United States v. Coplan (2012)

Moreover, even if there were flaws in the analogy, Appellants do not meet their “heavy burden” of showing that the prosecutor’s misstatement was “so severe and significant as to result in the denial of [the] right to a fair trial.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). “[T]he Government has broad latitude in the inferences it may reasonably suggest to the jury during summation.” Id. at 87 (quotations omitted).

According to Atilla, § 371 incorporates the common law definition of “to defraud” – “to deprive another of property rights by dishonest means.” Id. at 58 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 2012)).

The Jury Charge Ritz-Craft’s final argument is that the district court’s jury charge prejudiced Ritz-Craft because it included an overview of the Centrellas’ factual allegations against Ritz-Craft and failed to state that the Centrellas still had claims pending against Mountain View. “[W]e review a properly preserved claim of error regarding jury instructions de novo, reversing only where, viewing the charge as a whole, there was a prejudicial error.” United States v. Coplan…

More specifically, we have explained that, “[n]otwithstanding [certain] infirmities in the history and deployment of the statute,” Section 371 should be broadly interpreted to reach “any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government,” and “is not confined to fraud as that term has been defined in the common law.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citati…

We will grant one only when “the misconduct alleged [is] so severe and significant as to result in the denial of [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Whitten, 610 F.3d at 202 (“We will reverse on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct only if that misconduct caused substantial prejudice by so infecting the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting convi…

The district court, citing United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161 , 166–67 (1st Cir. 2004), and United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 79 (2d Cir. 2012), went a step further to hold that materiality was also an essential conduct element.

In making this determination, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). 12 Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that McIntosh possessed the required intent to …

Mack also insists that the Government failed to prove 5 that the relevant predicate acts were committed in furtherance of Nine Trey, 6 “rather than [drug] deals between two individuals that had nothing to do with 7 the [gang],” id. at 40 , or “[violence] in furtherance of a much smaller, 8 independently-operating group of [gang] members,” id. at 24 . 9 “[W]e will uphold the judgments of conviction if any rational trier of fact 10 could have found the essential elements of th…

A defendant seeking to overturn a conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient “bears a heavy burden.” United 1In quotations from caselaw, this summary order omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations, and accepts all alterations, unless otherwise noted. 3 States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012).

United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 79 (2d Cir. 2012).

In particular, Kidd contends that the government demonstrated only that he and his accomplice tried to steal marijuana from Jonathan Johnson, not that they actually did so. 11 A defendant contesting the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The government “has broad latitude in the inferences it may reasonably suggest to the jury during summation.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 87 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 342 F.3d 168, 181 (2d Cir. 2003)).

Nevertheless, we have explained that “a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that led to his conviction at trial bears a heavy burden as the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The movant “bears a heavy burden,” as “the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)).

However, “[t]he Government has broad latitude in the inferences it may reasonably suggest to the jury during summation.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 87 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2021). “[A] defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that led to his conviction at trial bears a heavy burden, as the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden,” as this standard of review is “exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 Here, there was ample evidence from which a rational jury could find that Belfiore unlawfully prescribed oxycodone to Martin. 1 The record demonstrates that Belfiore was aware that Martin struggled with alcoholism and of the risks that oxycodone po…

See United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Pinkerton is not a broad principle of vicarious liability . . . .

Government’s Summation Booth next argues that the Government’s remarks during summation warranted a mistrial because the Government improperly (1) referred to evidence to be presented by a co-defendant, Jerome Austin, who was set to but ultimately did not testify as a Government witness; (2) suggested that Booth held a leadership role in the scheme; and (3) referred to Booth by an alias that he did not use. “[T]he Government has broad latitude in the inferences it may reason…

We decline to do so. “[A] defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that led to his conviction at trial bears a heavy burden, as the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden,” as this standard of review is “exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Still, we have said that “a defendant asserting that a prosecutor’s remarks warrant a new trial faces a heavy burden, because the misconduct alleged must be so severe and significant as to result in the denial of his right to a fair trial.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 87 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, “[f]or a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, a District Court must make an individualized assessment when determining whether to impose a special condition of supervised release, and . . . state on the record the reason for imposing it.” Eaglin, 913 F.3d at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 92 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A district court commits procedural error where it . . . fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”).

“In considering whether inappropriate remarks rise to the level of prejudicial error, we examine ‘the severity of the misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct.’” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 2011)).

We will look for additional “substantial contacts” when “the defendant argues that his prosecution in the contested district will result in a hardship to him, prejudice him, or undermine the fairness of his trial.” Rutigliano, 790 F.3d at 399 (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir. 2012)).

Because the “principles 12 governing admissibility of evidence do not change on a motion for summary 13 judgment,” Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997), we review the 14 district court’s decision to exclude evidence as hearsay for abuse of discretion, 15 United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). “[O]nly admissible evidence 16 need be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary 17 judgment,” and a “district court deciding a su…

Sufficiency of the evidence “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence . . . at trial bears a heavy burden, as the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Sufficiency of the evidence This Court “review[s] preserved claims of insufficiency of the evidence de novo.” United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence . . . at trial bears a heavy burden, as the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 78 (2d Cir. 2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 (a)(1)-(3).

P. 29(c)(2). "[A] defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 'bears a heavy burden.'" United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)).

We will uphold the conviction if “any 4 rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 5 doubt.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 6 U.S. 307 , 319 (1979)). 7 In this case, sufficient evidence supported the Defendants-Appellants’ convictions for 8 retaliation murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513 (a)(1)(B), 1513(a)(2)(A), 2 and 3551 et seq.

We remain mindful that “the government is entitled to prove its case solely through circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9Indeed, because the officers had probable cause based on the undisputed facts, and because the discrepancies raised in Breslin’s affidavit did not contradict these facts, a warrant was not actually required.

The official acts the government relied upon are all proper “official acts” under the standard set forth in McDonnell, 69 upon United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 65 marks omitted). 66 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 67 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

No. 17-684. 60United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Fed.

In doing so we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” United States v. Caplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We will uphold the conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Coplon, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We will uphold the conviction if “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 2 doubt.’” United States v. Coplon, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 1.

P. 29(a). “[A] defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence ‘bears a heavy burden,’ and ‘the standard of review is exceedingly deferential.’” United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)).

United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012).

Conscious avoidance instructions are permissible only when the defendant mounts a 11 defense that he lacked “some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction” and “a rational 12 juror may reach the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high 13 probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.” United States v. 14 Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2012, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 819 (2013) (“[T]o prove a Klein conspiracy, the Government must show (1) that the defendant entered into an agreement (2) to obstruct a lawful function of the Government (3) by deceitful or dishonest means and (4) at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.”) (quotations and alterations omitted).

Although we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, United States v. Khalil, 857 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2017), the challenger "bears a heavy burden," United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2010)), and our review is "exceedingly deferential," id (quoting United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)). 19The filing of the concurrence should not be construed as disagr…

In evaluating the trial record, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's 7 favor, and deferring to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence." United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012).

They argue that the government was required to prove that they were ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for at least one month that they received benefits in order to establish violations of section 641. “[W]e will uphold the judgments of conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on each count of conviction. 4 4 Because each of the conspiracy convictions was predicated on substantive counts for which there was sufficient evidence, we need not reach the issue of whether there was also sufficient evidence to support so-called “Klein” conspiracies to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 , by “obstruct[ing]…

The Defendants next challenge two jury instructions issued by the district court, only one of which they objected to at trial. “[W]e review a properly preserved claim of error regarding jury instructions de novo,” but we will reverse “only where, viewing the charge as a whole, there was a prejudicial error.’” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 87 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Sufficiency of the Evidence 8 Davenport and Tanner maintain that there was insufficient evidence to 9 convict them of honest services wire fraud or of violating the Travel Act. 10 Although challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction are 11 reviewed de novo, the challenger “bears a heavy burden” because our review “is 12 exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) 13 (quotation marks omitted).

Our review is therefore “exceedingly deferential,” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), and we must affirm a defendant’s conviction “if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” Babilonia, 854 F.3d at 174 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

See, e.g., Blazic v. Henderson, 900 F.2d 534, 541 (2d Cir. 1990) (“For an erroneous state jury charge to result in a federal constitutional deprivation, ‘the ailing instruction by itself [must have] so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.”’ (quotingCupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,147 (1973)); c.f., United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 87 (2d Cir. 2012)(“A defendant challenging a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instru…