United States v. Lionel Reifler, Glenn B. Laken, John M. Black, Jr. (2006)

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 127 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Lazarenko, 624 F.3d at 1251 (“Congress could not have intended that result.

The court then multiplied the two figures, resulting in an intended gain of $75,650. 2 The methodology employed by the district court in this case is virtually identical to the methodology approved by the Second Circuit in United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 108 (2d Cir. 2006).

This includes background evidence, which can be admitted “to enable the jury to understand the complete story of the crimes charged.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

See Reifler, 446 F.3d at 87 (“In assessing [an] error’s likely impact . . . the strength of the prosecution’s case is probably the single most critical factor’”) (quoting Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162 , 1167–68 (2d 10 Cir. 1994)); United States v. Rolle, 631 F. App’x 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A]ny error was harmless in light of the overall strength of the governmentʹs case.”); United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 , 136‐37 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, …

See United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he defendant need not have completed or succeeded in his scheme to defraud . . . .”).

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006). 2.

Furthermore, affirmance is appropriate “so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury might fairly have concluded guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Klein, 913 F.3d at 78 (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 94 (2d Cir. 2006)). 11 A. Special Sentencing Factor Finding Against Torres Torres argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Suazo’s murder was related to the activities of the enterprise because Suazo was also a membe…

Separately, an order of restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which may be awarded only in the amount of losses proximately caused by a defendant’s conduct, see United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 115 (2d Cir. 2006), is reviewed “deferentially, and we will reverse only for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2013).

The Doma-related testimony thus “provide[d] background for the events alleged in the indictment,” and “enable[d] the jury to understand the complete story of the crimes charged” and “how the illegal relationship between [coconspirators] developed.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

A court must "defer to the jury's determination of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and to the jury's choice of the competing inferences that can be drawn from the evidence." Klein, 913 F.3d at 78 (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 94 (2d Cir. 2006)).

“To prove that the defendant acted with . . . specific intent [to aid and abet a crime], the government must show that he knew of the crime; but it need not show that he knew all the details of the crime, so long as the evidence shows that he joined the venture, that he shared in it, and that his efforts contributed towards its success.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Meeting this burden, however, does not require the government to establish that the defendant “knew all of the details of the crime” but only “that he ‘joined the venture, that he shared in it, and that his efforts contributed towards its success.’” Huezo, 546 F.3d at 179 -80 (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2006)) (alteration omitted).

“Where there are challenges to the court’s findings of fact, we review for clear error; insofar as the order rests on interpretations of law, we review those interpretations de novo.” Id. (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006)).

“Section 3663A(a)(1) does not authorize the court to order a defendant to pay restitution to any person who was not a victim of the offense of which the defendant was convicted.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 121 (2d Cir. 2006).

Where we find an abuse of discretion, “vacatur is required unless we are ‘convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Where we find an abuse of discretion, “vacatur is required unless we are ‘convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006)). 2 In determining whether an erroneous admission was harmless, we consider: “(1) the overall strength of the prosecutor’s case; (2) the prosecutor’s conduct with respect to the improperly admitted evidence; (3) the…

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 135 (2d Cir. 2006).10 When interpreting the MVRA, we have clarified that “a misstatement or omission” is the “proximate cause” of an investment loss for the purposes of imposing restitution, “if the risk that caused the loss was within the zone of risk concealed by the misrepresentations and omissions alleged by a disappointed investor.” United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omi…

Where we find an abuse of discretion, “vacatur is required unless we are ‘convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Benton argues that we cannot approve the district court’s order, as it “has the effect of treating coconspirators as ‘victims,’ and thereby requires ‘restitutionary’ payments to the perpetrators of the offense of conviction.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 127 (2d Cir. 2006).

In challenging the jury’s verdict, a Rule 29 movant “bears a heavy burden.” Martoma, 894 F.3d at 72 .1 A reviewing court must “credit[] every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor,” id., and “affirm the conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury might fairly have concluded guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 94 (2d Cir. 2006).

In challenging the jury’s verdict, a Rule 29 movant “bears a heavy burden.” Martoma, 894 F.3d at 72 .1 A reviewing court must “credit[] every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor,” id., and “affirm the conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury might fairly have concluded guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 94 (2d Cir. 2006).

See Reifler , 446 F.3d at 87 ("In assessing [an] error's likely impact ... the strength of the prosecution's case is probably the single most critical factor' ") (quoting Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162 , 1167-68 (2d Cir. 1994) ); United States v. Rolle , 631 F. App'x 17 , 21 (2d Cir. 2015) ("[A]ny error was harmless in light of the overall strength of the government's case."); United States v. Gupta , 747 F.3d 111 , 136-37 (2d Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Miller , 626 F.3d 68…

An order of restitution should not be granted that ʺhas the effect of treating coconspirators as ʹvictims,ʹ and thereby requires ʹrestitutionaryʹ payments to the perpetrators of the offense of conviction,ʺ United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 127 (2d Cir. ‐ 8 ‐ 2006), but restitution ʺmay not be denied simply because the victim had greedy or dishonest motives, where those intentions were not in pari materia with those of the defendant,ʺ United States v. Ojeikere, 545 F.3d …

“Where there are challenges to the court’s findings of fact, we review for clear error; insofar as the order rests on interpretations of law, We review those interpretations de novo.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006).

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006).

Union discussion in United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir.2006), and joining three sister circuits in concluding that “judicial factfinding to determine the appropriate amount of restitution under a statute that does not prescribe a maximum does not implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights” (collecting cases)).

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir.2006).

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir.2006).

The sentencing court need only “make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 107 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

MVRA”); United States v. Lazarenko, 624 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that “in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a co-conspirator cannot recover restitution for crimes in which he or she participates”); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 127 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that “any order entered under the MVRA that has the effect of treating coconspirators as ‘victims,’ and thereby requires ‘restitutionary’ payments *368 to the perpetrators of the offense of co…

United 10 States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006).

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir.2006).

United States v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 408, 420 (5th Cir.2014) (quoting United States v. Read, 710 F.3d 219, 231 (5th Cir.2012)); accord United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 1149-51 (9th Cir.2013) (holding Apprendi does not apply to restitution); United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 731-32 (4th Cir.2012) (same); United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 403-04 (1st Cir.2006) (same); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 114-20 (2d Cir.2006) (same); Dohrmann v. United States…

The court did not treat the co-conspirators as "victims” in a restitutionary sense, as was deemed improper in United States v. Lazarenko, 624 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (9th Cir.2010), and United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 127 (2d Cir.2006).

United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120-21 (2d Cir.2006).

Cf. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding Crawford error harmless given the “discerning nature of the verdicts” and the jury’s “differentiation” between defendants and evidence).

Cf. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 90 (2d Cir.2006) (finding Crawford error harmless given the “discerning nature of the verdicts” and the jury’s “differentiation” between defendants and evidence).

True, the Ngs “act[ed] with knowledge that the use of the [mails] w[ould] follow in the ordinary course of business.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir.2006) (citation omitted).

See also Reifler, 446 F.3d at 135 (“the district court cannot properly order restitution under the MVRA unless the victim’s harm resulted from the offense of conviction, including, with respect to a conspiracy offense, the defendant’s conduct in the course of the conspiracy”).

In United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2006), one of the defendants, Lionel Reifler, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and commercial bribery, and two counts of commercial bribery.

In United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.2006), one of the defendants, Lionel Reifler, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and commercial bribery, and two counts of commercial bribery.

To establish that a defendant acted with the requisite specific intent to aid and abet the underlying crime, “the prosecution must prove the defendant knew of the proposed crime — suspicion that it might occur is not enough — and had an interest in furthering it.” United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir.1996); see also Reifler, 446 F.3d at 96 (“To prove that the defendant acted with that specific intent, the government must show that he knew of the crime ....”).

“The strength of the prosecution's case, however, ‘is probably the single most critical factor.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006)).

“The strength of the prosecution’s case, however, ‘is probably the single most critical factor.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006)). 2.

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) provides “that in sentencing a defendant convicted of a felony committed through fraud or deceit, the court must order the defendant to pay restitution to any identifiable person directly and proximately harmed by the offense of conviction.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 113 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2)).

Of the four factors, “[t]he strength of the prosecution's case is probably the single most critical factor.” United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162 , 1167–68 (2d Cir.1994)).

Next, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a “scheme to defraud,” meaning conduct that is “designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.” [Dkt. 58 at 39](citing United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 95 (2d Cir. 2006)).

As a result, that payment constitutes a restitution payment for all relevant intents and purposes. . 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (f)(1)(A); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 134 (2d Cir. 2006). .

See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 380 n. 2, 125 S.Ct. 1766 (noting, in discussing a case that interpreted the term "property” in the mail fraud statute, that the Supreme Court has "construed identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari material ”); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 , 25 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 316 , 98 L.Ed.2d 275 (1987) (noting, in analyzing whether “money or property” was the object of a scheme, that “[t]he mail and wire fraud státutes share the…

Accord United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2013) (Apprendi inapplicable to restitution); United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1215-18 (7th Cir. 2012) (same), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 2797 (2013); United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 402-04 (1st Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 114, 118-20 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 336…