Deu Thapa v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States (2006)

The degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the others; “more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C.Cir. 2009); Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006), we have continued to use the Ruiz I test.

Having now become subject to a final order of removal, see Thapa v. Gonzalez, 460 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n order of voluntary departure that includes an alternate order of removal is a final order subject to judicial review.”), the Moras petition for review of the BIA’s decision denying their applications for adjustment of status.

The stay factors are a “sliding scale” in which “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006).

Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotations and alterations omitted); accord U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Triaxx Asset Mgmt.

“The Second Circuit has ‘treated these [four factors] somewhat like a sliding scale, citing approvingly other circuits’ formulation that . . . more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.’” In re Endi Plaza, 2026 WL 189891 , at *1 (alteration in original) (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)).

The Second Circuit has “treated these [four factors] somewhat like a sliding scale, citing approvingly other circuits’ formulation that . . . more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The Second Circuit has “treated these [four factors] somewhat like a sliding scale, citing approvingly other circuits’ formulation that . . . more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The Second Circuit evaluates these factors on a sliding scale, finding that “[t]he necessary level or degree of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).

Daspin, $ 57 F. App’x 46 , 48 @d Cir, 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)). □ apply the Nken factors below, addressing likelihood of success on the merits last since the degree to which Lalama Gomez must make that showing is determined by the balance of the remaining factors, see infra p. 5.

The Second Circuit explained that it has “treated these [four factors] somewhat like a sliding scale, citing approvingly other circuits’ formulation that . . . more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also In re GMC, 409 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr.

AMERICAS (NEW YORK, DELAWARE, MIAMI, SAN FRANCISCO, SAO PAULO, WASHINGTON DC) APAG (HONG KONG, SEOUL, SHANGHAI), CARIBBEAN (BVI, CAYMAN ISLANDS), EMEA (CYPRUS, DUBAI, LONDON, TEL Aviv) Page 2 Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). “[T]he degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning that ‘more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.’” Id. (quotation marks omitted; brackets in original) (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Further, the factors are a “sliding scale” in which “the necessary level or degree of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

While “[t]he first two factors are the most critical,” id., the Second Circuit has also held that “these criteria [are] somewhat like a sliding scale,” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006). “[T]he probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff will suffer absent the stay.

Specifically, the “‘probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff will suffer absent the stay.’” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mohammed y.

The stay factors are a “sliding scale” in which “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, this Court “will follow the Second Circuit’s practice of weighing the factors.” Id.; see, e.g., Antonyuk v. Hochul, No. 22-2908, 2022 WL 18228317 , at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 2022) (granting motion for stay pending appeal after “[h]aving weighed the applicable factors”); Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have treated the[] criteria [governing applications to stay pending appeal] somewhat like a sliding scale[.]”).

In doing so, the Court will apply the factors “somewhat like a sliding scale . . . ‘more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.’” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2002)).

Moreover, the “probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff will suffer absent the stay.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (alterations in Thapa) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court applies the same standard here, and will balance those factors “somewhat like a sliding scale . . . more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

In doing so, the Court will apply the factors “somewhat like a sliding scale . . . more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

The four factors operate as a “sliding scale” where “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court's assessment of the other stay factors . . . [and] [t]he probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff will suffer absent the stay.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

The four factors operate as a “sliding scale” where “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court's assessment of the other stay factors . . . [and] [t]he probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff will suffer absent the stay.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007), in turn quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)).

While “[t]he first two factors are the most critical,” New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 2020), “[t]he Second Circuit has held that these criteria should be applied ‘somewhat like a sliding scale . . . more of one excuses less of the other.’” In re Platinum Partners, 2018 WL 3207119 , at *3 (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)). “[A] stay is not a matter of right . . . rather, a stay is an exercise of judicial discret…

“The Second Circuit has held that these criteria should be applied ‘somewhat like a sliding scale . . . more of one excuses less of the other.’” Id. (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

The Second Circuit evaluates these factors on a sliding scale, finding that “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006). 4 “The probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff[] will suffer absent the stay.

“The Second Circuit has held that these criteria should be applied ‘somewhat like a sliding scale . . . more of one excuses less of the other.’” Id. (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006), in turn quoting, Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)).

The degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the others; “more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

While “[t]he first two factors are the most critical,” New York v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 5495530 , at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 11, 2020), “[t]he Second Circuit has held that these criteria should be applied ‘somewhat like a sliding scale . . . more of one excuses less of the other.’” In re Platinum Partners, 2018 WL 3207119 , at *3 (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (first alteration added)). “[A] stay is not a matter …

“The degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning that ‘more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.’” Id. (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)).

“The degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning that ‘more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.’” Id. (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)).

The Second Circuit evaluates these factors on a sliding scale, finding that “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006).

Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006).

In weighing these factors, courts should adopt “a sliding scale,” such that “the necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration and some quotation marks omitted).

Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 609 (2013) (“It is a basic tenet that regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated.” (quotation omitted)); Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[The Court] cannot uphold a regulation that is inconsistent with both the plain meaning and purpose of the statute.”).

Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 2d 502, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rakoff, J.) (citing Thapa v. Gonzalez, 460 F.3d 323, 334-35 (2d Cir. 2006).

July 29, 2015) (citing Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2006)).

The Second Circuit has held that the factors should be evaluated on a “sliding scale” and that “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay factors.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006)).

These factors operate as a “sliding scale” where “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other stay fac tors ... [and] [t]he probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff will suffer absent the stay.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006) (citation omitted).

Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d at 170 (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006)). .

To the contrary, the Second Circuit emphasized certain differences between voluntary departure and removal, noting that voluntary departure allows aliens "to put their affairs in order without fear of being taken into custody at any time.” Id. at 328 (quotation omitted). 19 .

A stay is proper, for example, where the plaintiff can “demonstrate! ] some possibility of success and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in his favor.” Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 335 (2d Cir.2004).

In considering these factors, “the degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning that “ ‘more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.’ ” ” Id. (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95 , 101 (2d Cir.2002))).