State v. Meade (1998)

Vondehn, 348 Or at 472 ; see Joslin, 332 Or at 380 (noting that protection against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, “extends to custodial interrogations, because of the inherent level of coercion that exists in such interrogations”); Meade, 327 Or at 339 (court “has recognized that a level of coercion is inherent in any custodial setting”); State v. Brewton, 247 Or 241, 244 , 422 P2d 581 , cert den, 387 US 943 (1967) (recognizing “the inherently coer…

See Meade, 327 Or at 339 (“When a suspect in police custody makes an unequivocal request to talk to a lawyer, all police questioning must cease.”); State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 54 , 913 P2d 308 (1996) (same).

Vondehn, 348 Or at 472 ; see Joslin, 332 Or at 380 (noting that protection against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, sec- tion 12, “extends to custodial interrogations, because of the inherent level of coercion that exists in such interroga- tions”); Meade, 327 Or at 339 (court “has recognized that a level of coercion is inherent in any custodial setting”); State v. Brewton, 247 Or 241, 244 , 422 P2d 581 , cert den, 387 US 943 (1967) (recognizing “the inherently …

See State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 340 , 963 P2d 656 (1998) (“[A] suspect’s own actions may, in a given case, eliminate any need for clarification by the officers.”).

See Meade, 327 Or at 339 (“When the request is equivocal, however, the police may follow up with questions intended to clarify whether the suspect meant to invoke his right to counsel.”).

As has been noted, “courts have developed no sim- ple, clear test for determining whether a suspect’s oral ref- erence to a need for legal advice during a police interview amounts to an invocation of the right to counsel.” Meade, 327 Or at 344 (Durham, J., dissenting).

Meade, 327 Or at 340-42 (describing two-step inquiry); see also Edwards, 451 US at 486 n 9 (whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence has occurred is assessed “under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities”).

State v. Meade, 963 P.2d 656, 660 (Or. 1998).

See State v. James, 339 Or 476 , 480 n 2, 123 P3d 251 (2005) (describing constitutional responses); Meade, 327 Or at 339-40 (same); State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 54 , 913 P2d 308 (1996) (same).

The full extent of the court’s discussion of the rationale for that rule has been to state that, when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, warnings are necessary “ ‘because of the inherent level of coercion that exists in such interrogations.’ ” State v. Scott, 343 Or 195, 200 , 166 P3d 528 (2007) (quoting State v. Joslin, 332 Or 373, 380 , 29 P3d 1112 (2001)); see also State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 339 , 963 P2d 656 (1998).

See State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 341-42 , 963 P2d 656 (1998) (even without a prior vio- lation, affirmative waiver immediately following adminis- tration of Miranda warnings was “significant” to conclusion that the defendant validly waived his rights).

See State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 339 , 963 P2d 656 (1998) (stating that, in the case of an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel where the police have followed up with clarifying questions, “the suspect may thereafter waive the right to have counsel present during that * * * interrogation” (emphasis added)). 6 We conclude below that defendant, at the very least, made an equivocal invocation of counsel, and the officers failed to clarify his intent.

See Meade , 327 Or. at 340 , 963 P.2d 656 (officers did not need to ask clarifying questions because suspect's own conduct clarified his intent).

App. 362 , 149 P.3d 1234 (2006) (observing that the phrase "will I have an opportunity to call an attorney" was ambiguous because it "may express a present desire to do something, or it may simply be intended to explore one's options" (referencing State v. Charboneau , 323 Or. 38 , 913 P.2d 308 (1996) ); see also Meade , 327 Or. at 348 n. 10, 963 P.2d 656 (Durham, J., dissenting) (observing that the case law surrounding invocations of the right to counsel tends to use "ambig…

See Meade , 327 Or. at 340 , 963 P.2d 656 .

See State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 339 , 963 P2d 656 (1998) (right to assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation arises out of Article I, section 12, right against self-incrimination); see generally State v. Randant, 341 Or 64, 70 , 136 P3d 1113 (2006), cert den, 549 US 1227 (2007) *400 (discussing and comparing right to counsel as derived from both Article I, sections 11 and 12, of Oregon Constitution).

See Meade, 327 Or at 340 .

See State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 341 , 963 P2d 656 (1998) (suspect who has made equivocal request for counsel thereafter may *174 waive right to have counsel present during that or later interrogation).

See Meade, 327 Or at 339 .

See, e.g., Meade, 327 Or at 339 (discussing rights afforded under Article I, section 12, including derivative right to assistance of counsel, in context of pre-arrest custodial interrogation); State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7-8 , 791 P2d 836 (1990) (discussing requirement of Miranda-like warnings under Article I, section 12, in context of pre-arrest custodial setting).