Cluster 776245 (2002)
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· 65 citation events
across 13 courts.
Showing the 16 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
200220142026
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Id. at 917.
Id. at 917.
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Act II Jewelry, LLC v. Wooten (2018)
See, Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie , 277 F.3d 916 , 920 (7th Cir. 2002) ("It is easy to *911 imagine facts consistent with this complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs' standing, and no more is required.").
"It is easy to *911 imagine facts consistent with this complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs' standing, and no more is required."
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Act II Jewelry, LLC v. Wooten (2018)
See, Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 277 F.3d 916 , 920 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It is easy to imagine facts consistent with this complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs’ standing, and no more is required.”).
“It is easy to imagine facts consistent with this complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs’ standing, and no more is required.”
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Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States (2006)
See, e.g., Alliant Energy Corp., 277 F.3d at 920 (“Higher costs of capital injure the firm, making [plaintiffs] the right plaintiffs.”); Mount Wilson FM Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 884 F.2d 1462, 1465 (D.C.Cir.1987) (approving this theory); Tax Analysts, 566 F.2d at 136-37 ; cf. McKinney, 799 F.2d at 1555.
“Higher costs of capital injure the firm, making [plaintiffs] the right plaintiffs.”
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T & B LTD. INC. v. City of Chicago (2005)
See Szumny, 246 F.3d at 1067 ; Alliant Energy Corp., 277 F.3d at 919.
Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 277 F.3d 916 , 920 (7th Cir. 2002) (“general” factual allegations suffice at the pleading stage, details on “where? when? sell to whom? – can come later.”) Statutes of Limitations Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ direct purchaser claims should be dismissed because they accrued in 2014 which falls outside of the Sherman Act’s and FDUTPA’s four-year statutes of limitations.
“general” factual allegations suffice at the pleading stage, details on “where? when? sell to whom? – can come later.”
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Livingston v. City of Chicago (2020)
See Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 647 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[P]laintiffs in federal court are not required to plead with precision legal theories or detailed facts.”); Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 277 F.3d 916 , 919 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A complaint need only state the nature of the claim; details can wait for later stages[.]”).
“A complaint need only state the nature of the claim; details can wait for later stages[.]”
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Reliant Transportation, Inc. v. Division 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union - New York Employees Pension Fund (2019)
See also Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 277 F.3d 916 , 920 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It is easy to imagine facts consistent with [the] complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs’ standing . . . no more is required.”).
“It is easy to imagine facts consistent with [the] complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs’ standing . . . no more is required.”
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Baker Development Corp. v. Mulder (In Re Mulder) (2004)
“Skepticism about a plaintiffs ability to prove its claims is not a reason to dismiss a pleading.” Alliant, 277 F.3d at 920.
Alliant Energy, 277 F.3d at 919.
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Brandt v. VILLAGE OF WINNETKA, ILL. (2010)
See also Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 277 F.3d 916 (7th Cir.2002); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 Hofstra L.Rev. 1123 (2005).
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Baur v. Veneman (2003)
See Alliant Energy, 277 F.3d at 920 (emphasizing that “[s]kep-ticism about a plaintiffs ability to prove [his] claims is not a reason to dismiss a pleading ... it is at most a reason to hold a hearing [on the question of standing] and require the plaintiff to pony up the proof’); cf. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1280 n. 16 (noting that while “some overlap may be inevitable, standing doctrine was not intended to provide a vehicle for resolution ... of fun damentally merits issues” at …
emphasizing that “[s]kep-ticism about a plaintiffs ability to prove [his] claims is not a reason to dismiss a pleading ... it is at most a reason to hold a hearing [on the question of standing] and require the plaintiff to pony up the proof’
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Baur v. Veneman (2003)
See Alliant Energy, 277 F.3d at 920 (emphasizing that "[s]kepticism about a plaintiff's ability to prove [his] claims is not a reason to dismiss a pleading ... it is at most a reason to hold a hearing [on the question of standing] and require the plaintiff to pony up the proof"); cf. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1280 n. 16 (noting that while "some overlap may be inevitable, standing doctrine was not intended to provide a vehicle for resolution ... of fundamentally merits issues" at t…
emphasizing that "[s]kepticism about a plaintiff's ability to prove [his] claims is not a reason to dismiss a pleading ... it is at most a reason to hold a hearing [on the question of standing] and require the plaintiff to pony up the proof"
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Valente v. French (2021)
See Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 277 F.3d 916 , 920 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that “[i]t is easy to imagine facts consistent with this complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs’ standing, and no more is required”) (emphasis in original).
holding that “[i]t is easy to imagine facts consistent with this complaint and affidavits that will show plaintiffs’ standing, and no more is required”
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Silverman v. Motorola, Inc. (2011)
See generally Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 277 F.3d 916 , 919 (7th Cir.2002) (“In response to a summary judgment motion ... the plaintiff ... must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.”); Ruffm-Thompkins v. Experian Info.