Cluster 779151 (2002)

Luce Forward appealed and the EEOC cross-appealed. 3 A three-judge panel reversed the district court's grant of injunctive relief, holding that "employers may require employees to sign agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of their employment." EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir.2002) (" Luce Forward II ").

Luce Forward II, 303 F.3d at 997.

“Title VII ... make[s] it unlawful for an employer to discriminate or retaliate against an employee or an applicant for employment because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated, in any manner in a proceeding.” Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotation omitted).

In addition, Title VII makes “it unlawful for an employer to discriminate or retaliate against an employee or an applicant for employment because that person ‘has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a ... proceeding.’ ” Luce, 303 F.3d at 1006 (ellipses in original) (citation omitted).

See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1004-05 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that protected activity includes protesting an unlawful employment practice).

See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1007 (9th Cir.2002).

See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1002-03 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Duffield in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001)), vacated by 319 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (order).

See Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d at 1004-05.

See E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2002). similar conduct,” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003), including conduct that is of “comparable seriousness,” Norton v. PHC-Elko, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1088 (D.

That said, 6 the allegedly unlawful employment practice does not need to be demonstrably unlawful. 7 Id. (citing Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 , 695–96 (9th Cir. 1978)); see 8 also E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1005 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Instead, anti-retaliation protection is accorded “whenever the opposition is based on a 10 ‘reasonable belief’ that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice,” 11 regardless of…

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ADA’s interference provision does not bar ‘any action whatsoever that in any way hinders a member of a protected class.’ ”); see also EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the agency’s argument that the plaintiffs refusal to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment “waiving] his procedural right to file or litigate a civil suit was protec…

See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1004-05 (9th Cir.2002)(adverse action in response to employee’s stated intention to file claim constitutes retaliation); E.E.O.C. v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir.1992) (retaliation established even though adverse action preceded filing of claim).

See E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1002-04 (9th Cir.2002)(collecting cases); Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir.2004); Carbajal, 372 F.3d at 905-05 . 9 .