Cluster 766811 (1999)
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· 34 citation events
across 8 courts.
Showing the 13 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
199920122026
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Stormans Inc v. Selecky (2009)
Although we stated that “evidence of a substantial animus that motivated the law in question” could distinguish Lukumi, id. at 1051 (internal quotation marks omitted), we held that “there [was] no showing that application of the regulation to KDM’s case burdens KDM’s or his parents’ free exercise of their religion,” id. at 1050. this question.
internal quotation marks omitted
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Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky (2009)
Although we stated that “evidence of a substantial animus that motivated the law in question” could distinguish Lukumi, id. at 1051 (internal quotation marks omitted), we held that “there [was] no showing that application of the regulation to RDM’s case burdens RDM’s or his parents’ free exercise of their religion,” id. at 1050.
internal quotation marks omitted
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Dennis Walker v. Beard (2015)
WJM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that compliance with a state constitution is a legitimate state interest).
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Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish (2004)
WJM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that courts consistently find that routine administrative contacts with religious groups do not create excessive entanglement).
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Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. William (2004)
WJM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that courts consistently find that routine administrative contacts with religious groups do not create excessive entanglement).
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Hooks v. Clark County School District (2000)
See J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 931 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that home-educated children do not comprise a suspect class); cf. KDM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046 , 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) ("parochial school students are not a suspect class").
"parochial school students are not a suspect class"
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Asah v. N.J. Dep't of Educ. (2018)
Dist. , 196 F.3d 1046 , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Because parochial school students are not a suspect class, scrutiny of their treatment by the state is under the rational basis test.").
"Because parochial school students are not a suspect class, scrutiny of their treatment by the state is under the rational basis test."
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Burke Ex Rel. Burke v. Independence Blue Cross (2015)
WJM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 , 121 S.Ct. 564 , 148 L.Ed.2d 483 (2000) (“Every, circuit that has considered whether the IDEA as amended in 1997 requires services to be provided on site at a private school has concluded it does not”) (collectingcases)'. § 1932.
WJM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.1999) (affirming district court’s denial of relief to parents under IDEA), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 , 121 S.Ct. 564 , 148 L.Ed.2d 483 (2000); K.R. by M.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming previous decision, 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir.1996), that IDEA did not require provision of services on-site at private school), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1046 , 118 S.Ct. 1360 , 140 L.Ed.…
See id. at 1049 (“Every circuit that has considered whether the IDEA ... requires services to be provided on site at a private school has concluded it does not.”).
“Every circuit that has considered whether the IDEA ... requires services to be provided on site at a private school has concluded it does not.”
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In the Interest of Doe (2001)
WJM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.1999); Russman v. Board of Educ., 150 F.3d 219 , 221-22 (2d Cir.1998); Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 998-99 (8th Cir.1998). 7 However, where the child’s par *278 ents have placed the child in a private facility because the parents believe that the state educational agency has failed to provide the FAPE to which the child is entitled, the state may be required to pay for the private placement.
See, e.g., KDM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (Oregon regulation requiring special education services to be provided in "religiously neutral settings"); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999) (California Motor Vehicle Code requirements); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir.1997) (requirement that non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel when bringing action on child's behalf). 26 In Vernon, a post-Smith ca…
Oregon regulation requiring special education services to be provided in "religiously neutral settings"
See, e.g., KDM v. Reedsport School Dist., 196 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.1999) (Oregon regulation requiring special education services to be provided in “religiously neutral settings”); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.1999) (California Motor Vehicle Code requirements); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir.1997) (requirement that non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel when bringing action on child’s behalf).