State v. Robinette (1995)

Tr. at 45-47. [6] Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172 (Del.2010) (citing Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 828 (Del. 2008); Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del.2001)). [7] Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Del. 2001). [8] Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). [9] Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1047 (collecting cases from Maryland and Colorado supporting this rule). [10] Id. at 1047 . [11] See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S…

As the Ohio Supreme Court related, the sheriff's deputy who detained Robinette for speeding and then asked Robinette for permission to search his vehicle "was on drug interdiction patrol at the time." 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 651 , 653 N. E. 2d 695, 696 (1995).

The court explained that, while the decision to stop the defendant for speeding had been justified, once the officer returned to the defendant’s car after cheeking his license, “every aspect of the speeding violation had been investigated and resolved.” Ohio v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (1995).

Involuntary detention, like that which occurred in Mays and in this case, would amount to an arrest requiring probable cause and compliance with the prompt presentment standards. 456 S.E.2d at 467 n. 17 1 State v. Jones, 193 W.Va. 378 , 456 S.E.2d 459 , 466-67 n.17 (1995) 2 State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (1995)

See id. at 699 (“[a] ‘consensual encounter’ immediately following a detention is likely to be imbued with the authoritative aura of detention”).

We adopt the rule articulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1995), rev’d on other grounds, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), that once the reason for the stop is over, the suspect should be informed they are free to leave, unless there are additional articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention.

That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away [while] the officer continues to address him. 519 U.S. at 47 , 117 S.Ct. at 425 (quoting the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1995)).

That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.' State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650, 655 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1995).

As the Ohio Supreme Court related, the sheriff’s deputy who detained Robinette for speeding and then asked Robinette for permission to search his vehicle ″was on drug interdiction patrol at the time.″ 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 651 , [**422] 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1995).

Id. at 36 (citing State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 ). ¶ 58.

Robinette III, 685 N.E.2d at 770 -71 (quoting Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 698 (emphases added)). .

Ed. 2d at 353 , 117 S. Ct. at 419-20 , quoting State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 650-51 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1995).

At oral argument, appellant and the Commonwealth cited Ohio v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995) (“Robinette I ”), rev’d and remanded, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (“Robinette II ”). 4 Appellant relies on Robinette I to echo Ms position that any subsequent roadside interaction with police could not be consensual; such interaction, he argues, must be deemed to have been influenced by a lingering authoritative aura of the earlier lawful t…

State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1995) ( Robinette I ), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1040 , 134 L.Ed.2d 187 , rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) ( Robinette II ) (reversing, as not required by the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, Ohio Supreme Court's pronouncement of bright-line rule directing officers to make clear the conclusion of a valid seizure and the beginning of a consensual …

Rev. at 1182 & n.90 (quoting videotape on file with author). 264Id. at 1183. 265Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36. 266State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 267Id. at 699. 268Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35. 94 validity of the consent to search under the Fourth Amendment.269 The Supreme Court repeated language from Schneckloth that knowledge of a right to refuse was a factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances calculation and that requiring a warn…

There is no doubt that "voluntary consent, determined under the totality of the circumstances, may validate an otherwise illegal detention and search." State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 241 (1997); Heien, 574 U.S. 54 . {¶ 85} The Ohio Supreme Court had a prior decision stating that "any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase 'at this time you legally are free to go' or by words of similar import." State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650, 655 (1…

Once Ms. Oberholtz informed Officer Tassone that they were just yelling at each other and that they were fine, however, Officer Tassone turned the encounter into an investigation into possible drug activity that “was not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention.” It found that, under the totality of the circumstances, Ms. Oberholtz’s alleged consent to the search of her person, including her pocket…

In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the Supreme Court of Ohio's statement that "When the motivation behind a police officer's continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an i…

In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the Supreme Court of Ohio‟s statement that “When the motivation behind a police officer‟s continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an i…

Ohio v. Robinette, supra, 519 U.S. at 41 , 117 S.Ct. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)(quoting State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650, 654-55 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698-99 (1995)).

Any attempt at consensual inter rogation must be preceded by the phrase ‘At this time you legally are free to go’ or by words of similar import.” 73 Ohio 3d 650, 650-51, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1995).

State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698-99 (1995).

Id. 519 U.S. at 36 , 117 S.Ct. at 419 -20 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650, 650-51 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1995)) (emphasis added).

Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase 'At this time you legally are free to go' or by words of similar import." Id . 519 U.S. at 36 , 117 S. Ct. at 419 -20 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette , 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 650-51 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1995)) (emphasis added).

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 , 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (Ginsburg, J„ concurring) (“ ‘While the legality of consensual encounters between police and citizens should be preserved, we do not believe that this legality should be used by police officers to turn a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity.’ ") (quoting State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698-699 (1995), rev’d 519 U.S. 33 , 117 S.Ct. 417 …

State v. Robi-mette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1995).

Ed. 2d at 353 , 117 S. Ct. at 419-20 , quoting State v. Robinette , 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 650-51 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1995).

Id. at 655- 658, 653 N.E.2d at 699-701 (F.E.

Id. at 655-658 , 653 N.E.2d at 699-701 (F.E.

That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.” State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650, 655 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1995).

The court explained that, while the decision to stop the defendant for speeding had been justified, once the officer returned to the defendant’s car after checking his license, “every aspect of the speeding violation had been investigated and resolved.” Ohio v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1995).

See State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995).

See State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695, 697-98 (1995).

See State v. Robinette (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653, 653 N.E.2d 695 (valid stop based on speeding even where no speeding ticket was issued).

See State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 654 , 1995-Ohio-162 , 653 N.E.2d 695 , reversed in Ohio v. Robinette (1996), 519 U.S. 33 , 117 S.Ct. 417 ; State v. Carty (2002), 170 N.J. 632 , 641 , 790 A.2d 903 ("Treating all citizens like criminals in order to catch the malefactors among us represents an unwise policy choice, an outlook favoring crime prevention over all of our other values."). {¶ 13} Here, Riggins contends (1) that he did not consent to the search, (2) that a…

See State v. Robinette (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Chatton (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 59 , 11 OBR 250, 463 N.E.2d 1237 ; State v. Venham (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655 , 645 N.E.2d 831, 834 , quoting State v. Krum (Sept. 1, 1993), Montgomery App. No. 13668, unreported, 1993 WL 333648 .

See generally Robinette, quoting State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d at 654, 653 N.E.2d 695 (1995). {¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, the totality of the circumstances establish that White’s consent was not freely and voluntarily given, and the State’s sole assigned error is overruled.