Irene Weldon v. United States (1995)

But cf. Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding FTCA also permits equitable relief in an independent action based on assertions of fraud on the court committed in the course of a suit against the government for money damages).

But cf. Weldon v. United States , 70 F.3d 1 , 4 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding FTCA also permits equitable relief in an independent action based on assertions of fraud on the court committed in the course of a suit against the government for money damages).

The majority bypasses the question of sovereign immunity by holding that "governmental consent is not required to bring an independent action in the same court as the original action[,]" citing the Second Circuit's opinion in Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1995).

Thus, " '[r]es judicata does not preclude a litigant from making a direct attack under Rule 60(b) upon the judgment before the court which rendered it.' " Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Watts, 752 F.2d at 410) (quotation and alteration omitted); see also 1B Moore & Lucas, supra, p 0.407 (stating that res judicata does not bar a litigant from seeking Rule 60(b) relief from the court which rendered the judgment). 63 We conclude that State Bank's a…

Cf. Campaniello Imports, 117 F.3d at 661 (“Res judi-cata ‘does not preclude a litigant from making a direct attack ... upon the judgment before the court which rendered it’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995))).

Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995).

Res judicata and the independent action in equity 28 Appellees initially argue that, based on the stipulation and Order of discontinuance of the 1994 Litigation, the claims in the present action pre-dating August 18, 1994, the date when the earlier suit was dismissed with prejudice, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. "[A] discontinuance with prejudice is deemed a final adjudication on the merits for res judicata purposes on the claims asserted or which could have be…

Res judicata “does not preclude a litigant from making a direct attack ... upon the judgment before the court which rendered it.” Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir.1985)).

I agree with the Bankers Mortgage court, and apparently the Supreme Court in Kokkonen, that it is important not to confuse the two conceptually distinct avenues for review. 14 consent is not required to bring an independent action in the same court as the original action[,]” citing the Second Circuit’s opinion in Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1995).

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend the complaint, 19 and some notice of its deficiencies, “unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies 20 of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 2 III.

Thus, “ ‘[r]es judicata does not preclude a litigant from making a direct attack under Rule 60(b) upon the judgment before the court which rendered it.’ ” Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Watts [v. Pinckney], 752 F.2d [406] at 410 [(9th Cir.1985)] (quotation and alteration omitted); see also 1B Moore & Lucas, supra, ¶ 0.407 (stating that res judicata does not bar a litigant from seeking Rule 60(b) relief from the court which rendered the judgment).

See, e.g., Cashion v. Torbert, 881 So.2d 408, 414 (Ala.2003) (res judicata bars “fraud on the court” argument because it could have been raised in the original action); Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2nd Cir.1995) (“Only if Weldon had had no opportunity to litigate the allegations of fraud on the court could this action go forward,” without regard to res judicata principles); Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553 , 558-60 (5th Cir.1989) (complaint that underlying judgmen…

The Court has federal question jurisdiction, however, because, "[ujnder elementary principles of fairness and justice, actions seeking relief from judgments based on alleged fraud upon the court should be treated as continuations of the former action.” Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1995).

Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2nd Cir.1995) (applying res judicata where the plaintiff sought to set aside an earlier judgment through an independent action, alleging misrepre *117 sentation and fraud upon the court).

Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 , 106 S.Ct. 2957, 2963 , 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3278 , 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983); Dynamic Image, 221 F.3d at 39 ; Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 4 (2nd Cir.1995).

Zack Metal Co. v. Int’l Navigation Corp. of Monrovia, 675 F.2d 525, 529 (2d Cir.1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995).

For example, “[r]es judicata ‘does not preclude a litigant from making a direct attack ... upon the judgment before the court which rendered it.’ ” Campaniello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995)).

See Granata, 2013 WL 6708412 , at *4; see also Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1995); Horwitz v. Alloy Auto.

See Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995).

See Foster v. Skinner, 70 F.3d 1 )84, 1087 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam).

See Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Res judicata does not preclude a litigant from making a direct attack [under Rule 60(b)] upon the judgment before the court which rendered it.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); accord Felton v. Local Union 804, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 22-2779, 2024 WL 2813896 , at *3 (2d Cir. June 3, 2024) (summary order).

See Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2nd Cir. 1995) (applying res judicata where the plaintiff sought to set aside an earlier judgment through an independent action, alleging misrepresentation and fraud upon the court).

See Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 1 The Court notes that the Magistrate Judge already denied the portions of Plaintiff’s motion requesting a hearing and appointment of counsel.

See Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1995) (“the very grounds on which [plaintiff] claims fraud upon the court—the government’s alleged misrepresentation and misconduct—were raised or should have been raised by [plaintiff] during the pendency of the earlier case, . . . whether prior to judgment or afterwards, by way of a motion for reconsideration or petition for rehearing. . . .

Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the plaintiff had failed to allege “fraud on the court.” Moreover, “an aggrieved party seeking relief under the saving clause of Rule 60(b) still must be able to show that there was no ‘opportunity to have the ground now relied upon to set aside the judgment fully litigated in the original action.’ ” Id. at 560 (quoting Serzysko, 461 F.2d at 702 n. 2); accord Weldon v. Unit…

See Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1995).

This is so because the independent action is considered a continuation of the original action for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction and does not require “an independent basis for jurisdiction.” United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 , 118 S.Ct. 1862 , 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998); see also Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that governmental consent is not required to bring an independent action in the same court as the original action).

See Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1995), quoting from 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2868, at 405 (2d ed. 1995) (“A party is not bound by the label he puts on his papers.