Plumbing Industry Board v. E.W. Howell Co. (1997)

Const. Co. (2000) 142 Wn.2d 431 [ 13 P.3d 622, 627 ] (Trig) [public works lien statute making third party contractor liable for ERISA contributions preempted as “alternative funding mechanism for the ERISA plans”]; but see Maui Prince Hotel, supra, 918 P.2d at pp. 1154—1155 [neutral and general mechanic’s and materialman’s lien statute not preempted].) As one court observed, “Because the state law impermissibly adds to the exclusive list of parties ERISA holds responsible fo…

Bd., 126 F.3d at 69; Romney II, 105 F.3d at 812-13.

Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999); Howell, 126 F.3d at 67; cf. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-60 (explaining that the fact that a law has an indirect economic influence on ERISA plans does not, in and of itself, justify preemption).

Ass’n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 , 119 S.Ct. 1033 , 143 L.Ed.2d 42 (1999); Howell, 126 F.3d at 67; cf. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-60 , 115 S.Ct. 1671 (explaining that the fact that a law has an indirect economic influence on ERISA plans does not, in and of itself, justify preemption).

Hence, to overcome the anti-preemption presumption, a party challenging a statute must convince a court that there is something in the practical operation of the challenged statute to indicate that it is the type of law that Congress specifically aimed to have ERISA supersede. 41 Id. at 66-67.

Howell Co., 126 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.1997).

Bd., 126 F.3d at 66; see also Taylor, 481 U.S. *46 at 63-67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 .

Howell Co., 126 F.3d at 66; Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Int’l Union Local 33 Benefit Funds v. America's Marble Source, Inc., 950 F.2d 114 , 117 (3d Cir.1991).

Howell Co., 126 F.3d at 66; Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Int'l Union Local 33 Benefit Funds v. America's Marble Source, *508 Inc., 950 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir.1991).

For quite some time, the key term of this preemption provision, “relate to,” was taken in an almost literal sense, see Shato, 463 U.S. at 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890 , with the concomitant problem arising that almost any matter somehow touching upon ERISA, no matter how tangential, could fall within the ambit of “relate to.” In 1995 the Supreme Court fashioned a significant doctrinal change with its Travelers decision ( 514 U.S. 645 , 115 S.Ct. 1671 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695 ) in which it…

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Louisville & N.R.

“Outside these areas, the presumption against preemption is considerable — state laws of general application that merely impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but are not ‘so acute’ as to force an ERISA plan to adopt certain coverage or to restrict its choice of insurers should not be disturbed.” Plumbing Ind. Bd., 126 F.3d at 67. “ ‘What triggers ERISA preemption is not just any effect on administrative procedures, but rather an effect on the primary admi…

Second, a state law is preempted even though it does not refer to ERISA or ERISA plans if it has a clear ‘connection with’ a plan in the sense that it ‘mandate[s] employee benefit structures or their administration’ or ‘providfes] alternative enforcement mechanisms.’ Plumbing Industry Bd., 126 F.3d at 67.

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 66 (2nd Cir.1997) (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645, 656 , 115 S.Ct. 1671 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995)).

Bd., Plumbing Local Union No. 1 v. Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.1997).

Bd., 126 F.3d at 67 (emphasis added) (citing California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 , 117 S.Ct. 832, 838 , 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) and Travelers Ins.

See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64-66 , 107 S.Ct. 1542 ; Howell, 126 F.3d at 66; Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 573 (2d Cir.1995).

Bd., 126 F.3d at 66; see also Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475 , 118 S.Ct. 921 (“The artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiffs state-law claim”).

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1997) ("ERISA preemption provides a valid basis for removal jurisdiction only if (1) the state law cause of action is preempted by ERISA, and (2) that cause of action is within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a).").

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1997) (“ERISA preemption provides a valid basis for removal jurisdiction only if (1) the state law cause of action is preempted by ERISA, and .(2) that cause of action is within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a).”).

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1997).

Howell Co. [Inc.], 126 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.1997), and led to the conclusion that ERISA preemption was “conspicuous for its breadth,” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 , 111 S.Ct. 403 , 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990).

Howell Co., 126 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.1997).

In that case, the Second Circuit recognized that “a state can — through generally applicable enforcement statutes that function irrespective of ERISA — enforce third-party obligations that are created without ERISA’s mandate or influence.” Id. at 69.

Bd., Plumbing Local Union No. 1, supra, 126 F3d, at 66, quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross, supra, 514 US, at 655 .) In the instant case, the subrogation cause of action is based upon tort claims which the Funds’ participants and beneficiaries could assert against Defendants.

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.1997).

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins.

Howell Co., Inc., 126 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins.

See 126 F.3d at 68-69 .

See 126 F.3d at 68-69 .