Anthony Parisi, Ii, a Minor, by His Parent and Natural Guardian, Lorralee Cooney v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security (1995)

Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995)); see also Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir.2012) (“We assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language expresses the legislature’s intent, and we resort to extrinsic aids to statutory construction (such as legislative history) only when the wording of the statute is freighted with ambiguity or leads to an unreasonable result.”).

We give effect to the statute's plain meaning "unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute's intended effect," Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995); see also United States v. Puerto Rico, 287 F.3d 212, 217 (1st Cir.2002); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 857-58 (1st Cir.1998), and we interpret the plain language "in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve." See Arnold, 136 F.3d at 858 (citing D…

The plain meaning of a statute’s text must be given effect “unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute’s intended effect.” Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995).

Consequently, claimant's federal work is excluded from the definition of "employment." -11- manifestly at odds with the statute's intended effect." Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 1995). ________________ ______ Relying on excerpts from 424a's legislative history, claimant contends that the offset resulting from the exclusion of her non-covered federal earnings from the computation of her "average current earnings" violates Congress's intent to leave di…

Accord Smith v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d at 313-15 ; Prather v. Shalala, 844 F.Supp. 239, 240-41 (D.Md.1993), aff'd, 14 F.3d 595 ( 4th Cir.1994); Clevinger v. Sullivan, 813 F.Supp. 421, 422 (E.D.Va.1993); cf. Viney v. Gardner, 310 F.Supp. 76, 77-78 (E.D.Mich.1970)(holding term "wages" in § 424a is defined by § 409(a)). 28 The plain meaning of a statute's text must be given effect "unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute's intended effect…

In other words, the First Circuit held that “section 403(a) operates to limit the total amount of benefits actually payable on a single worker’s record, not the amount of entitlements theoretically available.” Id. at 622 (emphasis in original).

A statute’s plain meaning governs “unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute’s intended effect.” Seahorse Marine Supplies, 295 F.3d at 74 (quoting Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995)); see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 575 , 102 S.Ct. 3245 , 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) (“interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent wi…

“No deference, though, is due an agency interpretation that is inconsistent with the language of the statute, contrary to the statute’s intended effect, arbitrary, or otherwise unreasonable.” Parisi v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995).

Parisi v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995) (“[G]ive effect to the statute’s plain meaning unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute’s intended effect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The SSA promulgated this regulation in response to the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Parisi v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614 (1st Cir.1995).

The plain meaning of a statute’s text must be given effect “unless it would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute’s intended effect.” Parisi v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995).

See also, Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 857-58 (1st Cir.1998); Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995); Midway Indus.

Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir.1995).

See also In re Bajgar, 104 F.3d 495, 497 (1stCir. 1997) (“Theplain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.’ ” (citations omitted); Parisi By Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 1995) (“If the meaning of the text is clear, then that meaning must be given effect, unless it would produce an absurd result or one m…

(Docket # 9, pg. 8.) Although not binding on this court, Parisi v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 616 (1st Cir.1995) deals with the issue of counting a zero entitlement into the family maximum.