United States v. Arnold Richards, III (2006)

Furthermore, finding that we are bound by the United States Supreme Court ruling in Almendárez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), and our own precedent in United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 905 , 127 S.Ct. 2097 , 167 L.Ed.2d 816 (2007), we affirm Charlton’s sentence.

Apprendi, however, is not the Court's controlling precedent on the question of when a prior conviction may be used to enhance a defendant's sentence. "[T]he Supreme Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), fairly construed, established that a sentencing enhancement may be grounded on prior criminal convictions neither separately charged - 24 - nor proven to a jury." United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir. 2006).

See, e.g., Eirby, 515 F.3d at 38 ; United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 45-47 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 264-65 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Sherwood, 156 F.3d 219, 222 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Meader, 118 F.3d 876, 884 (1st Cir.1997).

See, e.g., Eirby, 515 F.3d at 38 ; United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 45-47 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 264-65 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2 The Supreme Court recently asked for new briefing on whether the ACCA's parallel residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.

United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262-63 (1st Cir.2006).

That argument is “hopeless.” United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006).

United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 905 , 127 S.Ct. 2097 , 167 L.Ed.2d 816 (2007).

See United States v. Teague, 469 F.3d 205, 208 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262-63 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir.2004).

As defendant candidly recognizes, his challenge to consideration of his prior conviction on the ground that it was neither admitted, charged in the indictment, nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt is currently “hopeless.” United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d *712 350 (1998)), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2097 , 167 L.Ed.2d 816 (2007).

See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006).

In United States v. Richards, for example, we held that unlawful sexual contact offenses against children under fourteen by a person at least three years older under Maine law are violent felonies under the ACCA. 456 F.3d 260, 264-65 (1st Cir 2006), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2097 , 167 L.Ed.2d 816 (2007).

Other Claims of Error Appellant’s argument that the government must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a conviction that is used as a sentencing predicate has now been rejected repeatedly by this court, see, e.g., Miller, 478 F.3d at 52 ; United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006), and no more need be said on that issue.

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2007) [No. 05- 2763, slip op. at 4]; United States v. Bennett, 469 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 104-05 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 , 520 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 928 (2007).

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 478 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Bennett, 469 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 104-05 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 , 520 (1st Cir.2006) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 928 , 166 L.Ed.2d 715 (2007).

See, e.g., Roberson, 459 F.3d at 55 n. 11; United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 , 520 (1st Cir.2006) (en banc).

However, sentencing enhancements “may be grounded on prior criminal convictions neither separately chargéd nor [proved] to a jury.” United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998)); see also Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 2160 n. 1, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court recognized in AlmendarezTorres that prior convictio…

Thus, “if a violation of the statute underlying the prior conviction necessarily involves every element of a [crime of violence], the mere fact of conviction establishes that the putative predicate offense was a [crime of violence].” United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 263 (1 Cir., 2006) (applying categorical approach under ACCA).

See United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262 (1st Cir.2006).

See United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 263 (1st Cir.2006).

See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599-603 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 ; see also United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262-63 (1st Cir.2006).

See United States v. Rickards, 456 F.3d 260, 262-63 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)).

See United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262-63 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990)) (discussing the term “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act).