Cluster 678823 (1994)

But see Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 (4th Cir.1994) (holding lender could arbitrarily refuse to lower its prime interest rates when the deed of trust gave the lender the right to set its own prime rate).

App.3d 317 , 167 Ill.Dec. 554 , 587 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (1992) (holding cellular telephone wholesaler did not breach duty of good faith by raising rates where contract gave wholesaler sole discretion to raise rates at any time); Labovitz v. Dolan, 189 Ill.App.3d 403 , 136 Ill.Dec. 780 , 545 N.E.2d 304, 313 (1989) (holding general partner with sole discretion to distribute cash to limited partners owed duty of good faith to limited partners as fiduciary under partnership agreem…

Riggs, 36 F.3d at 373.

Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 373 (4th Cir. 1994) (“An implied duty of good faith cannot be used to override or modify explicit contractual terms.”).13 13 Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant, “like all banks and credit unions, offers a robust . . . ‘chargeback’ process,” by which customers can report fraud and, in turn, the bank will “pull[] funds from the merchant’s account, and return[] them to the cardholder’s account, or otherwise refund[] the accoun…

Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 373 (4th Cir. 1994) (“An implied duty of good faith cannot be used to override or modify explicit contractual terms.”); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of ‘good faith.’”). 21 the contract.

Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 373 (4th Cir. 1994) (“An implied duty of good faith cannot be used to override or modify explicit contractual terms.”); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of ‘good faith.’”). 21 the contract.

Bank of Wa., D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 373 (4th Cir. 1994) (“An implied duty of good faith cannot be used to override or modify explicit contractual terms.”).

Id. at 373.

See Riggs Nat’l Bank of D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 374 (4th Cir. 1994) (wife who co-owned collateral could be required to execute 9 an unlimited personal guarantee, but only because the lender first determined that her husband was not creditworthy).

See Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 374 (4th Cir. 1994) (“It is well-established that the ECOA and its implementing regulations prohibit a creditor from requiring a spouse’s signature on a note when the applicant individually qualifies for the requested credit.” (citations omitted)).

See, e.g., Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. LinCh, 829 F.Supp. 163, 169 (E.D.Va.1993), aff 'd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 370 (4th Cir.1994).

Cir. 1979) (stating that "one, perhaps even the main, purpose of the [ECOA] was to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider apart from their husbands as individually worthy of credit"); see also Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 374 (4th Cir. 1994).

See Markham v. Cobnial Mortgage Service Co., 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C.Cir.1979) (stating that “one, perhaps even the main, purpose of the [ECOA] was to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider apart from their husbands as individually worthy of credit”); see also Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 374 (4th Cir.1994).

See Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.1994); cf. Tymshare v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 153-54 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("We cannot imagine ... entertaining a claim that a demand for payment of a demand note has been made 'in bad faith.' ").

Under Virginia law, "[w]hen the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the terms will be given their plain and ordinary meaning." Marina Shores, Ltd. v. Cohn-Phillips, Ltd., 435 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Va.1993) (citing Marriott Corp. v. Combined Properties, 391 S.E.2d 313, 316 (1990)); see also Riggs Nat'l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 374 (4th Cir.1994) (applying Virginia law).

Cir. 1979) (stating that "one, perhaps even the main, purpose of the [ECOA] was to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider apart from their husbands as individually worthy of credit"); see also Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Linch , 36 F.3d 370 , 374 (4th Cir. 1994).

See Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 373-74 (4th Cir.1994) (applying Virginia law).

See also the Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash *390 ington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.1994) (“An implied duty of good faith cannot be used to override or modify explicit contractual terms.”).

See Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370 , 374 (4th Cir.1994) (determinative factual issue on ECOA claim is whether bank made determination that husband was not independently creditworthy before it requested wife to guarantee loan).