Lillbask v. State of Connecticut Department of Education (2005)

This rule “applies only in exceptional situations” where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Id. at 85 (cleaned up).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A plaintiff must point to something more in the record to lift th[e] possibility [of repetition] beyond the speculative.”).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d 2 Cir. 2005) (internation quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mauclaire v. Connecticut Department of Education, 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire v. State of Connecticut Department of Education, 397 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying Arizonans for Official English to reject that a “general claim for ‘other such relief as the Court deems appropriate’ is sufficiently expansive to include” the only relief that would render the case not moot); WildEarth Guardians v. Pub.

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire, 397 F.3d at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mauclaire, 397 F.3d at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Conn. Citizens Def.

Mauclaire v. State of Connecticut 15 Department of Education, 397 F.3d 77 , 86 n.4 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Lillbask") ("a child remains 16 eligible for a [FAPE] under IDEA until his 22nd birthday"). 17 By statute, Connecticut law provides that, in accordance with Board 18 regulations, local and regional boards of education are required to "[p]rovide special -5- 1 education for school-age children requiring special education," but that that 2 "obligation . . . shall terminate when s…

See Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 82 (“[T]he due weight we ordinarily must give to the state administrative proceedings is not implicated with respect to issues of law, such as the proper interpretation of the federal statute and its requirements.”) (quotation marks, ellipses, and alteration omitted).

Mauclaire, 397 F.3d at 90, of any request for or reference to “damages”—an omission that stands in stark contrast to the detail of plaintiff’s requests for declaratory judgment and injunctive orders, see Second Am.

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding no deference due to SRO’s finding that SRO lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate parent’s claims).

But “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘recognized an exception to the general rule regarding mootness . . . in cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. at 84-85 (alteration omitted) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)).

However the Second Circuit has cautioned that the mere possibility that a student will be subject to the same placement as that proposed in a prior IEP is insufficient to satisfy the exception to mootness, as such possibility “exists in the case of every disabled child who is presently in a mainstream classroom and for whom a new IEP must be prepared annually.” Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 88.

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dept. of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 , 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (“When the issues in dispute between the parties are no longer live, a case becomes moot, and the court—whether trial, appellate, or Supreme— loses jurisdiction over the suit, which therefore must be dismissed”) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) and Russman v. Board of Educ., 260 F.3d 114 , 118–19 (2d Cir. 2001)) (cleaned up).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dept. of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 , 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (“When the issues in dispute between the parties are no longer live, a case becomes moot, and the court—whether trial, appellate, or Supreme—loses jurisdiction over the suit, which therefore must be dismissed”) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) and Russman v. Board of Educ., 260 F.3d 114 , 118–19 (2d Cir. 2001)) (cleaned up).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2005) (alterations omitted) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding claim mooted by repeal of offending portion of statute because no indication of plan to reinstate repealed portion) (collecting cases); Lamar Advert. of Penn., LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Mindful of the deference to the legislative body, we are hesitant to hold that a significant amendment or repeal of a challenged provision that obviates the plaintiff’s…

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 91 (2d Cir. 2005)).) They contend that the change in DOH policy coincided with “the changed circumstances surrounding COVID-19 and federal vaccination recommendations,” and that consequently, it is “merely speculative” that State Defendants would enforce a rule like Section 2.61 again.

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire, 397 F.3d at 85.

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire,397 F.3d at 82; Muller on Behalf of Muller v. Committee on Special Educ.

M.M. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114 , 1122 (2d Cir. 1997) and Lillbask , 397 F.3d at 93-94).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 , 88 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A plaintiff must point to something more in the record to lift that possibility beyond the speculative.”).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005).

LLC, 2021 WL 4538640 , at *1 (holding that “[a] defendant satisfies its burden [of demonstrating that a challenge is moot] where it shows that the possibility of recurrence is merely ‘speculative’”) (citing Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 88 (2d Cir. 2005))).

On “issues of law,” however, “such as the proper interpretation of the federal statute and its requirements, courts owe no deference to state hearing officers.” Id. (quoting Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 82) (internal quotations omitted).

See id.; Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 82; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 ; M.H., 685 F.3d at 240 .

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dept. of Educ., 397 F.3d at 77, 84- 85 (2d Cir. 2005)(quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)(per curiam)(alteration in original))(internal quotation marks omitted).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114 , 1122 (2d Cir. 1997) (alteration omitted)). “[A]s a general matter, when an IHO and SRO reach conflicting conclusions, [courts should] defer to the final decision of the state authorities, that is, the SRO’s decision” unless the SRO’s decision “is insufficiently reasoned to merit that deference and the IHO’s decision is more thorough and careful…

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir.2005)). 22.

“As courts in this circuit have observed, a motion for summary judgment in an IDEA case often triggers more than an inquiry into possible disputed issues of fact . . . . [r]ather, the motion serves as a ‘pragmatic procedural mechanism’ for reviewing a state’s compliance with the procedures set forth in IDEA and determining whether the challenged IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id. (collecting cases). “[A] motion for summary …

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2005).

Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).

The Second Circuit has repeatedly declined to apply the “capable of repetition” exception when an injury’s recurrence “is not reasonably likely but, at best, only a theoretical and speculative possibility.” Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 86 (emphasis in original); see Russman v. Bd. of Educ. of Enlarged City Sch.

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Gagliardo v. Arlington Central School Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007) (the reviewing court’s factual determinations must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.) Here, the parties dispute whether the SRO erred in determining two questions of law: (1) whether a Parent’s unilateral placement in an institution other than the previously agreed-upon placement 3 Defendant concedes tha…

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t. of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 , 86 n.4 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We have interpreted the word ‘inclusive,’ in this provision, to indicate that a child remains eligible for a free appropriate education under IDEA until his 22nd birthday.”); St.

Mauclaire v. State of Conn. Dep’t. of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 , 86 n.4 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We have interpreted the word ‘inclusive,’ in this provision, to indicate that a child remains eligible for a free appropriate education under IDEA until his 22nd birthday.”); St.