Cricket Group, Ltd. v. Highmark, Inc. (2016)

In an analogous case, Cricket Group, Ltd. v. Highmark, Inc., Judge Motz of this Court held that because the defendant had “never established a physical presence in Maryland,” the “many contacts between the two parties [that] occurred via email, telephone, or instant messaging . . . [did] not provide sufficient contacts to justify exercising personal jurisdiction.” 198 F. Supp. 3d 540, 544 (D.

Cricket Grp., Ltd. v. Highmark, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 540, 544 (D.

To assert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two conditions must be met: “the state’s applicable long-arm statute must confer jurisdiction, and the assertion of jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cricket Group, Limited v. Highmark, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 540, 543 (D.

Stated differently, “although many contacts between the two parties occurred via email, telephone, or instant messaging, such communications do not provide sufficient contacts to justify exercising personal jurisdiction.” Cricket Grp., Ltd. v. Highmark, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 540, 544 (D.

Palmer, Law of Restitution § 1.1 at 2 (1978) (footnotes omitted)) (“Restitution based upon unjust enrichment cuts across many branches of the law, including contract, tort, and fiduciary relationship, but it also occupies much territory that is its sole preserve.”). 6 also Cricket Group, Limited v. Highmark, Inc., 198 F.Supp.3d 540, 544 (D.

It is well-established that “a corporation’s ‘place of incorporation and principal place of business are paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’” Cricket Grp., Ltd. v. Highmark, Inc., 198 F.Supp.3d 540, 546 (D.Md. 2016) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)).

Highmark, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 540, 543 (D.