Cluster 785213 (2004)

We reasoned that, in light of the procedural circumstances of the case, the appeal was essentially our only opportunity to address the issue because "only in the most convoluted and improbable of hypotheticals will the jurisdictional issue presented here ever make its way to this Court on appeal from a final decision.” Id. at 321 (footnote omitted); see id. at 321-22 ("As a procedural matter, now is this Court's only opportunity to pass on the issue.").

Hodge, 359 F.3d at 318-19 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

See Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 325, 45 V.I. 738 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The United States Attorney’s word is enough; the reviewing court does not consider the truth of the certification.”).

As we recently explained, “an appeal of a nonfinal order will he if (1) the order from which the appellant appeals conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) the order resolves an important issue that is completely separate from the merits of the dispute; and (3) the order is *398 effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir.2004) (quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Ci…

Our jurisdiction to review orders of the Virgin Islands District Court lies under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c), but "our cases have uniformly held that 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) has the same requirements for appealability as 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir.2004). 3 .

Id. at 318.

See Gov’t of V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 325 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The United States Attorney’s word is enough; the reviewing court does not consider the truth of the certification.”).

Gourmet Gallery Crown Bay, Inc., 68 V.1. at 596 (citing Enrietto, 49 V.1. at 319-20; Hodge, 359 F.3d at 320).

See United States v. Whitlock, 639 F.3d 26 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “neither prisoners nor ‘persons convicted of crimes' 27 constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes”); see also Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 28 359 F.3d 312 , 326 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court has not announced that the status 1 of ‘criminal defendant’ is a suspect classification[.]”).

V.I. v. Hodge, 45 V.I. 738 , 359 F.3d 312 , 323 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We exercise plenary review in determining whether a court hierarchically below us had subject matter jurisdiction.”).

See Gov't of Virgin Is. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 325 & n. 13 (3d Cir.2004) (holding that jurisdiction was proper based on the filing of the certification); United States v. Centracchio, 236 F.3d 812, 813 (7th Cir.2001) ("We therefore treat as conclusive of our jurisdiction over a [§ 3731] appeal the submission of the certification required by the statute."); United States v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that "appellate jurisdiction is proper if the gove…

See Gov’t of V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 317 (3d Cir. 2004). 9 We will exercise plenary review over the constitutional question presented in this appeal.

See Gov’t of Virgin Is. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 325 & n.13 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that jurisdiction was proper based on the filing of the certification); United States v. Centracchio, 236 F.3d 812, 813 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We therefore treat as con- clusive of our jurisdiction over a [§ 3731] appeal the submis- sion of the certification required by the statute.”); United States v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that “appellate jurisdiction is proper if th…

See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 320 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that we retain jurisdiction to review the limited question 2 Neither party suggests, nor do we discern, any basis for invoking appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.

See Gov't of V.I. v. Hodge , 359 F.3d 312 , 323 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting its peculiarity but recognizing Congress intended the system of review).

See also Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 322 (3d Cir.2004) (“Questions of original jurisdiction are always automatically before this Court on appellate review.”).

See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 316 (3d Cir.2004) (describing the Virgin Islands court system in existence at the time). .

See Gov’t of V.I. v. Hodge, 45 V.I. 738 , 359 F.3d 312 , 317 (3d Cir. 2004).

See Gov’t of the VI. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 318-19 (3d Cir.2004).

Collateral Order Doctrine Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521-22 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. We recently had occasion to discuss the 229, 233 (1945))); see also Gov’t of V.I. v. collateral order doctrine in Gov’t of V.I. v. Rivera, 333 F.3d 143, 150 (3d Cir. 2003) Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 319 (3d Cir. 2004): (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233).

See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 323 (3d Cir.2004) (discussing the “two-tier appellate review as of right” from the Appellate Division, and stating that “Congress ... has granted litigants an appeal as of right [to the Third Circuit] from the Appellate Division”).

See, e.g., Gov’t of the V.I. v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 320-21, 45 V.I. 738 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that former section 39, which governed appeals by the government, is ambiguous, and interpreting it in light of 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a)); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Blake, 118 F.3d 972, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Warner, 48 F.3d 688, 692 , 31 V.I. 373 (3d Cir. 1995) (relying on 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) to expand Appellate Division’s jurisdiction over appeals by crimin…