Flores v. Long (1997)

Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1997).

Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997).

Corp. v. 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P., 105 F.3d 578 , 580 (10th 11 Cir. 1997) (noting that “the only remands immune to appellate review are those predicated upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in the removal procedure”); cf. Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[I]n the instant case there was no motion to remand for a defect in removal procedure.

Despite the seemingly unqualified language of the first clause of § 1447(d), its prohibition on appellate review applies “only if the district court remands on grounds permitted by § 1447(c).” Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 731 (10th Cir.1997); see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.

See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 , 582 n. 6 (4th Cir.1997) (following the footnote and refusing to reach the Eleventh Amendment issue because it was not raised by the parties); Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732 (10th Cir.1997) (noting the Patsy language and refusing to decide whether the rule is discretionary or mandatory); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1996) (exercising sua sponte review of the Eleventh Amendment issue and finding that Seminole…

The district court need not be correct in its determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, however, so long as it made that determination in good faith.” Id. (citing Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732, 733 (10th Cir.1997)).

Accord New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (11th Cir.1997) (finding no jurisdiction in light of § 1447(d) to consider appeal or petition for mandamus with respect to remand order); Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997) (same); Gonzalez- Garcia v. Williamson Dickie Mfg.

Accord New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (11th Cir.1997) (finding no jurisdiction in light of § 1447(d) to consider appeal or petition for mandamus with respect to remand order); Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997) (same); Gonzalez-Garcia v. Williamson Dickie Mfg.

In Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 131 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir.1997), we discussed Eleventh Amendment immunity as a jurisdictional bar and stated that "it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would consider Eleventh Amendment immunity to be an affirmative defense or a jurisdictional bar (which nonetheless can be waived) for the purposes of the removal statute.” See also Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732 (10th Cir.1997)(same).

Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997); see also Archuleta, 131 F.3d at 1363 .

The remand therefore falls within the statutory reasons for remand set forth in Section 1447(c), causing Section 1447(d) to bar review “on appeal or otherwise.” Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 131 F.3d 1359 , 1362 (10th Cir.1997); Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 731 (10th Cir.1997).

This is true “even if the district court’s jurisdictional *931 determination appears erroneous, so long as that determination was made in good faith.” Dalrymple v. Grand River Dam Authority, 145 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir.1998) (citing Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 131 F.3d 1359 , 1362 (10th Cir.1997), and Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997)).

The case relied on by plaintiffs, Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997), is not applicable to this case since it dealt with the situation where the district court remanded the entire case containing state and federal claims because the Eleventh Amendment precluded federal court jurisdiction over the state and state officials in their official capacities.

Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997); see also Archuleta, 131 F.3d at 1363.

See Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that this court must determine by independent review the actual grounds upon which the remand was based). 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) specifically permits a district court to remand a case based on a defect in the removal procedure.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d) (providing that, with a specified exception not applicable here, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise”); see also Flores v. Long , 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that there is no appellate jurisdiction to review a remand order, entered in a removed case, “based to a fair degree upon the court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case…

See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d) (providing that, with a specified exception not applicable here, "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise"); see also Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that there is no appellate jurisdiction to review a remand order, entered in a removed case, "based to a fair degree upon the court's finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case")…

See Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732-33 (10th Cir.1997).

See Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732-33 (10th Cir.1997).

See Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732-33 (10th Cir.1997).

See Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 731 (10th Cir.1997).