Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa (1999)

To determine whether an employee was fired “because of ” his race, see Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), we usually “look only to the con- duct of the decisionmaker—the party with the ‘power to actually [fire] the employee.’” Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1196 (11th Cir. 2019) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1…

See Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1332 (“[The ‘cat’s paw’] theory provides that causation may be established if the plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.”).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

CAT’S PAW THEORY To show a non-decisionmaker’s animus caused the decisionmaker’s termination action, “the plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory animus behind the recommendation, and not the underlying employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual cause of the other party’s decision to terminate the employee.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)).

A cat’s-paw argument requires evidence that the ultimate (and ma- nipulated) decisionmaker—the puppet—“followed the biased rec- ommendation” of another—the puppeteer—“without inde- pendently investigating the complaint against the employee.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

That theory “provides that causation may be established if the plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Ziyadat, 3 F.4th at 1298 .

To establish a Title VII discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the employer’s discriminatory animus towards the employee based on the employee’s protected characteristic; (2) a discharge or other significant change in the terms or conditions of employment; and (3) a causal link between the two.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).

Hitt, 301 F.3d at 248-49 (emphasis by underlining added); see also Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1332 (“We need not announce a bright line at which an independent investigation becomes a rubber stamp to resolve this case, because the record before us does not contain any hint of a cat’s paw arrangement.”); Quinn v. Monroe Cty., 330 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir.2003) (“Stimpson thus held that the city [of Tuscaloosa] could not be held liable for retaliation because the civil service boa…

“In such a case, the recommender is using the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or ‘cat’s paw’ to give effect to the recommender’s discriminatory animus.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).

Ferguson would need to show “the decisionmaker [Reed] followed [Reaves’] biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against [Ferguson].” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

Viable cat’s paw cases typically involve a subordinate employee recommending that an adverse action be taken against an individual, and the decisionmaker following “the biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1268 n. 10. 27 Minard cursorily invokes the “cat’s paw” doctrine by stating: “Rushforth’s actions clearly demonstrate she had discriminatory animus and that she intended to, and did, influence [Sam’s] employment decisions with respect to [Minard], satisfying the ‘cat’s paw’ doctrine and rendering the ‘formal decision-maker’ label irrelevant.” Doc. 58 at 31. “[A] ‘cat’s paw’ theory of recovery may apply when a biased actor recommends that an adverse e…

But as Mr. Robinson continues to include Davis in various arguments, the court also includes Davis in its holdings to clarify that those holdings apply to any claims that have not been withdrawn against him. “cat’s paw” liability, see Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999), because Davis and Newton simply rubber-stamped Edgil and Williams’s decisions, thus serving as a conduit for their discriminatory animus, (see doc. 27 at 38–39).

To state a plausible race discrimination claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts that establish that the defendant employer’s racially “discriminatory animus,” an adverse employment action, and “a causal link between the two.” Woods v. Waste Pro of Fla., Inc., No. 21-12610, 2022 WL 2288683 , at *2 (11th Cir. June 24, 2022) (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)).1 Determining an employer’s “actual reason” for an adverse employ…

See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 (2011); Llampallas v. Mini-Cirs., Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 , 1249 (11th Cir. 1998); Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

“At times, a discharge recommendation by a party without actual power to discharge an employee may be actionable,” but only if the recommendation “directly resulted in the employee’s discharge.” Gilroy, 843 F. App’x at 196 (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999). “[T]he plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory animus behind the recommendation, and not the underlying employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual cause of the other party’s decision to terminate the employee.” Id. at 1331 .

These small things matter because, although Eubanks and Joyner deny knowing about Plaintiff’s prior complaints, there’s conflicting testimony about Reynolds’ knowledge. [Doc. 29, ¶ 14]; [Doc. 27, ¶ 12]; [Doc. 22, Dennard Depo., p. 444:3–15 (discussing Reynolds’ anger that Plaintiff circumvented him by going to HR with her complaints about Burgess)]; cf. also Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff does so again with Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

But, a cat’s paw theory requires evidence that the ultimate decisionmaker “followed the biased recommendation” of another “without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

In such a case, the recommender is using the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or ‘cat’s paw’ to give effect to the recommender's discriminatory animus.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998)).

In other words, a non-decision-making employee uses “the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or ‘cat's paw’ to give effect to the [non-decision-making employee’s] discriminatory animus.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

(Doc. 47 at 18, 27.) Under a cat’s paw theory, causation may be established if the plaintiff “shows that the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation [of a recommender] without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

See, e.g., Marshall, 854 F.3d at 378 (discussing the rationale underlying cat’s paw liability and determining that the agency principles that support its application to other types of claims also apply to claims of discrimination under the Family Medical Leave Act); Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 273 (recognizing that “Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles,” and turning to those principles for guidance in determining under what circumst…

In such a case, the recommender is using the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or ‘cat’s paw’ to give effect to the recommender’s discriminatory animus.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

To establish a Title VII intentional discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the employer's discriminatory animus towards [her] based on the [her] protected characteristic; (2) a discharge or other significant change in the terms or conditions of employment; and (3) a causal link between the two.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

For example, the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “in order to prove intentional discrimination under this section, a plaintiff must establish (1) the employer's discriminatory animus towards the employee based on the employee’s protected characteristic; (2) a discharge or other significant change in the terms or conditions of employment; and (3) a causal link between the two.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).

The Eleventh Circuit has described this as the “cat’s paw theory,” which applies “when a biased actor recommends that an adverse employment action be taken against an employee, but the biased actor is not the ultimate decision-maker.” Id. (citing Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).

(See doc. 37, pp. 15–17.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show that the decisionmakers7 were “aware of his communications with the sexual harassment complainants or with his interview with the . . . employment action be taken against an employee, but the biased actor is not the ultimate decision-maker.” Id. (citing Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).

Additionally, between her initial meeting with Mayor Girtz and her termination, Maddox’s contract was renewed twice.86 Thus, Maddox’s cat’s paw theory fails. 83 Gilroy v. Baldwin, 843 F. App'x 194 , 197 (11th Cir. 2021) (“As for the cat's paw theory -- assuming arguendo that it applies in the § 1983 context”). 84 Id. at 196 (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)). 85 Id. 86 Amended Complaint, [Doc. 17] at ¶ 30, 34, 37.

“Regardless of whether a Title VII plaintiff invokes McDonnell Douglas or presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence, the record must permit the inference of a ‘causal link’ between the ‘discriminatory animus’ and the ‘discharge or other significant change in the terms or conditions of employment.’” Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1196 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part) (citing Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).

In such a scenario where the decisionmaker follows the biased recommendation without an independent investigation, “the recommender is using the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or ‘cat’s paw’ to give effect to the recommender’s [retaliatory] animus.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

In cat’s paw cases, “causation may be established if the plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker followed [a] biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

See Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[The cat’s paw] theory provides that causation may be established if the plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.”). the ultimate decision.” Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1174 .

Id. (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Crockett v. GEO Grp., Inc., 582 F. App’x 793 , 797–98 (11th Cir. 2014); Brooks v. Hyundai Motor Mfg.

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

The Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] previously stated the general proposition that in some cases, a discharge recommendation by a party with no power to actually discharge the employee may be actionable if the plaintiff proves that the recommendation directly resulted in the employee’s discharge.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (under a “cat’s paw” theory, a plaintiff must “prove that the discriminatory animus behind the recommendation, and not the underlying employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual cause of the other party’s decision to terminate the employee.”). 83 ECF 87, at 64.

Instead, Sanchez needs to meet MEDS’ justifications 7 Discriminatory animus could also be demonstrated if Sanchez shows that McCall, following the biased recommendation of O’Connor, terminated him without independently investigating the complaints against him—a theory of liability known as the “cat’s paw.” See Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).

Even where there is a known discriminatory animus in play, the employee still has the burden of proving that the discriminatory animus was “an actual cause of the . . . decision.” Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).

Dist., 604 F. App’x 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)).

App’x 194, 196 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)).

“In such a case, the recommender is using the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or ‘cat’s paw’ to give effect to the recommender’s discriminatory animus.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 , 979 n.21 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).

“Under the cat's paw doctrine, a plaintiff may establish but-for causation if she shows that the unbiased decision-maker (here [the Commission]) followed a ‘biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.’” Godwin, 615 F. App’x at 528 (quoting Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).

Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).