United States v. Salameh (1998)

See id. (“[M]y hands were literally, like, shaking.

See also Salameh, 152 F.3d at 149 (“We have cautioned that the Pinkerton charge should not be given as a matter of course and in particular where the evidence is such that the jury is required to resort to the inverse of Pinkerton and infer the existence of a conspiracy from the series of disparate criminal offenses.”) (internal quotations omitted).

“A grand jury subpoena is presumed to have a proper purpose,” and the party challenging the subpoena “bears the burden of showing that the grand jury has exceeded its legal powers.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing R.

Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401 , 405 (2d Cir. 2015)) (“[W]e review the district court’s construction of legal standards de novo”); see also U.S. v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 , 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Whether jury instructions were properly given is a question of law that this court reviews de novo”).

See, e.g., Salameh, 152 F.3d at 115 (“There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together ... particularly .., where, as here, the defendants are alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme.”).

United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation modified).

United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998).

We have recognized that “[m]utually antagonistic or irreconcilable defenses may be so prejudicial in some circumstances as to mandate severance.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Likewise, “[t]he government is free to comment on the failure of defendant to 14 refute government evidence or to support his own claims.” United States v. Aquart, 912 F.3d 1 , 15 29 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 136 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Thus, even assuming arguendo that Oladokun’s counsel was ineffective, Oladokun cannot show prejudice because “the district court need not conduct a Franks hearing” when, “after setting aside the allegedly misleading statements or omissions, the affidavit, nonetheless, presents sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998).

See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 139 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Government is ordinarily permitted to respond to arguments impugning the integrity of its case and to reply with rebutting language suitable to the occasion.”) (quoting United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 60 (2d Cir. 1983)).

When a court “delivers a timely curative instruction, we ordinarily may presume that the jury adhered to that correction unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the court’s instructions.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Co. v. Scor Reinsurance Co., 62 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (“When a defendant fails to object to the curative instruction at trial, we review the court’s instruction for plain error.”). 8 Second, as to the comments made during testimony by Springs, while we recognize that a judge should strive to create an “atmosphere of perfect impartiality,” Shah v. Pan Am.

As a general rule, the grand jury process is afforded a “presumption of regularity.” See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1998).

Thus, a defendant seeking “[t]o suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an affidavit containing erroneous information” must satisfy both a state of mind requirement and a materiality requirement by showing that “‘(1) the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the result of the affiant’s deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing judge’s probable cause finding.’” United States v. Canfield, …

A district court abuses its discretion when its decision incorporates an “error of law,” rests on a “clearly erroneous factual finding,” or “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2001).1 In this context, that deferential standard applies to both the general “manner in which [voir dire] has been conducted,” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 121 (2d Cir. 1998), and the specific questions …

Thus, a defendant bears the “extremely difficult burden” of showing that the denial of his severance motion “caused substantial prejudice.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, a defendant bears an “extremely difficult burden” of demonstrating that the denial of his motion “caused substantial prejudice.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If the denial of the motion causes some prejudice, but less than substantial prejudice, we are not apt to reverse, since, by and large, joinder promotes judicial efficiency.”) (quoting United States v. Casamento,…

Assuming arguendo that King did not waive 9 this argument by failing to raise it in the District Court, we evaluate his challenge for plain error. 10 See United States v. Johnson, 525 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1975). 11 “[A] Rule 16(a) violation is not grounds for reversal unless the violation caused the 12 defendant ‘substantial prejudice.’” United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 2016) 13 (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 130 (2d Cir. 1998)).

“A grand jury 6 subpoena is presumed to have a proper purpose,” and the party challenging the 7 subpoena “bears the burden of showing that the grand jury has exceeded its legal 8 powers.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing R.

United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 161 (2d Cir. 1998).

The February 2015 Order ʺTo suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an affidavit containing erroneous information, the defendant must show that: (1) the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the result of the affiantʹs deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the 6 truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the [issuing] judgeʹs probable cause finding.ʺ United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713 , 717‐18 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Sa…

Olivera argues that she suffered unfair spillover prejudice from having the jury hear evidence of Lopez’s uncharged acts, in particular the evidence of Lopez and Fernandez’s 2014 planned “sting” robbery, with which Olivera was not involved. 4 The decision “[w]hether to grant or deny a severance motion is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . [and] [t]he district court’s exercise of that discretion is virtually unreviewable.” United States v. Salameh, 152…

“A decision to admit [expert testimony] is not an abuse of discretion unless it is manifestly erroneous.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, out-of-court statements introduced to establish a declarant’s state of mind, United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998), or knowledge, United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131, 136-38 (2d Cir. 2013), are not hearsay.

See, e.g., United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The law has long recognized that criminal intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone.”); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]s a general rule most evidence of intent is circumstantial.”).

Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 2015)) (“[W]e review the district 8 court’s construction of legal standards de novo”); see also U.S. v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 , 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Whether jury instructions were properly given is a question of law that this court reviews de novo”).

See, e.g. , United States v. Heras , 609 F.3d 101 , 106 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The law has long recognized that criminal intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone."); United States v. Salameh , 152 F.3d 88 , 143 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A]s a general rule most evidence of intent is circumstantial.").

See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Because Ajaj was in jail and his telephone calls were monitored, Ajaj and Yousef spoke in code when discussing the bomb plot.”); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1190 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that conspirators in a complex narcotics scheme spoke in code); Hoffman, 832 F.2d at 1308 ; United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 917 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[W]hen the government eavesdrops on clan…

See United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 195 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[e]videntiary rulings are reversed only if they are 'manifestly erroneous,' such that the admission constitutes an abuse of discretion"); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[w]e will second-guess a district court 'only if there is a clear showing that the court abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or irrationally'") (quoting United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324, 1…

See, e.g., Salameh, 152 F.3d at 116-17 (“[A]ny possible prejudice was eliminated by the district court’s repeated admonitions to the jury that each defendant’s guilt had to be separately and individually considered.”) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1029-30 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir.1982)).

(Id.) knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal.” 922 F.2d at 963; see also Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 151 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To identify the essential nature of the [conspiracy] plan, we focus on the essence of the underlying illegal objectives, and the kind of criminal conduct in fact contemplated.”) (quotation and alterations omitted).

See Salameh, 152 F.3d at 123 (“Probative evidence is not inadmissible solely because it has a tendency to upset or disturb the trier of fact.”).

Salameh, 152 F.3d at 115 (“[The] preference [for joint trials] is particularly strong where, as here, the defendants are alleged to have participated in a common plan or scheme.”).

As the Second Circuit concluded, “the government presented more than enough evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Abouhalima was a knowing member of the conspiracy and was guilty, either directly or on a Pinkerton theory, on all of the substantive counts with which he was charged.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 155 (2d.

Evidence that would be admissible against Olivieri at a separate trial is “neither spillover nor prejudicial.” Rosa, 11 F.3d at 341 ; see also Salameh, 152 F.3d at 115 (“ ‘Prejudice’ occurs in joint trials when proof inadmissible against a defendant becomes a part of his trial solely due to the presence of co-defendants as to whom its admission is proper.”).

Cf. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining to require a suppression hearing to consider whether statements to Egyptian police allegedly after torture should be suppressed).3 Nothing in the SRA, related statutes, or Washington statutes in general clearly establishes whether the legislature meant to include only other states of the union or all non-Washington convictions, including convictions entered by the courts of United States territories, th…

Vernon, 672 F. Supp. 2d 391, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Any doubt about the existence of probable cause must be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.” (citing United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998))).

The predicate offense for Count 10 was conspiracy to destroy buildings in violation of 18 U.S.C. § United States v. Salameh “Salameh P’), 152 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir, 1998), 371.

Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 160 (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curium)).

As the Second Circuit noted when upholding the admission of gruesome photographs of the victims of the World Trade Center bombing, “Probative evidence is not inadmissible solely because it has a tendency to upset or disturb the trier of fact.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 123 (2d Cir.1998).

“A diminished mental state is only relevant to the voluntariness inquiry if it made mental or physical coercion by the police more effective.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1998).

See Canfield, 212 F.3d at 718 (holding that plaintiffs must show that “the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the [issuing] judge’s probable cause finding” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 , 113 (2d Cir.1998))); see also United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992) (“False information voids a warrant only if the information was necessary to the finding of probable cause.”); Foti v. County of Marin, No. 09-CV-4…

Moreover, the trial court specifically found, on the basis of its review of the video recording of the interro- gation, that the defendant did not ‘‘[suffer] from a lack of mental acuity or physical infirmity as a result of a lack of sleep . . . .’’ Such a factual finding defeats the defendant’s claim that his lack of sleep contributed to the involuntariness of his confession because ‘‘[a] diminished mental state is only relevant to the voluntari- ness inquiry if it made men…

See United States v. Hensley, 982 F.3d 1147, 1161 (8th Cir. 2020) (unbalanced 30 hypothetical was not error but "discourag[ing] the use of such one-sided jury instructions"); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 142-143 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1028 (1999) (noting unbalanced hypotheticals are "disfavored" but did not constitute prejudicial error in circumstances, because most circumstantial evidence in case pointed towards guilt).

The motion was stayed pending resolution of constitutional challenges to Section 924(c)(3)’s definition of “crime of violence.” 1 United States v. Salameh (“Salameh I”), 152 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 1998). 2 The sentencing judge believed that the statutory text and Second Circuit case law at the time of sentencing required this calculation.

The speech was not the basis for the prosecution, but instead it was used to establish the existence of, and [the defendant’s] participation in, the alleged RICO enterprise.”), and United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding use of evidence of political speech or beliefs to prove the existence of a conspiracy and its motive)).

Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 160 (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam)).

The law has long recognized that criminal intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone,” a principle of broad application. “[A]s a general rule most evidence of intent is circumstantial.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 143 (2d Cir. 1998).

Lynch v. City of Mount Vernon, 567 F. Supp. 2d 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998)).