UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John E. CALHOON, Defendant-Appellant (1996)

See United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, we accept all reasonable inferences that tend to support the government’s case); United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable jury could find the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).

We defer to the discretion of the district court on “whether the probative value was outweighed by an unfair prejudice,” and we reverse the decision to admit the testimony “only if it were clearly an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 533 (11th Cir. 1996).

In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury charge, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 533 (11th Cir. 1996).

See, e.g., United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 235 (1st Cir.1985) ("test for materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is ... whether [the statement] had the capacity to influence a government function"); United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir.1980) ("false statement must simply have the capacity to impair or pervert the functioning of a government agency"); United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir.2001) ("`materiality' is a fairly low bar. …

When examining a district court’s ruling under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[w]e defer to the discretion of the district court on ‘whether the probative value was outweighed by any unfair prejudice,’ and we reverse the deci- sion to admit the testimony ‘only if it were clearly an abuse of dis- cretion.’” Id. at 1350 (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 533 (11th Cir. 1996)).

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and accept all reasonable factual inferences to deter- mine whether “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evi- dence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 632 (11th Cir. 1990); and then citing United States v. Gafyczk, 847 F.2d 685 , 691–92 (11th Cir. 1988)).

“Evidence is suf- ficient to support a conviction if ‘a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (quot- ing United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

“Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if ‘a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

The evidence will be sufficient to support a conviction if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1284-85 (quoting United States v. Calhoun, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

United States v. Cal- hoon, 97 F.3d 518, 533 (11th Cir. 1996).

The evidence will be sufficient to support a conviction if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1284-85 (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

The evidence will be sufficient to support a conviction if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1284–85 (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (a), (a)(3); United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1132 (11th Cir. 2004) (“For a conviction to be sustained under § 1001(a)(3), it is imperative that the ‘writing or document’ be ‘false.’”); id. at 1136–41 (discussing the “within the jurisdiction” element); United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996) (listing the elements of a “violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1001” before the statute was divided into subsections like § 1001(a)(3)); …

“Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if ‘a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282 , 1299 12 Case: 19-15179 Date Filed: 07/31/2020 Page: 13 of 18 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

Tr. 32:24-25; see also Safavian, 528 F.3d at 965 n.7; United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 531 (11th Cir. 1996).

In that case, “the evidence will be sufficient to support a conviction if ‘a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 1284–85 (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

First, we review de novo an alleged violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, United States v. Strickland, 261 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001); the sufficiency of the evidence, United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996); an alleged constructive amendment of the indictment, United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298 , 1309 n.9 (11th Cir. 2012); and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1997).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 531 (11th Cir. 1996).

And, we are guided by this polestar: evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).

The evidence is sufficient if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).

The trial evidence included testimony, for example:' (i)t that the Cristiano Ronaldo was located more than 120 miles offshore, away from any fishing fleet, with essentially no fishing gear, but with a large amount "of fuel; (ii) that the Cristiano Ronaldo sped off when the .Coast Guard helicopter approached, despite the Coast Guard’s radio-transmitted orders to halt, and despite several warning shots from the helicopter into the water; (iii) that the crew of the Cristiano Ro…

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 531 (11th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 531 (11th Cir.1996).

To prove that Mr. Manning made a false statement to a law enforcement officer in *939 violation of § 1001, “the government must prove (1) that a statement was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that it was material; (4) that it was made with specific intent; and (5) that it was within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 531 (11th Cir.1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996).

Accordingly, our task is to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996)).

“Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required by a statute, government regulation, or form.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir.1996).

“Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required by a statute, government regulation, or form.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir. 1996).

“Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required by a statute, government regulation, or form.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir. 1996).

“Falsity under section 1001 can be established by a false representation or by the concealment of a material fact.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 524 (11th Cir.1996).

United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1079 (11th Cir.1999) (citations omitted). “[T]he evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if ‘a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996)). 1.

On his false statement conviction, Marion argues that the statement that he knew nothing about Tiera’s loans was immaterial. 1 “To satisfy the element of materiality, it is enough if the statements had a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of affecting or influencing a government function.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 530 (11th Cir.1996) (quotations omitted).

“Accordingly, the evidence will be sufficient to support a conviction if ‘a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996)).

“To sustain a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1001 , the government must prove (1) that a statement was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that it was material; (4) that it was made with specific intent; and (5) that it was within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir.1996).

United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 531 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

Ga. 2011). 50 U.S. v. R&F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 524 (11th Cir. 1996), and Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir. 1975)). 51 See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1012 (11th Cir. 2005). 12 procedure codes, specific dates on which Defendants submitted the claims to Medicare for payment, and specific amounts the Government paid to Defendants.

See id. at 4-5 ¶ 13; 18 ¶¶ 77-78. 19 97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required by a statute, government regulation, or form.”).

“Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed 6 In Markham, the Fifth Circuit upheld the sufficiency of a section 1001 indictment that listed a set of separate falsifications by the defendant to conceal the material facts at issue; the scheme included the defendant’s causing a patent application to be filed in the names of two individuals who were not the true inventors and his filing a series of misleading statements with the Patent Office. 537 F.2d …

Cir. 2008) (“Concealment cases in this circuit and others have found a duty to disclose material facts on the basis of specific requirements for disclosure of specific information.”); United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required by a statute, government regulation, or form.”).

Cir. 2008) ("Concealment cases in this circuit and others have found a duty to disclose material facts on the basis of specific requirements for disclosure of specific information."); United States v. Calhoon , 97 F.3d 518 , 526 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required by a statute, government regulation, or form.").

However, this is contrary to the plain language of the statute, which includes as an element of the offense the requirement that the offender made a “materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)(2) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d at 740 ; United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).

The Court further finds that there is sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could find that after January 1, 2002, Dr. Lucasti was at least reckless with regard to the truth of the Medicare claims at issue here. (a) Claims Submitted After January 1, 2002 “Medicare claims may be false if they claim reimbursement for services or costs that either are not reimbursable or were not rendered as claimed.” United States v. R & F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349,…