Xu Ming Li Xin Kui Yu v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General (2003)

However, we review de novo both “purely legal questions” and “mixed questions of law and fact requiring us to exercise judgment about legal principles.” United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir.2010); Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

Although “[t]he BIA’s interpretation of immigration laws is entitled to deference ..., we are not obligated to accept an.interpretation clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003); see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

The government argues that the BIA’s interpretation of section 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) is entitled to such deference here, whereas Petitioner points out that the BIA’s interpretation is due no deference when its construction is contrary to the statute’s "plain and sensible meaning.” See Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir.2008) (“We will not defer to the BIA when its construction of a statute defies its plain and sensible meaning.’ Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858…

Kankamalage v. I.N.S., 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). 3 The footnote reads “In effect, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that [§ 1227(a)(2)(A)] is broader in its coverage of crimes involving moral turpitude than [§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)], because it would include inchoate offenses, such as solicitation and facilitation, that are not specifically enumerated in [§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)], which lists only attempts and conspiracies.” Matter of Vo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 426 , 429 n.4 (BI…

Although the EPA clarified the term “any area” in its 2010 amendments to mean “any portion of a nonattain ment or maintenance area, including the local area affected by the transportation project,” the EPA did not clearly indicate that this interpretation should apply retroactively. 75 Fed.Reg. at 14,276; cf. Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003) (observing that a regulation may not apply retroactively unless it “unambiguously directs retroactive application”).

Reg. at 14,276; cf. Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that a regulation may not apply retroactively unless it “unambiguously directs retroactive application”).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

Although “[t]he BIA’s interpretation of immigration laws is entitled to deference . . . , we are not obligated to accept an interpretation clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the stat- ute.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003); see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

We review de novo questions of law, Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861-62 (9th Cir.2003), and we deny the petition for review.

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

The BIA’s interpretation of immigration laws is “entitled to deference.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003). *978 III Velasco contends that the BIA and IJ erred by concluding that she failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground if she was forced to return to Mexico. 2 Specifically, Velasco contends that she would suffer harm at the hands of the smugglers due to her membership in a particular social group:…

The BIA’s interpretation of immigration laws is “entitled to deference.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003).

The applicable legal stan- dard for determining whether the alien has committed a par- ticularly serious crime no longer requires the BIA to engage “in a separate determination to address whether the alien is a danger to the community.” Id.; see also Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858 , 861 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Once the INS makes a finding that an offense constitutes a particularly serious crime, a separate determination of danger to the community is not required.”).

We review factual findings for substantial evidence, Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.2008), and legal questions and due process claims de novo, Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861-62 (9th Cir.2003); Ngongo v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.2005).

The government argues that the BIA’s interpretation of section 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) is entitled to such deference here, whereas Petitioner points out that the BIA’s interpretation is due no deference when its con- struction is contrary to the statute’s “plain and sensible meaning.” See Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We will not defer to the BIA when its construction of a statute defies its ‘plain and sensible meaning.’ Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d…

However, we are not obligated to accept an interpretation clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

However, we are not obligated to accept an interpretation clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted).

We will not defer to the BIA when its construction of a statute defies its “plain and sensible meaning.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003).

We will not defer to the BIA when its construction of a statute defies its “plain and sensible meaning.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003).

“We review the BIA’s determination of purely legal questions regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act de novo.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

“We review the [Board’s] determination of purely legal questions regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act de novo.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

“We review the [Board’s] determination of purely legal questions regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act de novo.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003).

Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003)) (equal protection); Khup, 376 F.3d at 902 (citing Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc)) (due process).

Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)) (equal protection); Khup, 376 F.3d at 902 (citing Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)) (due process).

This court reviews questions of law de novo, see Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861-62 (9th Cir.2003), and reviews factual findings for substantial evidence, see Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.2001).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861-62 (9th Cir.2003).

This court reviews questions of law de novo, see Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861-62 (9th Cir.2003), and reviews factual findings for substantial evidence, see Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.2001).

Kanka- malage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

Kankwmalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

Although BIA interpretations of immigration stat *520 utes are entitled to some deference, Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003), “interpretations promulgated in a non-precedential manner are ‘beyond the Chevron pale.’ ” Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 , 121 S.Ct. 2164 , 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001)).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003).

Although BIA interpreta- tions of immigration statutes are entitled to some deference, Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003), “in- terpretations promulgated in a non-precedential manner are ‘beyond the Chevron pale.’ ” Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001)).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861-62 (9th Cir.2003).

Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325 , 121 S.Ct. 2271 ; see also Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 935, 941, 945 (9th Cir.2005) (Fisher, J., concurring); Kankamalage, 335 F.3d at 863.

See, e.g., Sinotes-Cruz, 468 F.3d at 1202-03 (“[P]art B of the stop-time rule of § 1229b(d)(1) does not apply retroactively to the seven-year continuous resi- dence requirement of § 1229b(a)(2) for an alien who pled guilty before the enactment of IIRIRA and was eligible for discretionary relief at the time IIRIRA became effective.”); Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 860, 863 (9th Cir. 2003) (immigration regulation promulgated in 1990, which made aliens convicted of “a parti…

Although the agency’s interpretation of immigration laws is entitled to deference, such deference is required only “after we determine that a statute is ambiguous.” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003).

Although the agency’s interpretation of immigration laws is entitled to deference, such deference is required only “after we determine that a statute is ambiguous.” Kankamal- age v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003).

We review “determination of purely legal questions regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act de novo,” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003), “the same standard we apply when reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a habeas petition . . . [except that] we now review the BIA’s decision, not the district court’s orders.” Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (inter- nal citation omitted).

However, "[t]he BIA's interpretation of immigration laws is entitled to deference.” See Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003).

See Colindres-Aguilar v. INS, 819 F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir.1987); see also de Martinez v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 759, 761 (9th Cir.2004); Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir.2004); Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir.2003). 2 .

See Colindres-Aguilar v. INS, 819 F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1987); see also De Martinez v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 2004); Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004); Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). 1930 HERNANDEZ-GIL v. GONZALES asked if he was prepared to “go forward at this time,” Hernandez-Gil responded, “No.” The IJ then asked Hernandez-Gil if he “would like a continuance to get with an attorney,” to which Hernandez-Gil sai…

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003) (cita- tion omitted).

Where a statute is ambiguous, we defer to the interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute, as long as its interpretation is not “clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute,” Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003), or in conflict with this Court’s precedent, Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.2003).

The focus “is on the nature of the crime and not the likelihood of future serious misconduct.” Id.; see also Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858 , 861 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Once . . . a finding [is made] that an offense constitutes a particularly serious crime, a separate determination of danger to the community is not required.”).

Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 ).