United States v. Bradley Oliver Bowen, United States v. Rinaldo Ticchiarelli, A/K/A Ronaldo, A/K/A Whitney Dorey (1997)

II A. Bowen 1.

II A. Bowen 1.

See Inclema, 363 F.3d at 1182 ; United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. Fenton, 309 F.3d 825 , 828 n. 3 (3d Cir.2002); United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir.2001); United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13-15 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. FuentesBarahona, 111 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Lazaro-Guadarrama, 71 F.3d 1419 , 1421 (8th Cir.1995); United …

In that event, however, we would have to apply the rule of lenity, Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998); United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1997), which would counsel against our adopting an understanding of what "specif[y]" means that would rule out reading the "defendant"-specific language in § 3B1.4 to constitute such an explicit instruction, see United States v. Luna-Díaz, 222 F.3d 1 , 3 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The rule of lenity requires …

Id. at 895 (citations omitted). 8 More recently, albeit in an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that Lee’s reading of the guideline would apply beyond the narrow facts of that case. 9 In United States v. Cornelius, 202 Fed.Appx. 437, 439 (11th Cir.2006), the court concluded that targets of a bank fraud scheme who were reimbursed shortly after they sustained losses were victims, and remarked that although the losses in Lee “were not short-term or subject…

United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 14 (1997) (applying rule of lenity when experts offered conflicting definitions of “hashish oil” and district court found “no scientific or universally accepted precise definition of the term”).

United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997)).

The First Circuit has recognized that the purpose underlying this rule is “to promote fair notice to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts.” United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 , 108 S.Ct. 2751, 2764 , 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The important purposes served by the rule of lenity include the following: "to promote fair notice to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts.” United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 , 108 S.Ct. 2751 , 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988)) (citations omitted). 16 .

United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.1997).

Thus, "[w]e have looked with favor on the application of this rule to a sentencing guideline when 'substantial ambiguity as to the guideline's meaning persists even after a court looks to its text, structure, context, and purposes.' " United States v. Suárez-González , 760 F.3d 96 , 101 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Damon 595 F.3d 395 , 401 (1st Cir. 2010) ); see United States v. Bowen , 127 F.3d 9 , 14 (1st Cir. 1997).

Id. (explaining that the “rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, a court can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)); see also Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8, 125 S.Ct. 377 (“Even if § 16 lacked clarity ... we would be constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in petitioner’s favor.”). 19 For, in addition to the notice concerns that one might d…

See United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir.1997) (applying rule of lenity).

See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997); see also United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1997) (invoking the rule of lenity to resolve Sentencing Guidelines' ambiguity in favor of criminal defendant).

See Bennett v. United States , 868 F.3d 1 , 23 (1st Cir.), opinion withdrawn and vacated , 870 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that "the rule of lenity ... serve[s] the additional and important purpose of ensuring 'the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts' ") (quoting United States v. Bowen , 127 F.3d 9 , 13 (1st Cir. 1997) ); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft , 543 U.S. 1 , 11 n.8, 125 S.Ct. 377 , 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) ("Even if § 16 lacked clarity ... we wou…

See United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1997); State v. Ashby, 1999 ME 188, ¶ 6 , 748 A.2d 1254 . [¶ 31] The criminal liability threshold set out in section 106(1), “reasonable degree of force” that the actor “reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or punish such person’s misconduct,” is derived from the common law and is shared by at least five other states. 10 [¶ 32] By way of comparison, the Model Penal Code expressly rejects the “reasonableness” and “nec…

See United States v. Bowen, 127 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997)); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus.