United States v. Karl P. Zinn (2003)

But cf. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1086, 1092 (11th Cir.2003) (holding it was not plain error to impose the following condition: ‘You shall participate as directed in a program of mental health treatment including a sexual offender treatment program approved by the probation officer.”).

See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124-126 (2d Cir.2002) (conditions forbidding use of computers and internet without permission from probation officer limited access to important source of information and communication); see also United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir.2003); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205-07 (10th Cir.2001); but see United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (11th Cir.2003) (conditions upheld).

See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 , 124–126 (2d Cir. 2002) (conditions forbidding use of computers and internet without permission from probation officer limited access to important source of information and communication); see also United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386 , 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 , 1205–07 (10th Cir. 2001); but see United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084 , 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2003) (conditions upheld).

Although access to the courts is a constitutional right, Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), a condition of supervised release is not invalid any time it affects a supervisee’s ability to ex- ercise his constitutional rights, Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1089 (explaining that a condition of supervised release “is not invalid simply because it affects a probationer’s ability to exercise constitutionally pro- tected rights”).

In United States v. Zinn, the defendant pleaded guilty to pos- session of child pornography and was sentenced to a term of in- carceration followed by supervised release, subject to the special condition that, “[he] shall have no direct contact with minors under the age of 18 without the written approval of the probation officer and shall refrain from entering into any area where children fre- quently congregate including schools, day care centers, theme parks, playgrounds, et…

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003).

Instead, “[i]t is a defendant’s—or his counsel’s—burden to articu- late the specific nature of his objection . . . so that the district court may reasonably have an opportunity to consider it.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1090 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1043 (2019) (explaining that a defendant must raise “specific factual and legal argumentation at every stage of sentencing proceedings”).

“If a defendant fails to clearly ar- ticulate a specific objection during sentencing, the objection is waived on appeal.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The district court’s sentence, of which the conditions of supervised release are a part, is a final judgment immediately appealable to this Court.”).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

That was so, we explained, because the law didn’t “restrict See, e.g., United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a restriction on access to the internet in a child-pornography prosecution be- cause the supervisee could still use the internet for valid purposes with his probation officer’s permission); United States v. Coglianese, 34 F.4th 1002 , 1010– 11 (11th Cir. 2022) (same). 8 To be sure, in Doe v. Moore, our careful description of the assert…

Notably, a term of supervised release is “part of the sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (a); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

When fashioning a sentence, a district court may impose any condition that is “‘reasonably related’ to the [section] 3553(a) factors, so long as the conditions ‘involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary . . . and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)).

The Sentencing Guidelines permit sen- tencing courts to impose any conditions of supervised release that are “reasonably related” to the § 3553(a) factors, so long as the con- ditions “involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth” in § 3553(a) “and are con- sistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentenc- ing Commission.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); see also United States v. Zinn, USCA11 Case: 23-13289 Document…

To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must properly raise it in the district court by “clearly stat[ing] the grounds for [his] objection.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (an objection must clearly inform the district court of its legal basis).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

To be reasonably related, a condition need not be “sup- ported by each factor enumerated in § 3553(a),” which merit “in- dependent consideration.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003).

A defendant must “clearly state the grounds for an objection in the district court.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (11th Cir. 2003).

“Where a defendant fails to clearly state the grounds for an objection in the district court, however, he waives the objection on appeal and we are limited to reviewing for plain error.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

Bobal, 981 F.3d at 976 (citing United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1086, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003)).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

See, e.g., United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272 , 277– 78 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Metzener, 584 F.3d 928, 931 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1090 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 217 (3d Cir. 2003)).

Standard of Review USCA11 Case: 22-12924 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 01/24/2023 Page: 5 of 7 22-12924 Opinion of the Court 5 Normally we review the district court’s imposition of a supervised release sentence for abuse of discretion, United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003), but if a defendant fails to state clearly the grounds for an objection to his sentence in the district court, we review for plain error, United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 130…

Cf. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he restriction in this case is not overly broad in that Appellant may still use the Internet for valid purposes by obtaining his probation officer's prior permission.”).

But when a de- fendant waives his objection to the imposition of special conditions of supervised release, “we are limited to reviewing for plain error.” Id. (quoting United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003)).

Cf. United States v. Ramos, 763 F.3d 45, 63 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[As compared to broader internet bans,] monitoring and filtering systems, searches of any computer equipment, and searches of other electronic or data-storage devices upon reasonable suspicion . . . are narrowly tailored tools."); Perazza- Mercado, 553 F.3d at 73 ("[O]ur concern regarding a categorical residential internet ban does not imply that [defendant] is entitled to unlimited internet access, particularly i…

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2003).

Even if we could read the record to indicate that the district court might order him to pay for treatment if both “ifs” came to fruition, “it would be pure speculation to assume such facts now simply because they might conceivably come to exist at some future time.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1091 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003).

Id. at 1292 (“[T]he district court may impose any condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in [section] 3553(a).” (quoting United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003))).

We held in United States v. Zinn that a limited restriction on a sex offender’s ability to use the internet while on a three-year period of supervised release was “a necessary and reasonable condition of supervised release” that did not burden the offender’s rights under the First Amendment. 321 F.3d 1084, 1086, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003).

To preserve an objection, however, a defendant must “clearly articulate a specific objection during sentencing.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis removed).

See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003) (“By determining a challenge to the polygraph testing requirement to be generally ripe, however, we do not imply that all specific challenges to the implementation of this condition are necessarily ripe.”).

See United States v. Kerr, 472 F.3d 517, 523-24 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no impermissible delegation to probation officer where district court made no indication it was relinquishing final authority over defendant’s treatment); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding no plain error in imposing condition that required defendant to participate as directed in a program of mental health treatment approved by the probation officer); see also United St…

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f a defendant fails to clearly articulate a specific objection during sentencing, the objection is waived on appeal and we confine our review to plain error.”).

But “[w]here a defendant fails to clearly state the grounds for an objection in the district court . . . [we are] limited to reviewing for plain error.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).