Patricia Hayes Associates, Inc. v. Cammell Laird Holdings U.K. (2003)

See Patricia Hayes & Assocs. v. Cammell Laird Holdings U.K., 339 F.3d 76 , 80 n. 2 (2d Cir.2003) (“[I]t is well established that this Court may ... affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground appearing in the record, even if the ground is different from the one relied on by the district court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The process of distributing the plan's assets began with the March 1999 filing of the intent to distribute, but it was not until the funds were actually released that the government could execute a warrant to arrest the funds. 22 The claimants assert that the government failed to pursue this forfeiture with sufficient diligence, and that notwithstanding ERISA, the government could have commenced its action in 1996, the time that the parties agree the government first learned…

The claimants assert that the government failed to pursue this forfeiture with sufficient diligence, and that notwithstanding ERISA, the government could have commenced its action in 1996, the time that the parties agree the government first learned of the pension funds and alleged money laundering offense. 12 We recognize that civil forfeiture is closely related to admiralty law, and “[i]t is settled that a suit may sometimes be brought in admiralty before the cause of acti…

See Patricia Hayes Assocs., Inc., 339 F.3d at 82-83 (noting a case where “the district court declined to dismiss a claim that was premature when filed but certain to mature shortly (ie., within a matter of hours)”); Greenwich Marine, Inc., 339 F.2d at 905 (“[t]he prematurity objection has been ignored only in isolated situations under peculiar factual circumstances”).

See, e.g., Patricia Hayes Associates, Inc. v. Cammell Laird Holdings, 339 F.3d 76 , 80 (2d Cir. 2003).