United States v. Richard Langley (1995)

Langley, 62 F.3d at 604-05 (stating issue on appeal was whether insertion of the term “knowingly” in a provision setting penalties for gun crimes mandated a scienter as to each element of a 922(g)(1) offense); id. at 610-11 (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting) (concluding, after discussing at length the oddity of inserting a mens rea requirement into a penalty provision, that it was appropriate to resort to legislative history “because the statutory text is ambiguous”);…

"The predecessor statutes to § 922(g) [ ]" that forbade felons to transport, receive, or possess firearms "contained no mens rea requirement," leading courts "interpreting these processor statutes [to] require[ ] ... proof that the defendant knowingly received, transported, or possessed a firearm." Langley , 62 F.3d at 604 (internal quotation and citation omitted). "[B]ut, at the same time, [these decisions] recognized that the defendant's knowledge of the weapon's interstat…

See United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713-14 (1st Cir. 1991) (felony conviction, § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012) (same); Langley, 62 F.3d at 606 (same); United States v. Butler, 637 F.3d 519, 524-25 (5th Cir. 2011) (dishonorable discharge, § 922(g)(6)); United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2003) (felony conviction, § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Stein, 712 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2013) (misdemeanor domestic violenc…

Langley, 62 F.3d at 606 (holding that § 922(g) does not require the Government to prove that a defendant was aware of his felony status).

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (laying out the elements of the § 922(g)(1) offense, the first of which is the defendant "had been convicted in some court of a crime punishable by a term of. imprisonment ex ceeding one year”).

United States v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir.2012); United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir.2003); United States v. Kind, 194 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605-06 (4th Cir.1995) (per curiam); United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862 , 867 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1989); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam).

Accord United States v. Stone, 706 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.2013) (holding the mens rea requirement in § 924(a)(2) did not extend to § 922(g)(l)’s interstate commerce element and that “the interstate commerce element is purely jurisdictional”); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc) (analyzing § 922(g)(1)’s history, concluding “Congress did not intend ... to place the additional evidentiary burdens on the government,” and explaining it was “highl…

A canon of statutory construction is that "[w]e presume that when Congress amends a statute, it is knowledgeable about judicial decisions interpreting the prior legislation." Porter v. Bd. of Trustees of Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist., 307 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) ("It is firmly entrenched that Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the knowledge of th…

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019).

The rule announced in Rehaif was not dictated by prior precedent; indeed, Rehaif “overturn[ed] the long-established interpretation” of the statute “that ha[d] been adopted by every single Court of Appeals to address the question,” Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2201 (Alito, J., dissenting), including the Fourth Circuit, see United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that the government was not required to prove that the defendant knew of his status …

It is thus not only helpful to consider how the probation revocation process worked in the decades preceding the 1984 CCCA—it is an essential part of the construction process: As a matter of statutory construction, federal courts “presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts.” Goodyear Atomic Corporation v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 , 184–85 (1988); see also Strawn v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) (recogn…

One is the values and attitudes.”). 38 USCA4 Appeal: 20-1363 Doc: 51 Filed: 11/30/2021 Pg: 39 of 63 LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “in the absence of statutory text reversing the burden of proof, we presume that Congress legislated consistently with existing law.”); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining that “it is firmly entrenched that Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; t…

At the time of Gary’s guilty plea, the parties and the district court relied on this Court’s decision in United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), abrogated by Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2191 , wherein this Court had held that knowledge of one’s prohibited status was not a required element of a § 922(g) offense.

One is the values and attitudes.”). 38 LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 297 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “in the absence of statutory text reversing the burden of proof, we presume that Congress legislated consistently with existing law.”); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining that “it is firmly entrenched that Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the knowledge of the interpretation that courts h…

At the time of Gary’s guilty plea, the parties and the district court relied on this Court’s decision in United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), abrogated by Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2191 , wherein this Court had held that knowledge of one’s prohibited status was not a required element of a § 922(g) offense.

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that knowledge requirement stated in Langley and Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), “has been applied without exception by this and other circuits when interpreting § 924(a)(2)’s application to subsection (g) firearm possession crimes”).

“Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 To convict a defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: “(1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant kn…

For a defendant to be guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the government must prove that, “(1) [the defendant] had been convicted in some court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) he thereafter voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm had been shipped or transported in interstate or for *617 eign commerce at some point during its existence.” United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. …

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc).

United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir.2001); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc).

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc).

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605-06 (4th Cir.1995).

United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir.2001); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc).

A canon of statutory construction is that "[w]e presume that when Congress amends a statute, it is knowledgeable about judicial decisions interpreting the prior legislation." Porter v. Bd. of Trustees of Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist., 307 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) ("It is firmly entrenched that Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the knowledge of th…

The crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm has three elements: “(1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed, transported, shipped, or received the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 395 (4th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc)).

“Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Reid, 523 F.3d at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir.2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is the province of the jury …

Thus, our holding in Talebnejad is inapposite to the scienter argument that Gibert advances here. 16 We find no merit in Gibert’s scienter argument, because Gibert’s conviction for violating the animal fighting statute required proof of knowledge of the stated factual elements of the offense, but did not require proof of knowledge that the activity was “in or affected interstate commerce.” 17 See, e.g., United States v. *629 Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605-06 (4th Cir.1995) (convi…

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc).

To sustain a conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1), the Government must prove: “(1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable *289 by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed, transported, shipped, or received, the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had travelled in interstate or foreign commerce.” United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1…

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g), the Government must prove: “(1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed, transported, shipped, or received[] the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce.” United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc).

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc).

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that a defendant need not know of his status as a prohibited person under § 922(g)); United States v. Santiesteban, 825 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Williams, 588 F.2d 92, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting arguments similar to those raised in Rehaif).

Lending Corp. (In re Witt), 113 F.3d 508, 513 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).

Mr. Moore insists the second requirement is also satisfied inasmuch as he “showed that the settled law of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) did in fact change when the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) rendered an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) that virtually every circuit[,] including [the Fourth Circuit in] Langley[,] rejected.” [Doc. 29 at 3 (internal citations omitted)].

See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 637 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605-606, 608 (4th Cir. 1995) (an en banc decision in which 4 judges of this circuit dissented by urging adoption of the principle ultimately decreed in Rehaif).

In Moore v. United States, the Court found the petitioner had 3 not shown cause, reasoning that at the time of sentencing and foregone appeal, there were 4 “plenty of cases where this issue was being raised,” citing United States v. Jackson, 120 5 F.3d 1226 , 1229 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 6 1995) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991).

In Moore v. United States, the Court found the petitioner had 21 not shown cause, reasoning that at the time of sentencing and foregone appeal, there were 22 “plenty of cases where this issue was being raised,” citing United States v. Jackson, 120 1 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 2 1995) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991).

In Moore v. United States, the Court found the petitioner had 19 not shown cause, reasoning that at the time of sentencing and foregone appeal, there were 20 “plenty of cases where this issue was being raised,” citing United States v. Jackson, 120 21 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 22 1995) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991).

More 22 23 24 25 26 7See U.S. v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Langley, 62 F. 3d 602, 604-08 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); U.S. 27 v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705-06 (5th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Lane, 267 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Thomas, 615 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Enslin, 237 F.3d 788 , 28 798 (9th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Jackson, 120, …

See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 712 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2013) (convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 922(g)(9)); United States v. Butler, 637 F.3d 519 , 523--24 (5th Cir. 2011) (dishonorable dischargee under 922(g)(6)); United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2003) (felon under 922(g)(1)); United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129 , 1131--33 (9th Cir. 2000) (subject of a restraining order under 922(g)(8)); United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d…

See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 712 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2013) (convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 922(g)(9)); United States v. Butler, 637 F.3d 519 , 523--24 (5th Cir. 2011) (dishonorable dischargee under 922(g)(6)); United States v. Olender, 338 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2003) (felon under 922(g)(1)); United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129 , 1131--33 (9th Cir. 2000) (subject of a restraining order under 922(g)(8)); United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d…

Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2210 n.6 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Langley, 62 F. 3d 602, 604-08 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Similar to its predecessors, § 922(g)(1) contains no mens rea requirement. … Our holding today comports with all of the post-FOPA decisions that have, by implication, rejected the notion that the government is required to prove either knowledge of felony status or interstate nexus in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution”)).

See United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the knowledge of the interpretation that courts have given to an existing statute.”); Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 530 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom.

Importantly, it is “firmly entrenched” as a matter of statutory construction that “Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the knowledge of the interpretation that courts have given to an existing statute.” United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995); Howell, 827 F.3d at 530 (“Congress is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of the law, and ... is assumed to have acted with awareness of judicial interpretat…

See United States v. Tomlinson, 67 F.3d 508, 513 (4th Cir.1995) (holding that Staples requires that when a conviction turns on “possession of a particular type of firearm” the Government must prove that a defendant knew of a firearm’s “particular nature”); United States v. Forbes, 64 F.3d 928, 932 (4th Cir.1995) (reasoning that “the concept of mens rea is so ‘firmly embedded’ in ‘the background rules of the common law,’ that it is not at all surprising that Congress might in…

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605 (4th Cir.1995) (“Thus, it is proper to consider that Congress acts with knowledge of existing law, and that absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction.”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-68 , 112 S.Ct. 1311 , 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); Miles v. Apex…

United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (“Thus, it is proper to consider that Congress acts with knowledge of existing law,.and that absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction.”) (internal quotation omitted); - see also Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-68 , 112 S.Ct. 1311 , 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); Miles v. Ap…

See United States v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1139-42 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 54 (2013); United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700 , 715-16 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606-07 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Locke, 542 F.2d 800, 801 (9th Cir. 1976); Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 323-24 (Iowa 1986); State v. Pelleteri, 294 N.J.

In United States v. Cooper, the Fourth Circuit stated that “[i]t is well settled that mens rea requirements typically do not extend to the jurisdictional elements of a crime—that ‘the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute.’ ” 482 F.3d 658, 664-65 (4th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 , 677 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 1255 , 43 L.Ed.2d 5…

United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 395 (4th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc)).