Cluster 766319 (1999)

The Eighth Circuit recognized its “duty to give [the law] a construction . . . that would avoid constitutional doubts.” 192 F. 3d, at 1150.

The problem with the Nebraska statute was the term "substantial portion." See id. at 1150.

See Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir.1999) (finding that scienter requirement could not save Iowa’s partial birth abortion ban because it could still encompass the D & E procedure); Jegley, 192 F.3d at 798 (rejecting argument that scienter requirement limits scope of Arkansas partial birth abortion statute to cover only D & X procedure); Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150 (applying similar reasoning with reference to Nebraska partial birt…

The Eight Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, see Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 , 1152 (8th Cir.1999), although-stating that it was considering "a challenge to the facial validity of an abortion regulation,” id. at 1149.

The Eight Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, see Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 , 1152 (8th Cir.1999), although stating that it was considering "a challenge to the facial validity of an abortion regulation," id. at 1149.

See Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller , 195 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that scienter requirement could not save Iowa's partial birth abortion ban because it could still encompass the D&E procedure); Jegley , 192 F.3d at 798 (rejecting argument that scienter requirement limits scope of Arkansas partial birth abortion statute to cover only D&X procedure); Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150 (applying similar reasoning with reference to Nebraska partial birth…

See also Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1152 (“[Defendant’s] role in the proceedings may have been minor, but this does not excuse him from having to share in the actual costs.

In Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir.1999), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute “impose[d] an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion” because it "prohibited] the most common procedure for second-trimester abortions[.]” Id. at 1151.

Thus, the central issue was essentially a statutory interpretation issue. [11] In Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute "impose[d] an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion" because it "prohibit[ed] the most common procedure for second-trimester abortions[.]" Id. at 1151.

In so deciding, the Eighth Circuit considered the appeal as if it were “a challenge to the facial validity of an abortion regulation.” Id. at 1149.

See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir.1999); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir.1999).

Finally, the Stenberg Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in toto, Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 946 , which itself used Casey’s large-fraction test, see Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 , 1149 (8th Cir. 1999); see also id. at 1151 (Because “[a]n abortion regulation that inhibits the vast majority of second trimester abortions would clearly have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion” and the restriction here “…

See Carhart v. Stenberg, 1999 192 F.3d 1142 , 1149-52 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 797 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999); Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 , 197-200 (6th Cir. 1997).

See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1148-50.

See, e.g., Carhart v. Sternberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying undue-burden analysis to partial-birth abortion ban); Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying undue-burden analysis to admitting-privileges law); June Medical Servs.

See, e.g., Carhart v. Sternberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying undue-burden analysis to partial-birth abortion ban); Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying undue-burden analysis to admitting-privileges law); June Medical Servs.

Finally, the Stenberg Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision in toto, Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 946 , 120 S.Ct. 2597 , which itself used Casey's large-fraction test, see Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 , 1149 (8th Cir.1999); see also id. at 1151 (Because "[a]n abortion regulation that inhibits the vast majority of second trimester abortions would clearly have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion" and the re…

See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1152.

See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1152.

See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir.1999).

See, e.g., Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1132 (D.Neb.1998) (explaining that “[a] criminal law, especially one banning protected constitutional freedoms like abortion, that fails to give fair warning or that allows arbitrary prosecution is ‘void for vagueness’ ”), aff'd, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir.1999), aff'd, 530 U.S. 914 , 120 S.Ct. 2597 , 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000).

See also Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore , 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998) (case not decided on the merits, but for purposes of issuing a stay). 11 Carhart v. Stenberg , 192 F.3d at 1146-1148 ; Little Rock Family Planning v. Jegley , 192 F.3d at 797 ; Voinovich , 130 F.3d at 198 ; Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore , 55 F. Supp.2d 441 , 453 (E.D.Va. 1999); A Choice for Women v. Butterworth , 54 F. Supp.2d at 1152 -1153 ; Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster ,…