Laborers Local 17 Health And Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. (1998)

But see Note, Statutory Interpretation — Second Circuit Holds that Health Care Funds Lack Standing to Sue Tobacco Companies Under RICO — Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir.1999) (“The court’s reb-anee on an overly mechanical test of proximate cause led it to ignore the policies underlying the RICO predicate offenses of fraud.

See id. at 239 ("Being purely contingent on harm to third parties, these injuries are indirect.").

In Laborers Local 17 we declared that "analogous principles to those that doomed plaintiffs’ RICO causes of action also bar plaintiffs' common law fraud and special duty actions.” Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 243.

Commercial does not seek to recover based on “the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 , 112 S.Ct. 1311 ; see also Laborers, 191 F.3d at 238-39 (“[T]he critical question posed by the direct injury test is whether the damages a plaintiff sustains are derivative of an injury to a third party.

See Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 240 (“sheerest sort of speculation to determine how these damages might have been lessened had the Funds adopted [special] measures”).

See Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund, 191 F.3d at 240 ("sheerest sort of speculation to determine how these damages might have been lessened had the Funds adopted [special] measures").

Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 1999).

It is a fundamental tort law principle that while an injury to a plaintiff might be foreseeable, the damages incurred could still be “too remote to permit recovery.” See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir.1999).

Defendants then unsuccessfully renewed their motion after this Court found similar common law and RICO claims were too remote to permit suit in Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239-40 (2d Cir.1999).

To that end, “plaintiffs who are obligated to pay the medical expenses of another may not recover against the tortfeasor who caused the damage, because their injuries are 5 indirect since they derive wholly from the injuries sustained by the third party.” Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1999).

Id. at 623 (quoting Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 1999)).

It is a fundamental tort law principle that while an injury to a plaintiff might be foreseeable, the damages incurred could still be "too remote to permit recovery." See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir.1999).

AGC, 459 U.S. at 531 ; Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69 ; Laborers Local 17 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1999) ("To determine in a given case whether proximate cause is present [for purposes of RICO claims], common law principles are applied.").

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has read Holmes to imply that the common law torts principles of direct injury, substantial causation, reasonable foreseeability, and the “zone of interests” are “distinct concepts, [each] of which must generally be established by a plaintiff.” Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir.1999).

If so, then die injury is indirect, if not, it is direct.’ ” (citing Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 238-39 (2d Cir.1999))).

That case made clear that, to establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must prove: (1) direct injury, see id. at 235 (“direct injury is a key element for establishing proximate causation”); and (2) foreseeability.

Pleading “a direct injury is a key element for establishing proximate causation, independent of and in addition to other traditional elements of proximate cause.” See Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1999), as amended (Aug. 18, 1999) (noting that there must be “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”) (quoting Holmes v. Sec.

Fund. v. Philip Morris, 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1999)—which requires that any injury suffered by a plaintiff be direct.

It must, however, be emphasized that “[p]roximate cause is an elusive concept, one always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent.” Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 235 (“[D]irect injury is a key element for establishing proximate causation, independent of and in addition to other traditional elements of proximate cause.”).

P. 12(b)(6), on the grounds that Paradis’ state law claim is preempted by a treaty to which the United States is a party and that Paradis lacks standing to recover for losses suffered by his traveling companions. *110 DISCUSSION Motion to Dismiss In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), a court must assume that the allegations set for the complaint are true, and the motion may be granted “ ‘only if it is clear that no relief could be gra…

Dists., 241 F.3d at 705-06 (parallel "business or property" requirement in state statute barred financial claims based on smokers' personal injuries); Laborers Local, 191 F.3d at 241 (under parallel RICO "business or property" requirement, financial claims based on smoker's injuries are barred because "smoker's injuries are personal in nature"); Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 968 (where state trade-practices act imposed parallel "business or property" requirement, claims based…

Thus, a plaintiff who cannot establish " `some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged' " fails to plead "a key element for establishing proximate causation, independent of and in addition to other traditional elements of proximate cause." Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Laborers Local 17") (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 , 112 S.Ct. at 1318 ), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 108…

See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d at 239-40 ("The single satisfaction rule is often used to prevent a single plaintiff from recovering its damages several times over from multiple defendants").

Cf. Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing RICO claims by insurers against tobacco companies for harms to plan members caused by smoking-related diseases because harms to “plaintiff’s infrastructure, financial stability, and ability to project costs” were too attenuated).

Cir. 2001); see Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[The payors’] damages are entirely derivative of the harm suffered by plan participants as a result of using tobacco products.”); Perry v. Am.

(See Doc. 1 at 108–09 ¶¶ 247-248.) 22 These alleged injuries are not “wholly derivative of harm to a third party.” Laborers 23 Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1999); 24 see also Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 91 F.4th at 536–37. 25 3.

“In everyday terms, the concept might be explained as follows: Because the consequences of an act go endlessly forward in time and its causes stretch back to the dawn of human history, proximate cause is used essentially as a legal tool for limiting a wrongdoer’s liability only to those harms that have a reasonable connection to his actions.” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1999).

Cf.Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 456-61 (2006) (concluding that plaintiff failed to adequately plead proximate cause, and dismissal of civil RICO claim was therefore warranted, when plaintiff alleged that defendant defrauded the State of tax revenues and was able to undercut plaintiff’s prices as a result); Laborers Local 17 Health &Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that health-and-welfare trust funds did n…

See id. at 274 (stating 15 that proximate cause in the RICO context is based on “considerations of history and policy”); see 16 also Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing the 17 Holmes considerations as “non-exhaustive”); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip 18 Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 1999), as amended (Aug. 18, 1999) (“[T]he outer limits of 19 the direct injury test are described more by [Holmes’…

Derived from Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he single satisfaction rule is often used to prevent a single plaintiff from recovering its damages several times over from multiple defendants.” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 1999), as amended (Aug. 18, 1999).

Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1999).

The Second Circuit ... state[d] that a plaintiff must establish both foreseeability and direct injury, which are distinct concepts, and injuries which are wholly derivative of an injury to the property of a third-party, are too remote as a matter of law. [citing Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir.1999)].

Further, “a plaintiffs standing to sue under RICO requires” a showing that the defendant’s violation not only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.’ ” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir.1999).

Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir.1999); see also Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 888 F.Supp.2d 317, 329 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“It is beyond dispute that personal injuries are not injuries to ‘business or property.’ ”).

Proof of a causal relationship between a defendant’s action and a plaintiff’s injury is essential in every tort “because the consequences of an act go endlessly forward in time and its causes stretch back to the dawn of human history.” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir.1999).

While “[a]ny discussion of proximate cause should be approached with some trepidation because ... no topic is subject to more disagreement or such confusion,” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir.1999), it is well-established that one element of proximate causation is foreseeability, see Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Secs.

If so, then the injury is indirect; if not, it is direct.” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 238-39 (2d Cir.1999); accord Excimer Associates, Inc., 292 F.3d at 139-40 .

If so, then the injury is indirect; if not, it is direct.’” Id. (quoting Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 238-39 (2d Cir.1999)); see also Bartfield v. Murphy, 578 F.Supp.2d 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (stating, in the context of claims against each other by shareholders of an LLC, that “[t]he issue is whether the ‘primary injury’ for which relief is sought directly affects an interest the plaintiff holds, or if it injures the legal en…

See Anza, 547 U.S. at 459 , 126 S.Ct. 1991 ; Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239-40; Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 983 (9th Cir.2008).

This approach reflects an understanding that “the consequences of an act go endlessly forward in time and its causes stretch back to the dawn of human history....” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir.1999).

“A plaintiffs standing to sue under RICO requires a showing that the defendant’s violation not only was a but for cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 , 112 S.Ct. 1311 , 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992) (quotation marks omitted)).

Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1080 , 120 S. Ct. 799 , 145 L.

Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 236, 242 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that derivatively-injured plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for fraud under New York law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1080 , 120 S.Ct. 799 , 145 L.Ed.2d 673 (2000); see also Manson v. Stacescu, 11 F.3d 1127, 1130-31 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that plaintiff “does not have standing in his capacity as a creditor, shareholder, or employee of a corporation to assert a RICO cla…

The Second Circuit has held that “[t]hese principles [of RICO standing, proximate cause and direct injury requirement] also apply in general terms to the fraud and special duty causes of action asserted by plaintiffs under New York common law.” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 242-43 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that funds providing supplemental medical benefits lacked standing to sue cigarette company under New York common law of fraud…

The Second Circuit has held that "[t]hese principles [of RICO standing, proximate cause and direct injury requirement] also apply in general terms to the fraud and special duty causes of action asserted by plaintiffs under New York common law." Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 242-43 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that funds providing supplemental medical benefits lacked standing to sue cigarette company under New York common law of fraud…

See Schering Memo at 41 (citing Steamfitters; Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir.1999)). *543 For example, in Steamfitters the court found that injury was too speculative where the health insurers were not forced to pay higher prices for tobacco products, but merely were but one of the many groups suffering the financial and medical repercussions of an unsafe product.

Proof of a causal relationship between a defendant’s action and a plaintiff’s injury is essential in every tort “[bjecause the consequences of an act go endlessly forward in time and its causes stretch back to the dawn of human history.” Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1999).

For example, in Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, 191 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir.1999), the court held that *39 the plaintiffs' alleged damages were purely derivative of the physical injuries suffered by plan participants and therefore too remote for the plaintiffs to have standing to sue the defendants.

For example, in Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, 191 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir.1999), the court held that the plaintiffs’ alleged damages were purely derivative of the physical injuries suffered by plan participants and therefore too remote for the plaintiffs to have standing to sue the defendants.