Cincinnati Women's Services, Inc. v. Robert Taft (2006)

We have said that the test is “more conceptual than mathematical.” Taft, 468 F.3d at 374.

We have said that the test is “more conceptual than mathematical.” Taft, 468 F.3d at 374.

In that case, a panel of this court interpreted Casey to require that courts “determine whether a large fraction of the women ‘for whom the law is a restriction’ will be ‘deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the [government] has outlawed abortion in all cases.’” Cincinnati Women’s Services, 468 F.3d at 370 (emphasis added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 894 ).

See id. at 374 (“[T]he term ‘large fraction,’ which, in a way, is more conceptual than mathematical, envisions something more than the 12 out of 100 women identified here.”); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1459-63 (8th Cir.1995) (holding parental notification laws unduly burdened a “large fraction” without attempting to quantify the number of minors affected by provision; treating “substantial obstacle” as the “possibility of such obstruction…

Although our precedent includes mathematical applications, see Taft, 468 F.3d at 372-73 (holding that 12.5% is not a large fraction), our commonplace approach has been to treat the large-fraction test as “more conceptual than mathematical,” id. at 374; see also Baird, 438 F.3d at 606 ; Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 193-97.

Although our precedent includes mathematical applications, see Taft, 468 F.3d at 372-73 (holding that 12.5% is not a large fraction), our commonplace approach has been to treat the large-fraction test as “more conceptual than mathematical,” id. at 374; see also Baird, 438 F.3d at 606 ; Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 193-97.

Side Women's Clinic v. Newman , 305 F.3d 684 , 700 (7th Cir. 2002) (Coffey, J., concurring) (stating that a reduction of 10% to 13% in the number of abortions was not a large fraction and that a statute is impermissible only when the restrictions are " severe " and " lead to 'significant' reductions in abortion rates ' "). 70 Cincinnati Women's , 468 F.3d at 373-74 (emphasis added) (noting that "[t]o date, no circuit has found an abortion restriction to be unconstitutional u…

See id. (“[T]he term ‘large fraction,’ which, in a way, is more conceptual than mathematical, envisions, something more than the 12 out of 100 women identified here.”).

The Sixth Circuit held that Single-Petition Rule was facially unconstitutional under Casey because it “act[ed] as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to an abortion in a large fraction of the cases in which the single petition [was] relevant.” Cincinnati Women’s Servs., 468 F.3d at 370.

Id. at 369-71.

See Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft , 468 F.3d 361 , 374 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he term 'large fraction,' which, in a way, is more conceptual than mathematical, envisions something more than the 12 out of 100 women identified here.").

See Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 370 (6th Cir.2006); Planned Parenthood of N. New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

See Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 368-69 (6th Cir.2006) (reviewing cases from nine other circuits).

See Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 367-69 (6th Cir.2006) (citing cases).

See Cincinnati Women’s Servs. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 373–74 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding Ohio’s waiting period because plaintiffs could not satisfy the “large-fraction test”); A Woman’s Choice-E.

Even if a law regulating abortion is unconstitutional in some applications, the law remains facially valid so long as it does not impose an undue burden “in a large fraction of the cases in which [the regulation] is relevant.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 ; accord Cincinnati Women’s Servs., 468 F.3d at 369. 4.

See Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. Taft , 468 F.3d 361 , 372-74 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a 24-hour waiting period mandated by Ohio law not an undue burden); A Woman's Choice-E.

See Taft, 468 F.3d at 373 ("[I]n [Women's Medical Professional Corp. v.] Voinovich [ 130 F.3d 187 , 201( 6th Cir. 1997)], a large fraction was found because all women upon whom the restriction actually operated — i.e., women seeking second-trimester pre-viability abortions — would effectively be barred from exercising,their constitutional right to obtain an abortion.

See, e.g., Cincinnati Women's Ser., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 373 (6th Cir. 9 2006) (finding law requiring an in-person meeting with a physician at least 24-hours prior to the 10 abortion for informed consent purposes did not pose an undue burden); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 11 446, 483-88 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that requirement of a face-to-face meeting between the 12 attending physician and the woman 24 hours before the abortion procedure was not facially an 13 undue b…

See Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 372–74 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a 24-hour waiting period mandated by Ohio law not an undue burden); A Woman’s Choice–E.

See Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 372–74 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a 24-hour waiting period mandated by Ohio law not an undue burden); A Woman’s Choice–E.

However, the Fifth Circuit — standing alone — has required plaintiffs facially challenging an abortion restriction to prove that .“no possible application of the challenged law would be constitutional.” Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 588-89 (5th Cir.2014) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)); see also Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 368 (6th Ci…

See Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir.2006); A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.2002); Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F.Supp.2d 451 (W.D.Ky.2000); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir.1999); Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt, 844 F.Supp. 1482 (D.Utah 1994), rev’d in part and dismissing appeal in part, 75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.1995); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 860 F.Supp. 1409 (D.S.D.1994); Fargo…

To prevail on these claims, Plaintiff “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged policies] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); see also, Cincinnati Women’s Services, Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 , 368 (6th Cir.2006).