Pearl Snell v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Society Security (1999)

Feb. 4, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); accord Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

Feb. 4, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); accord Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

Feb. 4, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); accord Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

“Relatedly, where an ALJ fails to adequately evaluate evidence concerning plaintiff’s condition during the relevant period, thus disobeying the requirement to develop the record, full remand for further proceedings by the Commissioner is appropriate.” Id.; Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Failure to give good reasons for not crediting the opinion of a claimant's treating physician is a ground for remand.”); Anderson v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-4969, 2009 WL 282458…

Dec. 14, 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2)); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“When other substantial evidence in the record conflicts with the treating physician’s opinion[] . . . that opinion will not be deemed controlling.

Feb. 4, 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); accord Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician's statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

Furthermore, the Commissioner need not defer to a treating physician's opinion that is “not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record, such as the opinions of other medical experts.” Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32 (citation omitted); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“the less consistent [a treating physician's] opinion is with the record as a whole, the less weight it will be given.”). 6 The court notes that Regulations pertaining to supple…

See Selian, 708 F.3d at 419 (remanding where ALJ had not applied Burgess factors or provided other “good reasons” for rejecting treating physician’s opinion); Snell, 177 F.3d at 133 (“Failure to provide ‘good reasons’ for not crediting the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is a ground for remand.”).

See also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[f]ailure to provide good reasons for not crediting the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is a ground for remand”) (internal quotations omitted).

See Snell, 177 F.3d at 133 (“[T]he less consistent that [a treating source] opinion is with the record as a whole, the less weight it will be given.”).

In reviewing a disability determination, courts must examine the entire administrative record and “consider the evidence which fairly detracts from the administrative finding as well as that which supports it.” Covo v. Gardner, 314 F. Supp. 894, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contrad…

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“the ultimate finding of whether a claimant is disabled and cannot work—[is] reserved to the Commissioner.

It is well established that “whether [plaintiff] qualifies as disabled under the statute is a decision reserved to the Commissioner.” LaValley v. Colvin, 672 F. App'x 129, 130 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The final question of disability is ... expressly reserved to the Commissioner.”).

It is well established that “whether [plaintiff] qualifies as disabled under the statute is a decision reserved to the Commissioner.” LaValley v. Colvin, 672 F. App'x 129, 130 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The final question of disability is ... expressly reserved to the Commissioner.”).3 Second, the ALJ’s assessment of moderate mental impairments consistent with the ability to perform a …

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 3 2009) (citing, inter alia, Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The 4 requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the 5 disposition of their cases…”)).

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A reviewing court ‘may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.’”); Lucius R. v. O’Malley, No. 3:22-cv-01312-MPS, 2024 WL 1200181 , at *13 (D.

See also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[a] reviewing court ‘may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action’”) (quotation omitted).

See, e.g., Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Failure to provide ‘good reasons’ for not crediting the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is a ground for remand.”) (quoting Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1998)); Gavazzi v. Berryhill, 687 F. App’x 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (remanding where the ALJ failed to provide an “overwhelmingly compelling” justification for discounting the opinions of the plaintiff's treating physician); …

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.”).

Admin., 4 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing, inter alia, Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d 5 Cir. 1999) ("The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the 6 disposition of their cases…")). 7 The ALJ accordingly erred by discounting Plaintiff's testimony. 8 SCOPE OF REMAND 9 This case must be remanded because the ALJ harmfully misevaluated the 10 medical evidence and Plaintiff's testimony.

See Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32 (“Although the treating physician rule generally requires deference to the medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician, the opinion of the treating physician is not afforded controlling weight where . . . the treating physician issued opinions that are not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. . . .”); Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he less consistent [a treating physician’s] opinion is with the r…

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing, inter alia, Snell v. 27 Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, 28 to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases…")); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 1 Finally, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's testimony as inconsistent with her activities. 2 In support, the ALJ noted Plaintiff "reported no trouble standing, reaching, using her hands, 3 remembering, understanding…

Feb. 4, 2011)(treating provider’s statement “that the claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is not controlling,” because such determinations are reserved for the Commissioner)(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”). reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether a claimant is ‘disabled,’ the ALJ cannot …

See Pena, 2013 WL 1210932 , at *15 (noting that where “the treating physician issued opinions that [were] not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record, such as the opinion of other medical experts, the treating physician’s opinion is not afforded controlling weight”) (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999)(“[T]he less c…

Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A reviewing court 'may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action.'") (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); Rodriguez, 2021 WL 738348 , at *13 n.5 (rejecting argument that an Achilles tendon impairment was non-severe because "nothing in the ALJ's decision suggests that she considered" it at Step Two).

Feb. 4, 2011)(treating provider’s statement “that the claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is not controlling,” because such determinations are reserved for the Commissioner)(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

The Second Circuit has cautioned against “second-guess[ing]” the ALJ’s decision to discount a claimant’s statements about her symptoms “where the ALJ identified specific record-based reasons for [her] ruling.” Stanton v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2010); see Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he ALJ is in a better position to decide issues of credibility.”).

In reviewing a disability determination, courts must examine the entire administrative record and “consider the evidence which fairly detracts from the administrative finding as well as that which supports it.” Covo v. Gardner, 314 F. Supp. 894, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contrad…

Feb. 4, 2011)( (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(4); Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“When other substantial evidence in the record conflicts with the treating physician’s opinion, . . . that opinion will not be deemed controlling.

In reviewing a disability determination, courts must examine the entire administrative record and “consider the evidence which fairly detracts from the administrative finding as well as that which supports it.” Covo v. Gardner, 314 F. Supp. 894, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contrad…

Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d.

In reviewing a disability determination, courts must examine the entire administrative record and “consider the evidence which fairly detracts from the administrative finding as well as that which supports it.” Covo v. Gardner, 314 F. Supp. 894, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contrad…

Feb. 4, 2011)(treating provider’s statement “that the claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is not controlling,” because such determinations are reserved for the Commissioner)(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 (e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

Because Plaintiff’s application was filed on January 17, 2017, the previous regulations are applicable to his claim. 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1)); accord Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A treating physician’s statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative.”).

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[a] reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action”); Danette Z. v. Comm’r of Soc.

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir 1999) (“[a] reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action”).

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir 1999) (“[a] reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action”).

The ALJ properly declined to afford weight to the portion of Dr. Cohen’s statements that plaintiff's limitations in socializing and/or interacting and depression prevented plaintiff from holding full time employment and that plaintiff required financial assistance until she was able to work full time independently, id. at 462, on the basis 18 that this analysis constituted “conclusory statements on an issue reserved for the Commissioner taking into account medical and vocati…

Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action.”).

Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Social Security Administration considers the data that the physicians provide but draws its own conclusions as to whether those data indicate disability.”).

Admin., 554 14 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing, inter alia, Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 15 1999) (“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the 16 disposition of their cases…”)).

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A reviewing court ‘may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.’”) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).4 4 The Commissioner argues that Caponi is not an acceptable medical source because she is a Licensed Mental Health Counselor.

App'x. 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[a] court must not engage in a post hoc effort to supplement the reasoning of the ALJ”); see also Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[a] reviewing court may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action”).

See Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases, even — and perhaps especially — when those dispositions are unfavorable.”).

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing, inter alia, Snell v. Apfel, 11 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let 12 claimants understand the disposition of their cases…”)).

Tr. at 21-22, 548; Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Clearly, if [claimant’s] mental condition never deteriorated from what it was while she was working, she cannot claim to have become disabled by reason of [that] mental impairment.”).

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing, inter 15 alia, Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The requirement of reason-giving exists, 16 in part, to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases…”)). 17 CONCLUSION 18 Because the ALJ misevaluated the medical evidence and formulated an RFC that therefore 19 did not account for all assessed limitations, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s step five 20 challenge at this juncture.