Jeffrey G. Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc. (2001)

AMAZON.COM the recent decisions in Waithaka and Wallace, no court of appeals has yet addressed issues comparable to the ones we decide today. 3 The only Ninth Circuit case of any relevance is Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001), which held that the plaintiff, a delivery driver, was “engaged in” interstate commerce and exempt from the FAA because he “contracted to deliver packages throughout the United States, with connecting international service…

If they could be deemed transportation workers simply by eliding the foundational question of whether they work in a transportation industry, so program, Amazon Flex . . . .”); Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 590 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[Defendant] is a package transportation and delivery company . . . .”); Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff engaged to “provid[e] a small package information, transportation and delive…

See, e.g., Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Indisputably, if Lenz were a truck driver, he would be considered a transportation worker under § 1 of the FAA.”); Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (“As a delivery driver for RPS, Harden contracted to deliver packages 'throughout the United States, with connecting international service.’ Thus, he engaged in interstate commerce that is exempt from the FAA.”). .

Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND JURISDICTION “We review de novo the district court’s order compelling arbitration.” Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655, 661 (9th Cir. 2012) (order confirming arbitration award); Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (order compelling arbitration).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001) (citation omitted).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001); see also Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554 , 16 USPQ2d 1587, 1595 (Fed.Cir.1990) (“We review questions concerning subject matter jurisdiction . de novo.”).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001) (citation omitted).

Not only does the case cited by Princess, Moreno Roofing Co. v. Nagle, 99 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996), fail to support its contention that this court cannot consider an issue raised orally before the district court, but, as plaintiff also notes, this court has the power to consider arguments for the first time on appeal when "the issue presented is purely one of law and either does not depend on the factual record developed below, or the pertinent record has been fully develope…

Not only does the case cited by Princess, Moreno Roofing Co. v. Nagle, 99 F.3d 340 (9th Cir.1996), fail to support its contention that this court cannot consider an issue raised orally before the district court, but, as plaintiff also notes, this court has the power to consider arguments for the first time on appeal when "the issue presented is purely one of law and either does not depend on the factual record developed below, or the pertinent record has been fully developed…

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137,1140 (9th Cir.2001).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

Section 2 of the FAA—the FAA’s 12 coverage provision19—defines the outer limits of the act’s reach: it applies to any arbitration 13 clause in a contract involving a commercial transaction.20 Other sections of the FAA exclude 14 15 14 Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001). 16 15 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 16 Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). 17 17 In re Va…

Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351-52 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a customer service representative, though working in trucking industry, was not actually involved in flow of goods in interstate commerce); Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 593 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff, a field service supervisor in Philadelphia for the defendant-shipping company, was a transportation worker because she supervised the delivery of goods in interstate commerce); Harden v.…

In his recent opinion in Waithaka v. Amazon.com Inc., Judge Hillman carefully reviewed these cases: [D]rivers actually involved in the interstate transportation of physical goods ... have been found to be ‘transportation workers’ for purposes of the residuary exemption in Section 1 of the FAA.” [Kowalewski, 590 F.Supp.2d at 484 ]; see also Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Indisputably, if Lenz were a truck driver, he would be considered a tra…

There is one area, however, where a consensus has emerged: truck drivers.1 “[T]hat is, drivers actually 1 In Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., the First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that truck drivers engaged in interstate commerce fell within the scope of the residual clause. 857 F.3d 7, 17 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Prime does involved in the interstate transportation of physical goods . . . have been found to be ‘transportation workers’ for purposes of the residuary exemption in …

(See, e.g., Kienstra, supra, 702 F.3d at p. 957 [truckers based in Illinois who “occasionally transported loads into Missouri” “were interstate transportation workers within the meaning of § 1,” because if the driver “crosses state lines he is ‘actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce’”]; Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 [delivery driver who “contracted to deliver packages ‘throughout the United States, with …

Philadelphia area would be within the residuary exemption, the plaintiff whose job was to closely manage, oversee and monitor those drivers would also be exempt]; Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 [finding that a delivery driver of interstate packages came within the exemption].) As one federal district court put it: “If there is one area of clear common ground among the federal courts to address this question, it is that truck drive…

(Garrido, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 840 ["Garrido was a 6 'transportation worker' under section 1 of the FAA . . . [because he] worked as a truck driver transporting Air Liquide gases, frequently across state lines"]; Performance Team Freight Systems, Inc. v. Aleman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 ["Truck drivers who cross interstate lines usually are considered transportation workers"]; Lenz v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. (8th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3d 348, 351 ["Indisputabl…

Lexis 32208, p. *18 (Veliz).) “[T]he FAA is inapplicable to drivers . . . who are engaged in interstate commerce.” (Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2001) 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Harden).) It is not clear, however, that the individual respondents were transportation workers under section 1.

See, e.g., Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a truck driver, but not a customer service representative, is a transportation worker under § 1); Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a truck driver was exempt from the FAA under § 1); Am, Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir.1987) (noting that courts have limited the § 1 exemption to “workers a…

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001).

In re Villanueva, No. 08-08-00329-CV, 2009 WL 1945577, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 8, 2009, orig. proceeding) (citing Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001)); In re Swift Transp.

In re Villanueva , No. 08-08-00329-CV, 2009 WL 1945577, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 8, 2009, orig. proceeding) (citing Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc ., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001)); In re Swift Transp.

See, e.g., Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir.2005) (“Indisputably, if Lenz were a truck driver, he would be considered a transportation worker under § 1 of the FAA.” (citations omitted)); Palcko v. Airborne Express, 372 F.3d 588, 593-94 (3d Cir.2004) (assuming that truck drivers fall within the residuary exemption); Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001) (finding that a “delivery driver” falls within the residuary exemption)…

Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001).

Likewise, so-called “last mile” delivery drivers may be engaged in interstate commerce based on the nature of their employer’s business “regardless of whether the workers themselves physically cross state lines.” Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 26 (holding that Amazon Flex (“AmFlex”) delivery drivers are exempt under § 1); accord Rittman, 2020 WL 4814142 , at *9–10; see Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that delivery driver for predeces…

See Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[t]he district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration ... because the FAA is inapplicable to [employees] who are engaged in interstate commerce”).

See Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[t]he district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration... because the FAA is inapplicable to [employees] who are engaged in interstate commerce").

See Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001). 6.

See Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001).

See Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Bolker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985)).

See Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001).

See Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2001).

See id. (noting that truck drivers are “indisputably” transportation workers for purposes of 9 U.S.C. § 1 ), citing Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.2001).

See id. (noting that truck drivers are “indisputably” transportation workers for purposes of 9 U.S.C. § 1 ), citing Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.2001), We consider the third factor to be neutral, because although Vasquez does not handle goods that travel interstate, he handles the indispensable instrumentality of their travel: the trucks themselves.

See e.g., Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001); Lorntzen v. Swift Transportation, Inc., 316 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1095 (D.Kan.2004).

See e.g., Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lorntzen v. Swift Transportation, Inc., 316 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1095 (D.

See e.g., Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir.2001); Lorntzen v. Swift Transportation, Inc., 316 F.Supp.2d 1093,1095 (D.Kan.2004).

See e.g., Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc. , 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lorntzen v. Swift Transportation, Inc. , 316 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1095 (D.

See e.g., Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc. , 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lorntzen v. Swift Transportation, Inc. , 316 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1095 (D.

See e.g., Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lorntzen v. Swift Transportation, Inc., 316 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1095 (D.