United States v. Mike Darwich (2003)

Meanwhile, though the evidence that Santana put forward regarding his financial situation, employment, and lifestyle gives us pause, as it apparently did the district judge, see R. 48 (Sentencing Tr. at 19) (Page ID #384), it does not leave us “with the definite and firm 19 No. 17-1210, United States v. Santana conviction,” see, e.g., Darwich, 337 F.3d at 663 (citation omitted), that the district court erred in relying on the grand-jury testimony of CD-1 and CD-2.

See Hough, 276 F.3d at 894 (“[Speculation is not evidence and does not establish that it was ‘clearly improbable’ that [Woods] possessed the firearms during the offense.”); see also Wheaton, 517 F.3d at 368 (“The bare assertion of Wheaton’s counsel that the gun might simply have been for the lawful purpose of defending the residence is insufficient to sustain Wheaton’s burden of showing it was ‘clearly improbable’ that the gun was related to the drug conspiracy.”); Darwich, …

Darwich, 337 F.3d at 663 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 ).

We review the finding of indigency for clear error, meaning we will uphold the district court’s finding unless “we have the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 759 (quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003)).

We have held that “mere ‘idle chatter or casual conversation about past events’ is not considered a statement ‘in furtherance of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 657 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

“A finding of fact will only be clearly erroneous when, although there may be some evidence to support the finding, ‘the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Roskam Baking Co., 680 F.3d at 633 (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003)).

“We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings on drug quantity attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003).

P. 32(i)(3)(B); see also United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 666 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ontroverted matters at sentencing only require a ruling if the disputed matter will affect the eventual sentence.”).

See id. (“Whether a statement was in furtherance of a conspiracy turns on the context in which it was made and the intent of the declarant in making it.”).

This Court has held “literal compliance” with this provision, stating that it that a district court’s blanket reliance on the presentence “helps to ensure that defendants are sentenced on the report–as occurred in the present case–does not constitute a basis of accurate information and provides a clear record “ruling.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 667 (6th for appellate courts, prison officials, and administrative Cir. 2003) (“exclusive reliance on the PSR when a …

“A district court’s determination that the defendant possessed a firearm during a drug offense is a factual finding that this court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard.”4 United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003)).

“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Clay, 346 F.3d 173, 178 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003)). 4 No. 24-1440, United States v. Hooper The four-point enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) applies if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed at least eight firearms.

And in circumstances “‘[w]here there are two permissible -4- No. 22-6005, United States v. Bryant views of the evidence,’ we are loath to accept the invitation to overturn a district court’s choice between them.” United States v. Massey, 758 F. App’x 455 , 462 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)); see United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (“If the district court interprets the evi…

The district court reasoned that “[m]ost often children of the age 4 to 7 don’t ever disclose that they’re molested for myriad of reasons,” and that it made “perfect sense” that the sister decided to come forward when she did, because she was concerned that if Flanigan moved in with their mother, her children would interact with him when they visited. “[W]e will reverse the district court’s finding of reliability only if it leaves us ‘with the definite and firm conviction th…

So much so that we must uphold an enhancement if the court “has interpreted the evidence in a manner consistent with the record.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 , 573–74 (1985)).

“A district court’s finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug crime is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.” United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 504 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003)).

United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 665 (6th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003)).

United States v. Darwitch, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. -5- Nos. 18-4235/19-3169 United States v. Juan Caro-Silva, et al.

See United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (“If the district court interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record, we are required to uphold its decision even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.”).

See United States v. Darwich, No. 18-1671 United States v. Smith-Kilpatrick Page 15 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (“If the district court interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record, we are required to uphold its decision even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.”).

“That means we will reverse the district court’s finding of reliability only if it leaves us ‘with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Standard of review “We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings on drug quantity attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 436 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003)).

We review the district court’s factual determination for clear error, and in doing so, we may reverse only if we have the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 331 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Accordingly, we have held that “hearsay is permissible at a sentencing hearing so long as it has some minimum indicia of reliability.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 656 (6th Cir. 2003).

So long as “the district court interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record, we are -7- Nos. 17-4066/4049, United States v. Massey required to uphold its decision even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003).

“A statement is considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy ‘if it is intended to promote the objectives of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 657 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 392 (6th Cir.1997)).

“A statement is considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy ‘if it is intended to promote the objectives of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 657 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 392 (6th Cir.1997)).

Because the government demonstrated—and Smith conceded—that Smith possessed the gun, “the burden then shift[ed] to [Smith] to show that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with [his] crime.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 665 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384 , 390–91 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Penaloza, 648…

United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when “although there may be some evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Wheaton, 517 F.3d at 367 (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003)).

United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003).

So long as “the district court interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record,” we must uphold that court’s factual judgment, United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003).

“A district court’s finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug crime is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.” United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 504 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Accordingly, as long as the district Court “interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record, we are required to uphold its decision even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.” United *95 States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 , 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)).

“The government bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant either ‘actually or constructively possessed the weapon.’ ” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 665 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir.2002)).

United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 504 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir.2003)).

Applying that standard, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir.2003)).

Under the clearly-erroneous standard, we will leave the district court’s factual findings undisturbed unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

With regard to the drug amount attributable to Hernandez at sentencing, as long as “the district court interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record,” we will uphold the decision “even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.” See United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 , 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)); United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir.1999) (st…

The Government responds that sentencing enhancements based on the Guidelines, which is what is at issue here, can be determined by the sentencing court’s findings, so long as the enhanced sentence is still within the statutory range.' This court “review[s] for clear error the district court’s factual findings on drug quantity attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Mahaffey, 53 …

United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir.2003). *500 The Sentencing Guidelines call for a district court to apply a two-level increase if the defendant possessed “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm).” U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l).

Consequently, “[i]f the district court interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record, we are required to uphold its decision even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir.2003).

See United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 512-13 (6th Cir.2011) (“The Sixth Circuit requires ‘literal compliance’ with Rule 32, so when matters are contested the court must explain its [loss] calculation methods.” (quoting Nelson, 356 F.3d at 722-23 )); United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 667 (6th Cir.2003) (stating, where disputed matter would affect sentencing, “Because the matter of leadership role was disputed by [defendant] in his objections to the PSR, the distri…

Before a district court can apply a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l), the government must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant either actually or constructively possessed the weapon.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 665 (6th Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

See e.g., United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596, 599-600 (6th Cir.2013); United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 655-56 (6th Cir.2003).

See United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 655-56 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to raise an objection in the district court . . . limits appellate review to a plain error inquiry . . . .”).

“Once the government meets its burden of showing that the defendant possessed a weapon, a presumption arises that ‘the weapon was connected to the offense.’” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 665 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir. 2002)).

McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2015) (“In general, this requirement bars ‘mere narratives of past successes or failures’ and a ‘conspirator’s casual comments.’ ”); see also, e.g., Fratta v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 485, 504 (5th Cir. 2008)' (reporting the conspiracy’s status without “advancpng] the cause of or facilitating] the conspiracy” did not constitute statements in furtherance of the conspiracy); United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 657 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding casual conversa…