Mosby v. Ligon (2005)

Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars cases brought by state-court losers who complain of injuries by state- court judgments rendered before district court proceedings commenced and invite district court to review and reject those judgments); Mosby, 418 F.3d at 932 (where plaintiff failed to raise, but could have raised, constitutional claims before state court, district court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine to consider them).

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

In fact, Encompass’s brief goes so far as to say that “[n]one of the actions of the district court are at issue.” But when a case is removed from state court to federal court, and proceeds to final judgment, the state court’s orders entered before removal “are merged into the final judgment [of the federal court] and may be reviewed on appeal whether or not the district court elects to reexamine them after removal.” Reilly v. Waukesha Cnty., 993 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th Cir. 199…

Plaintiffs seeking prospective relief based on past actions must show “a real and immediate threat that [they] would again suffer similar injury in the future.” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-56 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (holding that criminal defendants could not mount a facial challenge to a statute that had been constitutionally applied at their trial); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 , 24-25, 80 S.Ct. 519 , 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882-83 (4th Cir. 2013); Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005).

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir.2005).

Upon de novo review, see Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir.2005) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo), we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Reviewing de novo, see Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir.2005), we conclude that dismissal was proper, because Rasidescu alleged insufficient facts to establish diversity or federal-question jurisdiction.

See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (noting that under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “[a] state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts, but a statute or rule governing the decision may be challenged in a federal action”); Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 646 (emphasizing that Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only if the claimed injury was caused by the state court judgment); Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927 , 932 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We agree that the Rooker-Feldman d…

Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 , 104 S.Ct. 2839 , 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984))); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 , 161 n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 1717 , 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (finding, in dicta, unnecessary to decide whether “to relax the general prudential rule that a litigant ‘must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties’ ”) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 ) (emphasis added); Mosby, …

See Park, 205 F.3d at 1037 ; Mosby, 418 F.3d at 933.

“The doctrine bars federal courts from hearing cases brought by the losing parties in state court proceedings alleging ‘injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.’ ” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005); see also D.C.

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Kvalvog v. Park Christian Sch., Inc., 66 F.4th 1147, 1152 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005)).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Kvalvog v. Park Christian Sch., Inc., 66 F.4th 1147 , 1152 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005)).

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, ‘with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.’” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003)).

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005).

Tex. 2024) (although the plaintiff’s 9 request for “a declaratory judgment that the Texas vexatious litigant statute is 10 unconstitutional on its face” was not precluded because “Rooker-Feldman . . . does not bar 11 facial challenges,” the request was still subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because 12 “[a]ll of Jones’s allegations stem from the vexatious litigant statute’s application to him”). 13 See also Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Mosb…

Servs., 959 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2020)) (quoting Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005)) (cleaned up); see also Lambros v. United States, No. 19- CV-1870 (MJD/ECW), 2020 WL 5505909 , at *8 (D.

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005).

See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927 , 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The Rooker—Feldman doctrine provides that, ‘with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.’”) (quoting Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546 , 548 (8th Cir. 2003)).

See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991) (“It is not the usual judicial practice, . . . nor do we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily—that is, before it is determined that the statute would be valid as applied.”); Mosby, 418 F.3d at 933 (finding no standing for attorney to bring facial challenge to the rules of professional conduct without also challenging their application to herself).

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003)).

“The Rooker-Feldman7 doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Kvalvog v. Park Christian School, Inc., 66 F.4th 1147, 1152 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005)).

Servs., 959 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2005)).

DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, ‘with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.’” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003)).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) The Rooker–Feldman doctrine provides that, “with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) The Rooker–Feldman doctrine provides that, “with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted).

Rooker-Feldman prohibits this Court from deciding “challenges to state court judgments and state proceedings.” Mosby, 418 F.3d at 931.

See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 , 352–53 (2006) (“A plaintiff must have standing for each claim it raises.”); Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927 , 932–33 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Litigants must satisfy ‘normal requirements’ of Article III standing even when bringing facial challenges.”).

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005); see D.C.

Although Plaintiffs' amended complaint also seeks damages, a facial challenge is "necessarily directed at the statute itself and [the remedy] must be injunctive and declaratory." Ezell v. City of Chicago , 651 F.3d 684 , 698 (7th Cir. 2011) ; cf. Mosby , 418 F.3d at 932-33 (equating a litigant bringing a facial challenge to one seeking declaratory or injunctive relief).

As they live in New Jersey, the individual plaintiffs are no longer subject to Minnesota’s 8 Although Plaintiffs’ amended complaint also seeks damages, a facial challenge is “necessarily directed at the statute itself and [the remedy] must be injunctive and declaratory.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir. 2011); cf. Mosby, 418 F.3d at 932-33 (equating a litigant bringing a facial challenge to one seeking declaratory or injunctive relief). laws.

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2005); Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2005).

Though plaintiffs must still satisfy the "normal requirements” of standing even when bringing facial challenges, Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 932-33 (8th Cir.2005), standing is determined at the time the complaint is filed.

Because the parties have not addressed the Younger abstention issue in this case and because post-disciplinary challenges to professional rules of conduct may, in limited circumstances, be properly brought before a federal district court, see Mosby, 418 F.3d at 932, the court finds that issues may need to be determined in federal court after the state disbarment proceedings conclude.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, except for habeas corpus petitions, “lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted).

See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005); Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med.

See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (Under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, “with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.”’) (internal quotation omitted).

See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927 , 931 (8th Cir. 2005).

See Mosby, 418 F.3d at 931–32 (holding Rooker-Feldman divested the federal district court of jurisdiction over a state disciplinary committee ruling where that ruling was subject to review by that Arkansas Supreme Court).

See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005); Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med.

See Kvalvog v. Park Christian Sch., Inc., 66 F.4th 1147, 1152 (8th Cir. 2023) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments.”) (quoting Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005)).

See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts generally lack subject matter jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.) (citing Rooker v. Fid.