John McBryde v. United States (2002)
green
· 75 citation events
across 5 courts.
Showing the 44 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
200220142026
Sort:
By significance ·
Most recent
green
Gabriel J. Martinez v. United States (2003)
Ordinarily a request for correction must be filed within three years after the claimant discovers the error or injustice, but the Board may waive the requirement "in the interest of justice." Id. § 1552(b). 102 Importantly, subsection (c) provides that the Secretary "may pay, from applicable current appropriations, a claim for the loss of pay, allowances, compensation, emoluments, or other pecuniary benefits, or for the repayment of a fine or forfeiture, if, as a result of c…
green
Champagne v. McDonough (2024)
Thus, we “use common sense and presume that the word conveys some degree of discretion.” McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Bell v. United States (2021)
Cl. 583, 593 (2005); see also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
“We may thus presume that . . . the word ‘may’ . . . conveys some degree of discretion. But we must pro- ceed to test that presumption against . . . other inferences that we may rationally draw . . . .”
green
Bell v. United States (2021)
Cl. 583, 593 (2005); see also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
“We may thus presume that . . . the word ‘may’ . . . conveys some degree of discretion. But we must pro- ceed to test that presumption against . . . other inferences that we may rationally draw . . . .”
green
Roberts v. United States (2014)
In McBryde v. United States, we further explained that “[w]e ... presume that when Congress used the word ‘may’ in [a] statute ..., we should use common sense and presume that the word conveys some degree of discretion.” 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002).
green
Bell v. United States (2019)
McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
San Antonio Housing Authority v. United States (2019)
Cir. 1996); and McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Harris v. United States (2014)
According to Plaintiff, McBryde v. United States, 5 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.
green
Contreras v. United States (2005)
McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002).
green
Hopi Tribe v. United States (2002)
However, “the use of the word ‘may’ does not, by itself, render a statute wholly discretionary, and thus not money-mandating.” McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002).
green
Davis v. United States (2019)
McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Price v. United States (2017)
Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit explained that to be money-mandating, a statute cannot give “the government complete discretion over the decision whether or not to pay an individual or group.” See also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.
stating that Tucker Act jurisdiction “arises only when the underlying statute can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained,” and then engaging in a lengthy discussion of mandatory versus permissive language
Cir. 2003) (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.
green
Hindman v. United States (2017)
Use of the word “may” in a statute creates a “presumption of discretion.” Doe, 463 F.3d at 1324 (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
“We . . . presume that when Congress used the word “may” in the statute in suit, we should use common sense and presume that the word conveys some degree of discretion.”
green
Hindman v. United States (2017)
Use of the word “may” in a statute creates a “presumption of *108 discretion.” Doe, 463 F.3d at 1824 (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
“We ... presume that when Congress used the word “may” in the statute in suit, we should use common sense and presume that the word conveys some degree of discretion.”
green
King v. United States (2017)
Cir. 2006) (quoting McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
While the word “may” in a statute creates a presumption of government discretion, Doe, 463 F.3d at 1324 (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Acevedo v. United States (2015)
As the court of appeals has observed, when Congress uses the word “may” in a statute, “we should use common sense and presume that the word conveys some degree of discretion.” McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002).
green
Acevedo v. United States (2015)
As the court of appeals has observed, when Congress uses the word “may” in a statute, “we should use common sense and presume that the word conveys some degree of discretion.” McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Matthew Walter Stephan v. United States (2013)
See United States v. Rogers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 , 103 S.Ct. 2132 , 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983) (The “word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion.”); McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002) (When the word “may” is used in a statute, “we should use common sense and presume that the word conveys some degree of discretion.”).
green
Davita, Inc. v. United States (2013)
Agwiak v. United States, 347 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2002); Huston v. United States, 956 F.2d 259, 261-62 (Fed.Cir.1992); Grav v. United States, 886 F.2d 1305, 1307 (Fed.Cir.1989)).
green
Evans v. United States (2012)
The Federal Circuit in Agwiak v. United States noted that: "We have repeatedly recognized that the use of the word 'shall' generally makes a statute money-mandating.” Agwiak v. United States, 347 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2002); Huston v. United States, 956 F.2d 259, 261-62 (Fed.Cir.1992); and Grav v. United States, 886 F.2d 1305, 1307 (Fed.Cir.1989)).
green
Hale v. United States (2012)
Cir.2006) (“There is a presumption that the use of the word ‘may’ in a statute creates discretion.” (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Collins v. United States (2011)
The court also remarked that “[t]here is a presumption that the use of the word ‘may’ in a statute creates discretion.” Id. (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002)).
green
Wolfchild v. United States (2011)
While discretionary terms may trigger the presumption that the statute is not money-mandating, that presumption can be overcome by “ ‘the intent of Congress and other inferences that [the court] may rationally draw from the structure and purpose of the statute at hand.’” Doe, 463 F.3d at 1324 (quoting McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002)); see also Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1579-82 (Fed.Cir.1996).
green
Wolfchild v. United States (2010)
Yet, “this presumption of discretion may be rebutted by ‘the intent of Congress and other inferences that [the court] may rationally draw from the structure and purpose of the statute at hand.’ ” Id. (quoting McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002)); see, e.g., Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1579-82 (Fed.Cir.1996) (concluding that moiety statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (a), which provided that the Secretary of Treasury “may award and pay” to an informant…
green
Samish Indian Nation v. United States (2009)
“There is a presumption that the use of the word ‘may’ in a statute creates discretion” that “may be rebutted by ‘the intent of Congress and other inferences’ ” that may be drawn “ ‘from the structure and purpose of the statute at hand.’” Id. (quoting McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002)).
green
Locke v. United States (2007)
See Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2006) (“There is a presumption that the use of the word ‘may5 in a statute creates discretion.”); McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002). 5) Whether I.R.C. § 7133 is money-mandating Plaintiffs next argue that jurisdiction is present because the levies constitute an “unauthorized collection action” pursuant to I.R.C. § 7433. 8 Pls.’ Br. filed Apr. 5, 2007, at 10.
green
District of Columbia v. United States (2005)
Agwiak v. United States, 347 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2003) (‘We have repeatedly recognized that the use of the word ‘shall’ generally makes a statute money-mandating.”) (citing McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2002); Huston v. United States, 956 F.2d 259, 261-62 (Fed.Cir.1992); Grav v. United States, 886 F.2d 1305, 1307 (Fed.Cir.1989)).
green
Roscoe Chambers v. Andrew Ciolli (2021)
Authorization is not required when, as here, government employees face official-capacity suits, which are defended by the U.S. Department of Justice. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (a)(8)(i); see McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
See Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996); see also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002).
green
Doe v. United States (2006)
Cir. 1996); see also McBryde v. United 05-5104 18 States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
The Supreme Court has noted that “the word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion.” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 , 103 S.Ct. 2132 , 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983); see also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002).
green
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. United States (2005)
The Supreme Court has noted that “the word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion.” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983); see also McBryde v. United 05-5010 8 States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Agwiak v. States (2003)
See, e.g., McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2002); Huston v. United States, 956 F.2d 259, 261-62 (Fed.Cir. 1992); Grav v. United States, 886 F.2d 1305, 1307 (Fed.Cir.1989).
green
Agwiak, Alf v. United States (2003)
See, e.g., McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2002); Huston v. United States, 956 F.2d 259, 261-62 (Fed.Cir. 1992); Grav v. United States, 886 F.2d 1305, 1307 (Fed.Cir.1989).
green
Young v. United States (2025)
See e.g., McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357 , 1361–64 (Fed.
green
Downey v. United States (2020)
Cir. 2003) (holding that the use of the word “shall” in a statute generally indicates that the statute is money- mandating); see also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.
green
Michael Roth & Associates v. United States (2017)
See McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
noting that generally the use of the word “may” “conveys some degree of discretion”
green
Florida Home Medical Supply, Inc. v. United States (2017)
In addressing such a circumstance, [t]he Supreme Court has noted that “the word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion.” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 , 103 S.Ct. 2132 , 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983); see also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.
green
Hastings v. United States (2007)
See McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir. 2002) ("[t]he word 'may,' when used in a statute usually implies some degree of discretion”).
"[t]he word 'may,' when used in a statute usually implies some degree of discretion”
green
Township of Pemberton v. Berardi (2005)
See also, McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2002)(holding that payment under judicial litigation expenses statute is mandatory, rather than discretionary, “when the statutory conditions are met, and it is therefore money-mandating for purposes of vesting the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction under the Tucker Act”); Wilson v. United States, 135 F.2d 1005, 1009 (3d Cir.l943)(noting that the word “may” is normally construed with a mandatory meaning …
green
American Insurance v. United States (2004)
See McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2002) ("[t]he word ‘may,’ when used in a statute usually implies some degree of discretion").
green
TORRES EX REL. TORRES v. Trinity Industries, Inc. (2002)
See also McBryde v. United States, 299 F.3d 1357, 1369-70 (Fed.Cir.2002) (Newman, J., dissenting).