Cluster 794635 (2006)

But see Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (remanding analysis of firm resettlement rule applied to petitioner from Fiji, who resettled in Canada, and was ordered removed to Fiji).

For instance, “an alien may have an ‘offer’ if the alien is entitled to permanent resettlement and all that remains in the process is for the alien to complete some ministerial act.” Id. at 977 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“[A] third country’s offer of permanent resettlement may consist of providing a defined class of aliens a process through which they are entitled to claim permanent refuge.”) (quoting Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2004)).

We must uphold the BIA’s finding of firm resettlement “if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, and we will reverse only if a reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to reach a different conclusion.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Under Maharaj and Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 2011), the BIA should have focused directly on whether the government had met its burden of 'showing that [Haghighatpour] had an offer of some type of official status permitting him to reside in [Germany] indefinitely.' Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added).

Under Maharaj and Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A.2011), the BIA should have focused directly on whether the government had met its burden of “showing that [Haghighatpour] had an offer of some type of official status permitting him to reside in [Germany] indefinitely.” Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added).

“This burden can be met by direct evidence of an offer of some type of permanent resettlement.” Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 976.

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

The government “bears the initial burden of showing that the government of the third country issued to the alien a formal offer of some type of official status permitting the alien to reside in that country indefinitely.” Su Hwa She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2006)).

FIRM RESETTLEMENT FINDING The government has not presented direct evidence that Austria issued Singh “a formal offer of some type of official status permitting the alien to reside in that country indefinitely,” nor has the government shown “that direct evidence of a formal offer is unobtainable.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc).

If the government establishes firm resettlement, the burden shifts to the alien to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the nature of his stay and ties was too tenuous ... for [her] to be firmly resettled.” Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 969, 976-77; Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir.1998) (“A duration of residence in a third country sufficient to support an inference of permanent resettlement in the absence of evidence to the contrary shifts the burden of proving a…

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). 1.

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (arguments not raised in a petition are waived); see also Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding issues raised but not supported by argument in a pro se petitioner’s brief waived).

On remand, the agency should reassess whether the government met its burden to show that an offer of permanent resettlement existed pursuant to Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976-78 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), and, if necessary, whether Belay has shown that either of the firm resettlement exceptions apply, see Aden, 989 F.3d at 1079-82 . 3 3.

The government satisfied its burden of showing that Louis received “an offer of some 3 type of permanent resettlement,” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), based on Louis’s testimony that he had permanent status, and a written communication from the Brazilian government to that effect.

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).2 Under substantial evidence review, we uphold factual determinations that are “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).

First, the government has the “initial burden of showing that the government of the third country issued to the alien a formal offer of some type of official status permitting the alien to reside in that country indefinitely.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

We must uphold the agency’s factual findings “‘if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,’ and we will reverse only if a reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to reach a different conclusion.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).

First, the government has the “initial burden of showing that the government of the third country issued to the alien a formal offer of some type of official status permitting the alien to reside in that country indefinitely.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) bears the initial burden of showing “an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 ).

See, e.g., Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379, 394-98 (6th Cir. 2014); Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 610-12 (8th Cir. 2004).

See Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229, 231, 233 (2d Cir.2006) (noting, in the context of an asylum claim by a person firmly resettled in a third country prior to entering the United States, that asylum is for those with nowhere else to turn); Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 989 (9th Cir.2006) (O’Scann-lain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (condemning “country-shopping” by a petitioner who had a pending asylum appeal in a third country before entering the Unite…

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 964 (9th Cir.2006).

See Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 647-50, 654-55 (9th Cir.2000) (taking judicial notice of events surrounding the May 2000 coup), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734 (9th Cir.2009); see also Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (9th Cir.2009); Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 965-66 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc).

See Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 647-50, 654-55 (9th Cir.2000) (taking judicial notice of events surrounding the May 2000 coup), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734 (9th Cir.2009); see also Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (9th Cir.2009); Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 965-66 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc).

Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 , 109 S.Ct. 1597 , 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (noting, under the common-law, that “domicile is established by physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there”); Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (deeming an alien’s “intent to remain” in a foreign country relevant to whether he meets the immigration law’s ban on asylum for those who ar…

Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holy- field, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) (noting, under the common-law, that “domicile is established by physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there”); Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (deeming an alien’s “intent to remain” in a foreign country relevant to whether he meets the immigration law’s ban on asylum for those who are “firmly resettled”); Nelson v…

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 973 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that, under 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 , the government bears the burden of proving firm resettlement, either through direct evidence of an offer for permanent resettlement or through circumstantial evidence triggering a presumption of permanent resettlement).

Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 974-75 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). 2 Here, it is undisputed that France issued the petitioners residence cards that were valid for eleven years.

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d at 971-72 (“Unfortunately, the BIA has not revisited firm resettlement in a published opinion since Soleimani was decided in 1989 under a different, discretionary regime.”).16 We now (...continued) with the intention to remain, had a pending asylum application, and had two siblings residing there. 15 The Sixth Circuit also noted that the declaration by Danish authorities that they were not obligated to accept the alien into their country did…

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In other words, an alien may have an ‘offer’ if the alien is entitled to permanent resettlement and all that remains in the process is for the alien to complete some ministerial act.”).

Furthermore, the Refugee Act was enacted to further the “historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands . . . . [and] it is the policy of the United States to encourage all nations to provide assistance and resettlement opportunities to refugees to the fullest extent possible.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 983 (9th Cir. 2006)(O’Scannlain, J. concurring in part)(citing Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citation omitted).

See Maharaj v. Gonzalez, 450 F.3d 961 , 967 (9th Cir. 2006); Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674 , 677–79 (9th Cir. 2004). 2 2009).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

See id. (the noncitizen must “show that the nature of his stay and ties was too tenuous, or the conditions of his residence too restricted, for him to be firmly resettled.” (quoting Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961 , 976–77 (9th Cir. 2006))).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 2 Petitioners contest the IJ’s statement that “the tenor of the [Petitioners’] declaration . . . suggests that [it] was created or edited by a person with an eye toward assisting the respondents in obtaining asylum in the United States.” Because the Petitioners did not disclose a preparer, the IJ found the preparation of the application “casts doubt upon the bona fides of the past persecution claim and the…

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the petitioner’s failure to challenge an issue in his opening brief waived appeal on that issue).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (noting that we review a firm resettlement determination for substantial evidence).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 2006).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc).

Instead, the regulation asks only whether the person has received “an offer” of some type of permanent status. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 ; see Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (holding that, in determining whether a petitioner has firmly resettled, “[t]he focus ... remains on receipt of an offer of permanent resettlement”).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 975 (9th Cir.2006) (explaining that “firm resettlement” requires “an offer of some type of permanent resettlement).” We therefore remand to the Board to correct the legal error made by the IJ.

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (holding that a finding of firm resettlement is reviewed for substantial evidence).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir.2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 .

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir.2006).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir .2006) (en bane) (holding that the government bears the initial burden of producing evidence that a third country offered the applicant “some type of permanent resettlement” or evidence “[a] third country officially sanction[ed] the alien’s indefinite presence”).

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (collecting cases where firm resettlement found). 1 Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of Bustillo-Fuentes’ withholding of removal claim because his experiences in El Salvador — including discriminatory firings, the mysterious death of a former boyfriend, and harassment by two off-duty police officers — do not rise to the level of past persecution.