Cluster 705999 (1995)

But see, Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1131 (4th Cir.1995) (An IRA fund to be distributed after the plan terminates is not disposable income); In re Ferretti, 203 B.R. 796, 800 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (exempt property can never be disposable income).

But cf. Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir.1995) (excluding individual retirement accounts from disposable income analysis); In re Kerr, 199 B.R. 370 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (excluding proceeds from sale of exempt real estate from disposable income calculation).

But see In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1135 (4th Cir.1995) (funds within exempt IRAs not included in *380 disposable income); In re Berger, 61 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.1995) (finding in Chapter 12 case that exempt life insurance proceeds are not part of disposable income); In re Koch, 187 B.R. 664, 668 (D SD 1995) (exempt worker’s compensation benefits not included in disposable income calculation); In re Tomasso, 98 B.R. 513, 515 (Bankr.SD Cal.1989) (personal injury settlement…

But see In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1135 (4th Cir.1995) (funds within exempt IRAs not included in disposable income; In re Berger, 61 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.1995) (finding in Chapter 12 case that exempt life insurance proceeds are not part of disposable income); In re Koch, 187 B.R. 664, 668 (D.S.D.1995) (exempt worker’s compensation benefits not included in disposable income calculation); In re Tomasso, 98 B.R. 513, 515 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1989) (personal injury settlement not…

In In re Solomon, 67 F. 3d 1128 (1995), for example, the Fourth Circuit refused to make such an adjustment because it deemed disbursements from an individual retirement account during the plan period to be “speculative” and “hypothetical.” Id., at 1132.

In In re Solomon, 67 F. 3d 1128 (1995), for example, the Fourth Circuit refused to make such an adjustment because it deemed disbursements from an individual retirement account during the plan period to be “speculative” and “hypothetical.” Id., at 1132.

But in other cases it will be the debtor, In re Solomon, supra, 67 F.3d at 1130-31; In re Kibbe, 361 B.R. 302, 314 (1st Cir. BAP 2007) (per curiam); In re Petro, 395 B.R. 369, 376 (6th Cir. BAP 2008), because the expenses that are deductible *356 in determining his disposable income are as likely to rise unexpectedly between the dates of submission and approval as to fall (and his income, as in Kibbe and Petro , is as likely to fall as to rise).

But in other cases it will be the debtor, In re Solomon, supra, 67 F.3d at 1130-31; In re Kibbe, 361 B.R. 302, 314 (1st Cir. BAP 2007) (per curiam); In re Petro, 395 B.R. 369, 376 (6th Cir. BAP 2008), because the expenses that are deductible in determining his dis- posable income are as likely to rise unexpectedly between the dates of submission and approval as to fall (and his income, as in Kibbe and Petro, is as likely to fall as to rise).

By enacting this tax protection scheme, Congress was supporting its “deep and continuing interest in the preservation of pension plans, and in encouraging retirement saving.” See Solomon, 67 F.3d at 1133.

See Watters v. McRoberts, 167 B.R. 146, 147 (S.D.Ill.1994) (personal injury recovery); In re Minor, 177 B.R. 576, 583 (Bankr.Tenn.1995) (lump-sum worker’s compensation settlement award) 7 ; In re Jackson, 173 B.R. 168, 171 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1994) (worker’s compensation settlement); In re Hagel, 171 B.R. 686, 689 (Bankr.D.Mont.1994) (social security disability benefits); In re Rogers, 168 B.R. 806, 807 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1993) (naval retirement benefits); In re Morse, 164 B.R. 651, 65…

In re Solomon, 67 F.3d at 1134.

Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995).

Solomon, 67 F.3d at 1134. “[T]he focus of the good faith inquiry under both Section 1307 and Section 1325 is often whether the filing is fundamentally fair to creditors.” In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir.1992).

In Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir.1995), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a Chapter 13 debtor’s entitlement to receive hypothetical IRA distributions constituted disposable income under the disposable income test of § 1325(b).

Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1995) (citing Deans v. O’Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir.1982); factors expounded upon in Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.1986)).

See § 1325(a)(4); Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir.1995).

Cf. Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) (because debtor was not withdrawing income from pension or retirement asset, court should not impute hypothetical income from the retirement asset when considering chapter 13 plan confirmation requirements).

Indeed, Judge Chasanow explicitly noted in In Re - Gibson that “the bankruptcy court’s ruling upholding the funds’ exemption until the expiration of the 60-day period supports the purpose behind pension and retirement plans: to ensure that workers have alien funds with which to support themselves and their dependents during their . retirement years.” in Re Gibson, 300 B.R. at 871 (citing Jn re Solomon, 67 F.3d at 1133).

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) (“‘[R]ather than engaging in hopeless speculation about the future,’ a court should determine projected disposable income by calculating a debtor’s ‘present monthly income and expenditures’ and extending those amounts over the life of the plan.”).

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) (“‘[R]ather than engaging in hopeless speculation about the future,’ a court should determine projected disposable income by calculating a debtor’s ‘present monthly income and expenditures’ and extending those amounts over the life of the plan.”).

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) (“‘[R]ather than engaging in hopeless speculation about the future,’ a court should determine projected disposable income by calculating a debtor’s ‘present monthly income and expenditures’ and extending those amounts over the life of the plan.”).

The Court based its determination on the broad language of the exemption statute, as well as its underlying purpose: “to ensure that workers have sufficient funds with which to support themselves and their dependents during their retirement years.” Id. (citing Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1133 (4th Cir. 1995)).

The debts excepted from a full compliance discharge do not include § 523(a)(6), debts for “willful and malicious injury.” A debtor who makes all plan payments and receives a full compliance discharge “is discharged from debts arising from willful and malicious conduct, since paragraph (a)(6) of Section 523 is not a stated exception.... ” Ambassadors Travel Servs., 404 B.R. at 504 ; see also Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1348 (8th Cir.1990); Graves v. Myr…

In re Colston, 539 B.R. at 747 ; Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1995); Deans v. O’Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.1982).

Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1995) (citing Deans v. O’Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir.1982) and Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.1986)).

While an above-median debtor who proposes to retain a nonessential or luxury asset may not be doing so at the expense of unsecured creditors post-BAPCPA, because the return to general unsecured creditors under a Chapter 13 plan is guided by the means test, such a conclusion does not make this court any less mindful of the fact that “the good faith inquiry is intended to prevent abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of Chapter 13.” Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F…

Before the enactment of BAPCPA, courts did not interpret “projected disposable income” as a phrase independent of the term “disposable income.” The Fourth Circuit observed in Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir.1995), that “[p]ro-jected disposable income typically is calculated by multiplying a debtor’s monthly income at the time of confirmation by 36 months, the normal duration of a Chapter 13 plan, then determining the portion of that income which…

In re Bridges, 326 B.R. 345, 347-48 (Bankr.D.S.C.2005) (citing Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1995)).

Good faith, which is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, is a necessary requirement to “prevent abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of Chapter 13.” Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1995) (citing Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.1986)); 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1325.04 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.

In re Solomon, 67 F.3d at 1134; In re Neufeld, 794 F.2d at 152 .

Id. at 1134. 66 . 91 F.3d 491 (3d Cir.1996). 67 .

The good faith inquiry is designed to “prevent abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of Chapter 13.” Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir.1995); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.1986).

The Fourth Circuit in In re Solomon, recently held that funds held in exempt individual retirement accounts which were not being disbursed to the debtor were not included in the debtor’s “projected disposable income.” 67 F.3d at 1131. 6 The court distinguished In re Hagel, 171 B.R. 686 (Bankr.D.Mont.1994) (prior to affirmation by the BAP at 184 B.R. 793 ), by pointing out that the debtor in Hagel was receiving monthly payments.

See Solomon v. Crosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir.1995) (declining to find that "hypothetical” withdrawals from an exempt IRA should be included in disposable income, because the debtor had the right to exempt such income and was under no obligation to make a withdrawal earlier than he deemed necessary).

Thus, in analyzing good faith, a court may consider, inter alia, “the percentage of proposed repayment, the 14 debtor’s financial situation, the period of time payment will be made, the debtor’s employment history and prospects, the nature and amount of unsecured claims, the debtor’s past bankruptcy filings, the debtor ’s honesty in representing facts, and any unusual or exceptional problems facing the particular debtor.” Neufeld, 794 F. 2d at 152 ; see In re Solomon, 67 F.3…

The Plaintiff asserts that the State Court has already ruled that the Defendant committed fraud and 7 In Chapter 13 cases, such as this one, only debts “of the kind specified in . . . paragraph (1)(B), (1)(C), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), or (9) of section 523(a)” are excepted from discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a)(2); see also Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128 , 1131 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing the “super-discharge” available to Chapter 13 debtors); Rosenblum v. Hard…

Mont. 1996)) (citing Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149 , 152–53 (4th Cir. 1986); see also In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1134 (4th Cir. 1995). 88 Case No. 17-02386, ECF Nos. 276, 280; entries mirrored at Case No. 23-00274, ECF Nos. 62, 66. 89 For example, Mr. Coates testified the parties had multiple “discussions” regarding the valuation of CCNW and engaged in “negotiations” regarding the length of the contract.

Mont. 1996)) (citing Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149 , 152–53 (4th Cir. 1986); see also In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1134 (4th Cir. 1995). 88 Case No. 17-02386, ECF Nos. 276, 280; entries mirrored at Case No. 23-00274, ECF Nos. 62, 66. 89 For example, Mr. Coates testified the parties had multiple “discussions” regarding the valuation of CCNW and engaged in “negotiations” regarding the length of the contract.

See generally In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1132 (4th Cir.1995) ( 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(4) requires that a chapter 13 plan provide unsecured creditors with a dividend at least equal to the amount those creditors would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation.). .

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1132 (4th Cir.1995) (citing In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993); In re Hagel, 171 B.R. 686 (Bankr.D.Mont.1994)).

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1134 (4th Cir.1995).

See generally In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1132 (4th Cir.1995).

See Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1133 (4th Cir.1995).

In re Pickering, 195 B.R. 759, 765 (Bankr.D.Mont.1996), citing In Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152-53 (4th Cir.1986); see also Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1995).

See In re Sellers, 285 B.R. at 771 (citing Mason v. Young (In re Young), 237 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir.2001), and Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1995), and Soc’y Nat’l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir.1992)); In re Chaffin, 816 F.2d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir.1987).

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir.1995).

See Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (4th Cir.1995) (The debtor’s IRAs would be exempt assets unavailable to creditors in a Chapter 7 liquidation, pursuant to Md.

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir.1995); In re Stones, 157 B.R. 669 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1993). 5 .

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 , 1131-32 (4th Cir.1995); In re Feldman, 220 B.R. 138, 145 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1998); Rothman I, supra, 204 B.R. at 157-58 ; In re Cornelius, 195 B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1995); In re Moore, 188 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1995); In re Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. 369, 373 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1994); In re Ward, 129 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1991); and In re Festner, 54 B.R. 532, 533 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1985).

See In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (CA4 1995).