Cluster 762161 (1999)

Id., at 518-522.

See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 519 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Now, as a qualified expert in fire investigation, Freeman was free to testify—as he did—that the burn and smoke patterns and other physical evidence indicated that, in his opinion, the fire started in the entryway and radiated to the sofa.”).

See Martin, 464 F.3d at 830-31 (holding that where plaintiff had disposable lighters from multiple manufacturers, circumstantial evidence in that case was insufficient to permit a jury to determine which manufacturer’s lighter had caused a fire; also holding that circumstantial evidence available in that case was insufficient to allow jury to determine whether fire was caused by product defect, product misuse, or damage to a product subsequent to the manufacturers’ relinquis…

Cf. Fireman’s Fund, 394 F.3d at 1058-59 (insufficient evidence of defect and causation when expert failed to propose a specific defect or conduct testing in accordance with industry standards); Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 521 (expert not qualified to testify to conclusions as to product failure given inexperience with the relevant products).

Cf. Fireman’s Fund, 394 F.3d at 1058–59 (insufficient evidence of defect and causation when expert failed to propose a specific defect or conduct testing in accordance with industry standards); Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 521 (expert not qualified to testify to conclusions as to product failure given inexperience with the relevant products).

Id. at 519.

Corp., 470 F.3d 1252, 1257-58 (8th Cir.2006); Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 519 (“[A]s a qualified expert in fire investigation, Freeman was free to testify — as he did — that the burn and smoke patterns and other physical evidence indicated that, in his opinion, the fire started in the entryway and radiated to the sofa.”).

Id. at 519; see also Kozar v. Sharp Elecs.

In Weisgram, a fire investigator testified that: [H]e had considered whether careless smoking might have started the fire in the sofa, but he rejected that possibility because he saw no smoking materials in the home and because he did not think the burn pattern in the sofa indicated that the fire began as the result of careless smoking, Id. at 518 (emphasis added).

Hunt Transp., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir.2001) (“Expert testimony that is speculative is not competent proof and contributes nothing to a legally sufficient evidentiary basis”) (citing Concord Boat Corp., 207 F.3d at 1057 ); In re Air Crash at Little Rock Ark., 291 F.3d at 514 (must be adequate nexus between scientific theory and subject of opinion); Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 756-57 (7th Cir.1999); Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 521 (expert te…

Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 519.

Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 519.

See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., — U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1176-77 (finding the proffered expert qualified as an expert in mechanical engineering, but that his methodology in analyzing a particular tire failure was not reliable); Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 518 (a city fire captain, although qualified as an expert on fire investigation, and therefore qualified to testify as to his opinion that a fire started in the entryway and radiated to a sofa, was not qualified to testify to h…

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 520-21 (8th Cir.1999) (affirming the exclusion of a metallurgist’s design defect opinion because he- had no personal experience and “no metallurgic reason for his conclusion”), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440, 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000); 2 accord Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 715 (8th Cir.2001); Khoury v. Philips Med.

See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 519 (8th Cir.1999) (permitting a fire investigator to testify about the origins of a fire, but not its cause).

See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem., Inc., 158 F.3d 548 , 564 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that “the district court abused its discretion in excluding admissible portions of [the expert’s] testimony by ruling that [the expert’s] testimony in its entirety was inadmissible”); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 518 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that although fire investigation expert was not qualified to opine on whether heater had malfunctioned, he could testify about t…

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 521 (8th Cir.1999) (excluding an expert's opinion that a defective thermostat in a baseboard heater caused a fire because the expert could not adequately demonstrate how a backup high-limit control failed), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440 , 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000).

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 521 (8th Cir.1999) (excluding an expert’s opinion that a defective thermostat in a baseboard heater caused a fire because the expert could not adequately demonstrate how a backup high-limit control failed), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440 , 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000).

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 521-22 (8th Cir.1999) (expert testimony not reliable where there was lack of nexus between theory and conclusion), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440 , 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000).

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 521-22 (8th Cir.1999) (expert testimony not reliable where there was lack of nexus between theory and conclusion), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440 , 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000).

See Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 518-20.

See Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 518-20.

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 517-21 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that portions of testimony from three different expert witnesses each *716 lacked a sufficient foundation because they had exceeded the scope of the witness’s expertise and thus were unreliable under Rule 702, and therefore it was an abuse of discretion to allow the testimony), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440 , 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000); Robertson, 148 F.3d at 907-08 (ordering new trial after manufac…

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 517-21 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that portions of testimony from three different expert witnesses each lacked a sufficient foundation because they had exceeded the scope of the witness's expertise and thus were unreliable under Rule 702, and therefore it was an abuse of discretion to allow the testimony), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440 (2000); Robertson, 148 F.3d at 907-08 (ordering new trial after manufacturing/ceramics/materials expert offere…

Stated differently, an expert’s opinion cannot be based upon “unsupported speculation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ; see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 519 (8th Cir.1999) (providing that expert testimony is nothing more than “patent speculation” when there is “no evidence in the record” to support it.), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440 , 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000); see also Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (“The trial judge in all cases o…

See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 518 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d 528 U.S. 440 (2000).

See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 519 (8th Cir.1999) (fire investigator did not have “free rein to speculate ... as to the cause of the fire by relying on inferences that [had] absolutely no record support”), aff'd, *1193 528 U.S. 440 , 120 S.Ct. 1011 , 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000).

See Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 521 (employing same analysis in regard to metallurgist as proposed design and manufacture expert).

See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 , 517 n. 2 (8th Cir.1999).