United States v. Joe Raymond Brooks (1999)

“The enhancement applies when the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, was notably more intricate than that of the garden-variety offense.” Adejumo, 772 F.3d at 531 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal marks omitted)). “‘We review the factual finding of whether a . . . scheme qualifies as sophisticated for clear error.’” Huston, 744 F.3d at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir. 1999…

United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1999).

See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, comment, (n.4) (conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through use of fictitious entity ordinarily indicates sophisticated means); United States v. Rouillard, 474 F.3d 551, 555 (8th Cir.2007) (findings of fact reviewed for clear error; interpretation and application of Guidelines reviewed de novo); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir.1999) (affirming application of sophisticated-means enhancement where defendant had take…

We give “great deference” to a district court’s decision to grant an enhancement for obstruction of justice, see United States v. Calderon-Avila, 322 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir.2003), and will reverse an enhancement only when the district court’s findings are insufficient, see United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958-59 (8th Cir.1999).

Finck also challenges the sufficiency of the district court’s findings relating to the obstruction adjustment. “[B]e-fore imposing an enhancement under § 3C1.1, a district court ‘must review the evidence and make independent factual findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to, or obstruction of, justice.’ ” United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 , 113 S.Ct. 1111 , 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993)).

See United States v. Anderson, 349 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Brooks, 174 F. 3d 950, 958 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We review the factual finding of whether a [fraud] scheme -5- A. Obstruction of Justice Sentencing guideline section 3C1.1 provides for a two-level sentence enhancement if the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation . . . of the instant offen…

United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999).

United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1999).

And we review “the factual finding of whether a . . . scheme qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir. 1999).

See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 193-94, 201-06 , 111 S.Ct. 604 , 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (failing to file return under § 7203; good-faith misunderstanding constitutes defense, but defendant’s views about validity of tax statutes, or claims that tax code provisions are unconstitutional, do not arise from innocent mistakes and are irrelevant to willfulness issue); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing affirmative steps to “dissociate” …

“The sophisticated-means enhancement is proper when the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, ‘was notably more intricate than that of the garden-variety [offense].’ ” United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir.2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hance, 501 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir.2007)) (addressing sophisticated-means enhancement in USSG § 2B1.1). “ ‘Even if any single step is not complicated, repetitive and coordinated conduct can amount to a so…

“We review the factual finding of whether a ... scheme qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” Id. at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir.1999)). *480 “Sophisticated means” need not be highly sophisticated.

“We review the factual finding of whether a ... scheme qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir.1999), citing United States v. Hunt, 25 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C.Cir.1994). 2 Here, the conspirators recruited straw buyers, obtained inflated appraisals, and created two entities to submit fraudulent billings and disburse loan proceeds to themselves and kickbacks to the buyers without arousing lender suspicion.

See e.g., Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174 , 1177 n. 2 (10th Cir.2008) (holding as frivolous taxpayer’s argument that he was not subject to the income tax because he is a “non resident alien” and awarding sanctions of $8,000); Ambort v. United States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1139 (10th Cir.2004) (noting Ambort conducted tax seminars instructing attendees that, although they were United States residents, they could legally claim to be “nonresident aliens” exempt from most federal income t…

United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999).

See, e.g., Flores, 362 F.3d at 1038-39; United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Brown, 311 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1999); -11- United States v. Benson, 961 F.2d 707, 709-10 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ogbeifun, 949 F.2d 1013, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1991).

See, e.g., Flores, 362 F.3d at 1038-39; United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2003); United States v. Brown, 311 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2002); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958-59 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Benson, 961 F.2d 707, 709-10 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Ogbeifun, 949 F.2d 1013, 1013-14 (8th Cir.1991).

United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999).

United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1999).

See United States v. Benson, 961 F.2d 707, 709-10 (8th Cir.1992) (reversing enhancement when district court relied solely on jury verdict); United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237, 1251-52 (2d Cir.1995) (reversing enhancement when district court based enhancement in part on guilty verdict). 29 Though we give "great deference" to a district court's decision to grant an enhancement for obstruction of justice, see United States v. Calderon-Avila, 322 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir.2003),…

Though we give “great deference” to a district court’s decision to grant an enhancement for obstruction of justice, see United States v. Calderon-Avila, 322 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir.2003), we will reverse an enhancement when the district court’s findings were not sufficient, see United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958-59 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Ransom, 990 F.2d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir.1993); Benson, 961 F.2d at 709-10 .

In United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999), we stated that “[t]o prove a tax deficiency, the first element [of income tax evasion under § 7201], the government must show that the taxpayer had unreported taxable income.” Id. at 954.

In United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1999), we stated that "[t]o prove a tax deficiency, the first element [of income tax evasion under § 7201], the government must show that the taxpayer had unreported taxable income." Id. at 954.

“We review the factual finding of whether a [fraud] scheme qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir.1999). 1 Anderson concedes that his conduct warranted a more-than-minimal-planning enhancement but argues that the district court clearly erred in imposing the increase for use of sophisticated means.

United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 702-03 (8th Cir.2003) (standard of review); see also United States v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir.2003) (care or custody); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958-59 (8th Cir.1999) (obstruction of justice enhancement); United States v. La-Roche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.1996) (district court does not err in finding use of force in relying on unobjeeted factual matters contained in the PSR).

“We review the factual finding of whether a [fraud] scheme qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir. 1999).1 Anderson concedes that his conduct warranted a more-than-minimal- planning enhancement but argues that the district court clearly erred in imposing the increase for use of sophisticated means.

United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958-59 (8th Cir.1999).

First, the district court did not commit error by enhancing Tindall's sentence for failing "to report or to correctly identify the source of income exceeding $10,000 in any year from criminal activity," U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2T1.1(b)(1) (1998); for using sophisticated means to conceal his offense, see id. § 2T1.1(b)(2); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir. 1999); for abusing his position of trust, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; United States v…

Reviewing the evidence presented to the district court de novo and in the light most favorable to the government, see United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1999), and noting Mr. Lyons’s testimony that the rifle had been his since 1963, that it was unique because he had never seen anything like it and had never seen a bolt-action pistol, and that he had shown it to others, we conclude the evidence showed he knew of its features that brought it within the scope …

See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201-203 , 111 S.Ct. 604 , 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir.1999). “[A] party is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, provided the instruction is ... supported by the evidence.... ” Jerde, 841 F.2d at 820 .

See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201-203 (1991); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1999). "[A] party is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case, provided the instruction is . . . supported by the evidence . . . ." Jerde, 841 F.2d at 820 .

United States v. Brooks, No. 98-1317, 1999 WL 262057, at * 5 (8th Cir. May 4, 1999).

See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 , 195-96 & nn. 3, 5, 111 S.Ct. 604 , 607-08 & nn. 3, 5, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991); United States v. Sassak, 881 F.2d 276, 277 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir.2008); United States v. Ellett, 527 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Stafford, 983 F.2d 25, 26 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir.1990)…

United States v. Lavoie, 433 F.3d 95, 97 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999) (citing Sansone, 380 U.S. at 351 , 85 S.Ct. 1004 ).

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding sufficient evidence of willfulness where the defendant “made a concerted effort to dissociate himself from his property and income” by transferring property to a trust). -8- The Government also produced evidence that Barker sought to terminate his relationship with Laughlin, Privatech and Nevis American after he discovered that the IRS was investigating the companies for assisting others in evading payme…

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir.1999) (finding sufficient evidence of willfulness where the defendant “made a concerted effort to dissociate himself from his property and income” by transferring property to a trust).

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir.1999) (noting that tax evasion must be willful and defining “[wjillfulness ... [to] require! ] the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty” (emphasis added)).

Compare United States v. Anderson, 349 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir.2003) (“We review the factual finding of whether a [fraud] scheme qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” (quoting United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir.1999))), ivith United States v. Finck, 407 F.3d 908, 913 (8th Cir.2005) (“We therefore review de novo ‘whether the district court correctly applied the guidelines when it determined those facts constituted sophisticated means.’ ” (quoting Unit…

Compare United States v. Anderson, 349 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We review the factual finding of whether a [fraud] scheme qualifies as ‘sophisticated’ for clear error.” (quoting United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir. 1999))), with United States v. Finck, 407 F.3d 908, 913 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We therefore review de novo ‘whether the district court correctly applied the guidelines when it determined those facts constituted sophisticated means.’” (quoting Uni…

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999) (elements of offense).

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir.1999) (“willfulness” in criminal tax context requires proof that defendant knew of and intentionally violated legal duty); United States v. Gleason, 726 F.2d 385, 387-88 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (elements of § 7203 violation; good faith disagreement with law does not negate willfulness, and circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove willfulness).

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1999).

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999).

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1999).

See United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir.1999).