Graves v. City Of Coeur D'alene (2003)

Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 838–39 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here a defendant does not object to an improperly-filed Rule 50(b) motion, and does not raise the issue of default for failure to abide Rule 50(a) before the trial court, then the procedural flaw in the Rule 50(b) motion is waived . . . .”), abrogation on other grounds recognized in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 885 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 572 (3d Cir. 1997) (ci…

Such a refusal may only be considered when the police have already observed, before asking for permission to search, facts sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425 , 435 n.32 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The mere fact that a person refuses to consent to search cannot be used as evidence in support of reasonable suspicion.”); cf. Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 842 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]hat [the suspect] refused to cons…

Such a refusal may only be considered when the police have already observed, before asking for permission to search, facts sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425 , 435 n.32 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The mere fact that a person refuses to consent to search cannot be used as evidence in support of reasonable suspicion.”); cf. Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 842 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]hat [the suspect] refused to cons…

Id. at 845-46.

These cases make clear that whether Bishop’s arrest for obstructing an officer was lawful depends on whether the frisk itself was lawful. 11 See Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho at 16-17 , 27 P.3d at 875-76 ; Graves, 339 F.3d at 841.

Instead, the Court is limited to analyzing whether “the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence,” Graves, 339 F.3d at 839.

See Graves, 339 F.3d at 844 (“the heart of our probable cause assessment [is] consideration of evidence supporting individualized suspicion”) (original emphasis).

Graves, 339 F.3d at 848; Redman, 942 F.2d at 1447 .

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 838-39. (9th Cir.2003) (holding that when a party does not raise its opponent’s failure to abide by Rule 50(a) in district court, on appeal, the procedural flaw in the Rule 50(b) motion is waived), abrogated on other grounds by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

Id.; see also Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 848 n.25 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The qualified immunity defense recognizes that officers make probable cause assessments in the field under pressure and therefore affords the officer leeway, permitting a reasonable mistake without resulting individual liability of the officer, when the law is not clearly established.”) 2.

See, e.g., Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 841 (9th Cir.2003) ("Probable cause means more than a bare suspicion ... but less than absolute certainty that [a] search will be fruitful."); United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir.1999) ("the requisite `fair probability' is something more than a bare suspicion, but need not reach the fifty percent mark."); United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.1983) (upholding a search of a suspect's residen…

See C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005 , 1022 n.12 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 838–39 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogation on other grounds recognized in OTR Wheel Eng’g, Inc. v. W.

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 838–39 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that when a party does not raise its opponent’s failure to abide by Rule 50(a) in district court, on appeal, the procedural flaw in the Rule 50(b) motion is waived), abrogated on other grounds by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

See Graves v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 845 n. 23 (9th Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 841-45 (9th Cir.2003) (officer lacked probable cause to search backpack where suspect was protesting parade held by group known for violence; threats had been made suggesting that violence would take place during parade; protester had heavy backpack that appeared to contain objects shaped like pipe bombs; officer was aware of prior bombing caused by backpack bomb; and protester became increasingly loud during confrontation …

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 838-39 (9th Cir.2003); Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Group Prop.

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 838-39 (9th Cir.2003) (finding that parties waived their challenge to a Rule 50(b) motion where they failed to raise it until the appeal), abrogated in part on other grounds by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

See Graves, 339 F.3d at 846 n. 24; see also Beier, 354 F.3d at 1068-69 .

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 848 (9th Cir.2003) (supervising officers can be held liable under section 1983 only if they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights).

See Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 848 (9th Cir.2003) (supervising officers can be held hable under section 1983 only if they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights) (quotations omitted).

Id.; see also Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 848 n. 25 (9th Cir.2003) ("The qualified immunity defense recognizes that officers make probable cause assessments in the field under pressure and therefore affords the officer leeway, permitting a reasonable mistake without resulting individual liability of the officer, when the law is not clearly established.") 2.

Instead, supervisors can be held liable under § 1983 “only if they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id.; see also Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 848 (9th Cir.2003).

Instead, supervisors can be held liable under § 1983 "only if they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights." Id.; see also Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 848 (9th Cir.2003).

See Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 846 n. 23 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that we may affirm the district court on "any ground supported by the record").

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 846 n. 23 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that we may affirm the district court on “any ground supported by the record”).

See Graves v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 846 n. 23 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that we may affirm the district court on “any ground supported by the record”).

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 845, n.23 (9th Cir. 2003). ¶26 While we narrowly apply immunity because it is the exception, not the rule, Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 93 Ariz. 384, 392 (1963), Arizona law supports qualified immunity for the discretionary decisions made by a school district superintendent in the scope of his job responsibilities.

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 841 (9th Cir.2003), abrogation on other grounds recognized by C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.2014) (finding that refusal “to consent to a search cannot be a basis for the arrest unless [the officer] had a right to search” independent of the refusal); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1439 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that refusal to consent to a search “could not serve as a basis for finding criminal intent”);…

See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828 , 846 (9th Cir.2003); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 , 121 S.Ct. 2151 .