Wit v. Berman (2002)

“Where a statute invidiously discriminates in granting the right to vote, we apply strict scrutiny in our review.” Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1259 (2d Cir.2002).

Co., 250 F. at 560 , and may be "the equivalent of domicilie] in statutes relating to judicial jurisdiction!,] voting, eligibility to hold office, ... liability for inheritance and poll taxes, and certain personal property taxes," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1971), cmt. k; see also Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1260 (2d Cir.2002) ("Residence and the legal concept of domicile are synonymous under the [New York] Election Law.”).

See Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir., 2002) (noting that “[d]omicile as a rule may have its philosophical defects . . . but it has enormous practical advantages over the alternatives” providing “workable standards” for election regulatory officials).

Dunn , 405 U.S. at 345 , 92 S.Ct. 995 (emphasis added); see also Wit , 306 F.3d at 1263 (noting, in a related context, that "some political organizations might well find it in their interests to attempt to register large numbers of persons with only marginal connections to the electoral district").

See Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1259 (2d Cir. 2002). {10} Although voters’ rights and the right to candidacy are subject to differing levels of scrutiny, these rights are not easily separable.

See Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1259 (2d Cir. 16 2002). 17 {10} Although voters’ rights and the right to candidacy are subject to differing levels 18 of scrutiny, these rights are not easily separable.

If it imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,’ then important regulatory interests are sufficient to justify the restrictions.”) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 ); accord Wit v. Berman, 306 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (2d Cir.2002); Lerman v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 135 , 145 (2d Cir.2000). 1.