Gagan v. American Cablevision (1996)

But see Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc. (In re Gagan), 77 F.3d 951 , 967-68 (7th Cir.1996). 36 .

Indeed, “RICO jurisprudence is replete with examples of faded attempts to dress up state law claims as suave RICO cases using the expansive definition of mail and wire fraud.” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 963 (7th Cir.1996).

Gagan, 77 F.3d at 961; MCM Partners, 62 F.3d at 980 .

Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir.1996) (failure to cite any factual or legal basis for an argument waives it); Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168 , 173 n. 1 (7th Cir.1996) (argument that is not developed in any meaningful way is waived); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Benefits Review Bd., 957 F.2d 302, 305 (7th Cir.1992). ("[W]e have no obligation to consider an issue that is merely raised on appeal, but not develop…

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir.1996).

Cdblevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir.1996) (“Losers in a trial can go hunting for relief on appeal with a rifle or a shotgun.

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir.1996) (Evans, J.); see also Fifth Third Mortg.

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996) (finding limited partner established RICO standing where the partnership was dissolved).

A section 1962(d) conspiracy charge thus does not require proof that the defendant committed two predicate acts of racke- teering, Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63, 65-66 , 118 S. Ct. at 476, 478 , that he agreed to commit two predicate acts, ibid., or, for that matter, that any such acts were ultimately com- mitted by anyone, id. at 63 , 118 S. Ct. at 476 (noting that section 1962(d) includes “no requirement of some overt act or specific act”); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 7…

A section 1962(d) conspiracy charge thus does not require proof that the defendant committed two predicate acts of racketeering, Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63, 65-66 , 118 S.Ct. at 476, 478 , that he agreed to commit two predicate acts, ibid., or, for that matter, that any such acts were ultimately committed by anyone, id. at 63 , 118 S.Ct. at 476 (noting that section 1962(d) includes “no requirement of some overt act or specific act”); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d…

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 967-68 (7th Cir.1996) (striking belated attempt to raise bankruptcy discharge defense, concluding that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), discharge in bankruptcy is affirmative defense that must be timely asserted or waived).

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 961 (7th Cir.1996).

See, e.g., Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 578 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding “[w]e will deem an issue waived where the argument on appeal is undeve- loped and not supported with pertinent authority.”); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir. 1996).

See, e.g., Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 578 (7th Cir.2001) (holding "[w]e will deem an issue waived where the argument on appeal is undeveloped and not supported with pertinent authority.”); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir.1996). 15 .

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966 (7th Cir.1996) (finding Rule 51 objection waived where party conceded that he did not object to that portion of the jury instruction questioned on appeal); Susan Wakeen Doll Co., 272 F.3d at 453 (party waived any appellate argument regarding clause to which no objection was made at instruction conference); cf. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334 (“We agree ... that the State’s trial objection was not specific enough to alert the district court to the mo…

Co., 134 F.3d 841, 852 (7th Cir.1998); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966-67 (7th Cir.1996).

See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir.1998); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996); Tapia v. City of Greenwood, 965 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir.1992).

However, “we limit our inquiry to whether the evidence presented, combined with all the reasonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed.” Id. (citing Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996) (other citation omitted)).

Because arguments not raised below cannot be pressed for the first time in this Court, Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966 (7th Cir.1996); Jean v. Dugan, 20 F.3d 255, 265 (7th Cir.1994), the claim that Council member Watson and Mrs. Larsen entered an oral agreement has been waived.

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966-67 (7th Cir.1996).

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966 (7th Cir.1996). 11 Almy's fourth argument challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Counts 1, 2, and 6 of the complaint based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

See Kerr v. Farley, 95 F.3d 472, 481 (7th Cir.1996) (failure to develop argument results in waiver); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir.1996) (failure to develop and support an argument results in the waiver of that argument); Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(6). 13 In any event, we review a sentencing court's safety valve decision for clear error.

See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1304-05 (7th Cir.1987); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., 63 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir.1995); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 962-64 (7th Cir.1996); cf. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir.1992).

Given that all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the winning party, Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996), we agree with the district court that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of causation.

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966 (7th Cir.1996).

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 955 (1996); United States v. Levy, 741 F.2d 915, 924 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984).

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir.1996).

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir.1996)

Gagan v. American Cablevision Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 967 (7th Cir.1996); Grassi v. Information Resources, Inc., 63 F.3d 596, 602-03 (7th Cir.1995).

Id. at 954.

Some panels of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals have not distinguished between closed and open-ended periods of racketeering, and focus on the same factors in either case, including: "(1) the number and variety of the predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed; (2) the number of victims; (3) the presence of separate schemes; and (4) the occurrence of distinct injuries.” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 962-63 (7th Cir.1996) (cit…

And the Trustee has failed to establish that “no reasonable person could agree with the [bankruptcy] court.” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 966 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir.1994)).

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir.1996) (advising appellants to use a rifle approach to briefing rather than bringing “their shotgun to Chicago”); United States v. Levy, 741 F.2d 915, 924 (7th Cir.1984) (“Again we observe that the shotgun inclusion of issues may be the basis of hitting the target with something but still runs the risk of obscuring the significant issues by dilution.”).

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir. 1996).

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 968 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Contrary to [debtor’s] assertion, it was his responsibility, not the bankruptcy or district courts’, to give [creditor] notice of his bankruptcy and to properly list [creditor] on his schedule of creditors.”).

The Seventh Circuit next cited Stark in Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc. , 77 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 1996), a civil case in which an individual investor "in a cable television limited partnership" sued "14 individuals, corporations, and limited partnerships alleging claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and other claims under state law." Id. at 954 (citation omitted).

RWB Servs., 539 F.3d at 686 (citing Gagan, 77 F.3d at 958); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c).

Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A ‘RICO conspiracy, like all conspiracies, does not require direct evidence of agreement; an agreement can be inferred from the circumstances.’ ”).

“Where the shareholder’s injury resulted directly from an injury to the corporation, but only indirectly from the harm the wrongdoer *936 wreaked upon the corporation, the RICO claim belongs to the corporation, and not the shareholder.” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 959 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir.1990) (“Shareholders of a corporation do not have standing as individuals to bring a RICO action for diminution in the va…

Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir.1984) (Section 1962(c) “requires only some separate and distinct existence for the person and the enterprise”). 13 “There need be shown ‘only some separate and distinct existence for the person and the enterprise.’ ” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 964 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1280 (7th Cir.1989)).

For each conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs must adequately allege “(1) that the defendants agreed to acquire or maintain an interest in or control of an enterprise or to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and (2) that defendants further agreed that someone would commit at least two predicate acts to accomplish those goals.” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 961 (7th Cir.1996).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b); Mathur v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 207 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir.2000); Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir.1998); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996).

In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266-68 , 112 S.Ct. 1311 , 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must establish that the defendant, by violating RICO, proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries: there must be “some relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” See also Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir.1996).

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 961 (7th Cir.1996).

However, the Seventh Circuit interprets RICO broadly for the purposes of § 1962(d), “requiring that a plaintiff only allege an overt act that furthers a RICO conspiracy, even if the overt act is not a' predicate act.” Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir.1996).

Instead, courts must look for an actual “agreement to participate in an endeavor which, if completed, would constitute a violation of the substantive statute.” Id. (citing Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996); Schiffels v. Kemper Fin.

See, e.g., Stoebner v. Parry, 91 F.3d 1091 , 1093 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (“We reject Stoebner’s argument that the bankruptcy court improperly allowed Parry, Murray to raise collateral estoppel in its summary judgment motion because Stoebner has failed to show that he lacked notice of the defense, or that Parry, Murray’s delay prejudiced his ability to respond,” citing Sanders v. Department of the Army, 981 F.2d 990, 991 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam), and Camarillo v. McCa…

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996).

Cagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 962-63 (7th Cir.1996).

Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970)).