Abdur-Rahman v. Walker (2009)

See Abdur-Rahman, 567 F.3d at 1284 (“We have consistently discredited narrow, rigid descriptions of official duties urged upon us to support an inference that public employees spoke as private citizens.”). 6 IV.

Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 ).

But Bott’s speech was made in her role as an employee because it wholly “owes its existence to . . . [her] professional duties.” See Abdur–Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 ).

Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 2009).

To determine whether the speech at issue was made in the employee’s role as a citizen or an employee, we make a practical inquiry into whether the speech “owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional duties.” Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir.2009) (quotations omitted).

Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (11th Cir.2009).

See Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir.2010); Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir.2009); see also Mpoy Reply Br. 2 ("[T]he Court's inquiry should be a practical one, seeking clues from *293 the context of Mr. Mpoy’s speech.” (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 )). 3 .

Abdur-Rah-man v. Walker; 567 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (11th Cir.2009).

Reviewing this decision de novo, accepting as true the facts alleged, and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to Mid-South, see Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (11th Cir.2009), we reverse because Mid-South’s allegations implicate an exception to the statute of frauds applicable when one party has performed under the unsigned contract and the other party has accepted that performance.

The practical inquiry asks whether the speech “owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional responsibilities.” Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir.2009) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 , 126 S.Ct. at 1960 ).

“We review de novo a district court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings, accepting the facts in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (11th Cir.2009). 1 On appeal, Plaintiff maintains that he demonstrated in his complaint that Defendants were unentitled to immunity.

The district court granted Defendants’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint because Wilcox’s allegations were not actionable under section 1983. 3 “We review de novo a district court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings, accepting the facts in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (11th Cir.2009).

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 , 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir.2009).

See Abdur-Rahman, 567 F.3d at 1283 (“Instead, to determine whether a statement receives First Amendment protection ... we look to the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).

To determine whether Plaintiff’s speech is entitled to protection, the Supreme Court has held that the “controlling factor” is whether the public employee’s statements “were made pursuant to his official duties.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006); Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2009).

Several factors are relevant in assessing whether a plaintiff spoke as a public employee or a private citizen, including “whether the speech occurs in the workplace” and “whether the speech concerns the subject matter of the employee’s job.” , 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2009); , 898 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Our cases have identified, among others, these considerations as relevant in determining whether a public employee spoke pursuant to his official duties: (1…

However, “[Supreme Court] precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.” Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 , 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006)).

The critical question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of the employee’s duties, not merely whether it concerns those duties.” Lane, 573 U.S. at 240. “[S]peech made pursuant to an employee’s job duties” is “speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities” and is “a product that ‘the employer itself has commissioned or created.’” Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting …

Ala. 2018) (“[A]s the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly found, an employee who makes internal reports regarding mismanagement and fraud generally speaks pursuant to her professional duties rather than as a citizen.”) (citing Alves, 804 F.3d at 1164-65 (11th Cir. 2015), Abdur- Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009), and Phillips v. City of Dawsonville, 499 F.3d 1239, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that even though reporting financial misconduct was not an enu…

Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009).

The Eleventh Circuit, quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25, first reasoned that “formal job descriptions ‘often bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform’” and instead applied a “functional review.” Id. at 1164 (citing Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009)).

See, e.g. , id. at 1164-65 (finding that a memorandum detailing repeated mismanagement of a student health center was not citizen speech because it represented an internal report of conduct interfering with the authors' job responsibilities); Abdur-Rahman , 567 F.3d at 1285 (explaining that "[s]peech that owes its existence to the official duties of public employees is not citizen speech even if those duties can be described so narrowly as not to mandate the act of speaking"…

There are other factors to consider with respect to the individual speech acts: the critiques were made in the context of completing a -mandatory part of Keller’s training program; the rebuttals were prepared at the direction of a supe rior officer; the conversations with Lewis and Haddon, though perhaps not strictly part of Keller’s duties, were the type of on-the-job, job-related exchanges that “cannot reasonably be divorced from [job] responsibilities,” Alves, 804 F.3d at…

“When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir.2009).

Under Garcetti “[t]he central inquiry is whether the speech at issue ‘owes its existence’ to the employee’s professional responsibilities.” Moss, 782 F.3d at 618 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 , 126 S.Ct. at 1960 ); see Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir.2009); Boyce, 510 F.3d at 1342.

See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir.2009).

See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[P]ublic employees ‘retain some possibility of” constitutional protection when they “make public statements . . . .” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423–24)).

See Abdur-Rahman , 567 F.3d at 1280 , 1283-84 ; Alves , 804 F.3d at 1161 , 1164-65 ; Moss , 782 F.3d at 618 -20 .

In complaining to her superiors at work about how time was allotted, she was speaking as an employee, and when a government employee speaks as an employee “there can be no First Amendment issue, and the constitutional inquiry ends.” Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir.2007); see also Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir.2009) (holding that “the reports of the inspectors to their supervisors about sewer overflows they were required to investigate a…

See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir.2009) (noting that an employee may speak pursuant to his official duties even when his duties do not mandate the particular speech at issue); Battle, 468 F.3d at 761 n. 6 (identifying the relevant issue as whether a public employee was speaking pursuant to an official duty, not whether that duty was part of the employee’s everyday job functions).

See 547 U.S. at 420-21 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 ; accord Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2009).

See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir.2009).

See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282-86 (11th Cir.2009); Boyce, 510 F.3d at 1344-45 ; and Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Georgia, 468 F.3d 755, 761-62 (11th Cir.2006).

See 547 U.S. at 420-21 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 ; accord Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir.2009).

Compare Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.2009) (compliance inspectors for public works department who complained to supervisors about improper reporting of sewer overflows to state authorities and over flow related violations of environmental laws spoke pursuant to job duties and *1299 not as citizens); D’Angelo v. School Board of Polk County, Florida, 497 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir.2007) (statements made by principal in connection with effort to convert school to ch…

See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that the subject of speech is a relevant but not determinative factor).

See 547 U.S. at 420-21 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 ; accord Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir.2009).