Ahearn v. Jackson Hospital Corporation (2003)

Servs., Inc. 551 F. App’x 825, 830 (6th Cir. 2014); see Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 237 (“[F]act-finding is inappropriate in the context of a district court’s consideration of a 10(j) petition.”).

Even when reasonable cause has been established, however, the proposed injunc-tive relief also must be “just and proper.” Aheam, 351 F.3d at 239.

See also Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 235 (“If the current 10(j) standard were in clear contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it seems unlikely that this or any other circuit would have continued to adhere to it for two decades without concern.”); Webco, 225 F.3d at 1137 (“[W]e will not reconsider this circuit’s longstanding Angle [v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir.1967) ] two-part test in favor of a traditional equitable analysis.”).

We have rejected several requests to adopt these alternative standards, stating that the “‘reasonable cause/just and proper’ standard may only be overruled by this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court.” Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 235; see McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 875 F.3d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 2017); Glasser, 379 F. App’x at 485 n.2.

Id. at 235.

Mich. Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 250 F.3d 962, 969 (6th Cir.2001)). 2 *486 Ahearn establishes as well that the director’s obligation to show reasonable cause is a “relatively insubstantial” burden that “requires only that the Board’s legal theory underlying the allegations of unfair labor practices be ‘substantial and not frivolous’ and that the facts of the case be consistent with the Board’s legal theory.” Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 237 (citations omitted).

Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir.2004); Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 237.

Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 238; see also Paulsen v. Remington Lodging & Hosp., LLC, 773 F.3d 462, 471 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding reasonable cause and stating that (i) court was “required to defer to the regional director’s judgment” as to finding that employee “had been discharged as a consequence of her support for union organizing” and that (ii) ALJ’s finding of violation “reinforces that conclusion”). “[I]t is not the job of the district court, in considering a § 10(j) petition, to…

In applying the “reasonable cause/ just and proper” standard, “fact-finding is inappropriate.” Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 237.

See Gottfried, 472 F. Supp. at 1166 (explaining need for injunctive relief including reinstatement despite respondent’s pending offer of reinstatement, stating: “When a company’s action creates an atmosphere inhospitable to union adherents[,] they may be reluctant to once again subject themselves to those conditions.”); Ahearn, 351 F.3d at 239.

The testimony provided here mirrors that in Ahearn where “the employees stopped wearing union buttons, spoke in hushed tones about union activities, and feared reprisal.” 351 F.3d at 239.

Ahea rn v. Jackson Hospital Corp., 351 F.3d 226, 234 (6th Cir.2003).

Corp., 351 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir.2003) (procedural history).

Corp., 351 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2003) (procedural history).

Indeed, fact-finding is inappropriate in the context of a district court’s consideration of a 10(j) petition. 351 F.3d at 237 (additional citations omitted).