation is called into question, it is a cardinal rule that courts must first determine whether a construction is possible by which the constitutional problem may be avoided." Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1476. 39 In its most recent treatment of compelled speech, the Supreme Court held that a …

"When the constitutional validity of a statute or regulation is called into question, it is a cardinal rule that courts must first determine whether a construction is possible by which the constitutional problem may be avoided." Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1476. .

However, we were unwilling to condone the Navy’s discharge of Meinhold “solely because of a statement of orientation devoid of any concrete, expressed desire or intent to act on his homosexual propensity contrary to military policy.” Id. at 1472 (emphasis added).

See Steffan, 41 F.3d at 684 ; Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1478; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 ; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 ; Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229 .

In Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1478, the Ninth Circuit, in addressing the equal protection implications of the military’s former policy concerning homosexuals in the armed forces, recognized that equating status with conduct or acts that are prohibited is “problematic,” and questioned whether it could ever be “rational to presume that one class of persons (identified by their sexual preference alone) will violate regulations whereas another class (identified by their preference) wi…

See, e.g., Steffan, 41 F.3d at 685 ; Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 , 112 S.Ct. 1514 , 117 L.Ed.2d 650 (1992); Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1477; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 461 ; Better v. Middendotf, 632 F.2d 788 , 812 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 , 101 S.Ct. 3030 , 69 L.Ed.2d 405 & 454 U.S. 855 , 102 S.Ct. 304 , 70 L.Ed.2d 150 (1981); Walmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir.1995) (pet. for cert.…

In Meinkold, the court stated: On the merits, we defer to the Navy’s judgment that the presence of persons who engage in homosexual conduct, or who demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct by their statements, impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. 34 F.3d at 1472.

Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1164 (emphasis added); Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1477.

Id. at 1474.

In Meinhold v. The United States Dept. of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994), the Ninth Circuit limited the injunction issued by the district court because effective relief could be obtained “by directing the Navy not to apply its regulation to Meinhold based only on his statement that he is gay.” The Court finds the above eases cited by defendant not to be on point and to be distinguishable.

See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1476-80 (9th Cir.1994) (in an equal protection challenge to the military's pre-"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" homosexuality policy, construing the policy as only applying to conduct in order to avoid constitutional concerns that would arise if the policy punished service members for "mere propensity" or status alone) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543-44 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968) (Black, J., concurring)).

See Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1496 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 (9th Cir. 1994)); Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025) (granting stay of preliminary injunctions “to the extent that the injunctions [we]re broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue”).

See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Def. , 34 F.3d 1469 , 1479 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the "effect of the regulation as applied in Meinhold's case").

See Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1474 (9th Cir.1994) ("Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-constitutional grounds for decision.”) (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 , 105 S.Ct. 2992 , 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985)).

See Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1474 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that it is error to rule on an avoidable constitutional claim); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 , 105 S.Ct. 2992 , 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) (“Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.

See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1474 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that it is error to rule on an avoidable constitutional claim); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 , 105 S.Ct. 2992 , 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) ("Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.

See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n. 14 (9th Cir.1994) (holding modification of preliminary injunction during pendency of appeal was proper to clarify injunction and supervise compliance in light of new facts).

See Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n. 14 (9th Cir.1994) (holding modification of preliminary injunction during pendency of appeal was proper to clarify injunction and supervise compliance in light of new facts).

See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n. 14 (9th Cir.1994) (order clarifying original injunction and supervising compliance is proper under Hoffman); The San-som Comm. v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 1552 , 1554 (3rd Cir.) (extension of time to purchase properties under consent decree is proper under Hoffman), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 431 , 83 L.Ed.2d 358 (1984).

See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n. 14 (9th Cir.1994) (order clarifying original injunction and supervising compliance is proper under Hoffman ); The Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 1552 , 1554 (3rd Cir.) (extension of time to purchase properties under consent decree is proper under Hoffman ), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 , 105 S.Ct. 431 , 83 L.Ed.2d 358 (1984).

Compare Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 694-95 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc) (noting that exhaustion might be required in “as-applied” challenge to former policy), with Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1477 (9th Cir.1994) (applying futility exception in another “as-applied” challenge).

Area Transit Comm'n v. Reliable Limousine Serv., LLC, 985 F.Supp.2d 23 , 29 (D.D.C. 2013) ; see Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n.14 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[The defendant] also contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue its amended order, which broadened the scope of injunctive relief, because an appeal had already been taken from the original order.

See 7 also Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (“This is not a 8 class action, and Meinhold sought only to have his discharge voided and to be reinstated 9 . . . [so] DOD should not be constrained from applying its regulations to Meinhold and all 10 other military personnel.

Prod., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204 , 1216 n.11 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n.14 (9th Cir. 1994). 28 1 | was prevented from participating in the OBT Open or any portion thereof, Plaintiff and PDGA 2 | are FURTHER ORDERED to include in their response a position as to whether PDGA violated 3 | this Court’s May 11, 2023, Order and if so, what recourse should follow. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED.” 5 | DATE: May 30, 2023 8 Troy L.

Remedy Br. at 2); see also, e.g., Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing the Califano principle in support of a narrower injunction).

See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1479 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the “effect of the 14 regulation as applied in Meinhold’s case”).

See, e.g. , Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Def. , 34 F.3d 1469 , 1473 n.2, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994) (adjudicating merits of DoD policy requiring discharge for homosexual conduct without mentioning or applying Mindes ); Christoffersen v. Wash. State Air Nat'l Guard , 855 F.2d 1437 , 1445-46 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that Mindes test barred review of service members' constitutional challenges to individual non-retention decisions, but addressing on the merits constitutional and statu…

See also Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“An injunction ‘should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.’ Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 , 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2558 , 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979)....

See Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that court could not impose nationwide injunction against application of unconstitutional federal regulation where plaintiffs had not been certified as a class).

See Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n. 14 (9th Cir.1994) (“As the district court issued the amended order to clarify its original injunction and to supervise compliance in the wake of Meinhold’s motion for contempt, it did not lack jurisdiction.”); cf. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C.Cir.2012) (distinguishing “modifications” and “clarifications” of injunctions).

See, e.g., Meinhold, v. United States Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469 , 1480 n. 14 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that modification of preliminary injunction during pendency of appeal was proper to clarify injunction).